nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2024‒05‒27
seven papers chosen by
Yves Oytana, Université de Franche-Comté


  1. Religiosity and Crime: Evidence from a City-Wide Shock By Lee, Wang-Sheng; Khalil, Umair; Johnston, David W.
  2. Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets By Brian Love; Yassine Lefouili; Christian Helmers
  3. The effect of lawful crossing on unlawful crossing at the US southwest border By Michael A. Clemens
  4. The Role of Public Security Reforms on Violent Crime Dynamics By Souza, Danilo; Maciel, Mateus
  5. Harnessing nearshoring opportunities in Mexico by boosting productivity and fighting climate change By Alberto González Pandiella; Alessandro Maravalle
  6. How Do People React to Income-Based Fines? Evidence from Speeding Tickets Discontinuities By Martti Kaila
  7. The Social Cost of Blockchain: Externalities, Allocation of Property Rights, and the Role of the Law By Martino, Edoardo D; Ringe, W. Georg

  1. By: Lee, Wang-Sheng (Monash University); Khalil, Umair (Deakin University); Johnston, David W. (Monash University)
    Abstract: This paper estimates the impacts of religiosity on criminal activity using a city-wide shock to religious sentiment from a 2015 Papal visit. Using daily data on all reported offences between 2010 and 2015 in Philadelphia at the census tract level and a difference-in-differences approach, we demonstrate significant reductions in less serious crimes in the week of the visit and for several weeks following. Reductions are particularly pronounced for drug offences and in historically Christian areas. Notably, similar crime effects are not found for President Obama's 2015 visit, suggesting changes in police deployment do not drive results.
    Keywords: economics of religion, deviant behavior, crime
    JEL: D74 I25
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16933&r=law
  2. By: Brian Love (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Yassine Lefouili (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Christian Helmers (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: To what extent and with what effect do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) "hold-up" companies that produce standard-compliant products? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic patent licensing behaviors using detailed information collected from the dockets of U.S. patent cases filed (2010-2019) to enforce SEPs and a matched sample of non-SEPs. Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the patent enforcer in approximately 77% of SEP and 65% of non-SEP assertions in court. The figures mask important heterogeneity. There is significantly more opportunistic conduct aimed at increasing a potential licensee's loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court: 35% of SEP assertions vs. 10% of non-SEP assertions. In contrast, conduct that increases a potential licensee's litigation costs is less common and the difference between SEP assertions (8%) and non-SEP assertions (6%) is small. We also show that opportunistic behavior is associated with case outcomes, with the effect on settlement depending on the type of opportunistic behavior. Behavior that increases a potential licensee's litigation costs is associated with an increase in the probability of settlement, while behavior that increases a potential licensee's loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court is negatively associated with settlement.
    Keywords: Litigation, Standards, Patents, Holdup, U.S
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04547832&r=law
  3. By: Michael A. Clemens (Peterson Institute for International Economics)
    Abstract: Legal and illegal markets often coexist. In theory, marginal legalization can either substitute for the remaining parallel market, or complement it via scale effects. I study migrants crossing without prior authorization at the US southwest border, where large-scale unlawful crossing coexists with substantial, varying, and policy-constrained lawful crossing. I test whether lawful and unlawful crossing are gross substitutes or complements, using lag-augmented local projections to analyze a monthly time-series on the full universe of 10, 658, 497 inadmissible migrants encountered from October 2011 through July 2023. Expanded lawful crossings cause reduced unlawful crossings, an effect that grows over time and reaches elasticity -0.3 after approximately 10 months. That is, in this case, expanded activity on the lawful market substitutes for the parallel market, even net of scale effects. This deterrent effect explains approximately 9 percent of the overall variance in unlawful crossings. In an ancillary finding, I fail to reject a null effect of depenalizing unlawful crossings on future attempted unlawful crossings.
    Keywords: Labor Mobility, Immigrant Workers, International Migration, Illegal Behavior, Enforcement of Law
    JEL: F22 J61 K42
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp24-10&r=law
  4. By: Souza, Danilo; Maciel, Mateus
    Abstract: In the context of increasing violence, public security reforms are commonly advocated as a solution to the problem despite the lack of empirical evidence. We address this question by evaluating the effect of the Pacto pela Vida program, a comprehensive reform on the public security of the state of Pernambuco, Brazil. We document a reduction of 16 homicides per 100, 000 inhabitants following the program implementation. We show that a reduction in crimes occurring on the streets and associated with young males and firearm availability are likely to have contributed to the program’s effect.
    Keywords: crime, reform, policy evaluation, Brazil
    JEL: H7
    Date: 2024–03–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120653&r=law
  5. By: Alberto González Pandiella; Alessandro Maravalle
    Abstract: Mexico has large potential to boost its productivity and attract investment from companies looking to relocate their operations to North America. It also has an historic opportunity to spread the benefits of trade throughout the country, integrate SMEs more forcefully into value chains and to create more and better value chain linkages. Nearshoring is also an opportunity to step up efforts to address and mitigate climate change. Fully realising these opportunities will require addressing long standing challenges related to transport and digital connectivity, regulations, the rule of law, renewable energy and water scarcity.
    Keywords: Competition, Digitalization, Logistics, Nearshoring, Productivity, renewables, Rule of Law, Trade, Water
    JEL: B27 K42 L41 L96 Q4 Q25
    Date: 2024–05–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1799-en&r=law
  6. By: Martti Kaila
    Abstract: This paper studies the impact of income-based criminal punishments on crime. In Finland, speeding tickets become income-dependent if the driver’s speed exceeds the speeding limit by more than 20 km/h, leading to a substantial jump in the size of the speeding ticket. Contrary to predictions of a traditional Becker model, individuals do not bunch below the fine hike. Instead, the speeding distributions are smooth at the cutoff. However, I demonstrate that the size of the realized speeding ticket has sizable but short-lived impacts on reoffending ex-post. I use a regression discontinuity design to show that fines that are 200 euros larger decrease reoffending by 15 percent in the following six months. After 12 months, the effect disappears. My empirical results are consistent with an explanation that people operate under information frictions. To illustrate this, I construct a Becker model with misperception and learning that can explain all the empirical findings.
    Keywords: deterrence, learning, optimization frictions, regression discontinuity design, income-based fines
    JEL: K40 K42 D83
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11064&r=law
  7. By: Martino, Edoardo D; Ringe, W. Georg
    Abstract: In the past decade, the legal and economic literature on blockchain technology and its applications has flourished. This new technology holds great promise for enhancing the efficiency of contracting. Building on the classic Coase theorem, blockchain as a decentralised mechanism of decision-making should be superior to centralised regulation, possibly yielding substantial efficiency gains. Notably, it also has the potential to improve the allocation of property rights and reduce transaction costs. However, many of these enthusiastic views about what blockchain technology may bring are overblown. This article demonstrates that blockchain creates a variety of new externalities, which cannot be addressed by the decentralised actors using it. The most obvious of them is the environmental externality stemming from the energy-intensive mining process. In addition, more immediate externalities emerge, for example through the operational and legal risks of being part of a blockchain transaction, which are particularly evident in the crypto economy. Moreover, issues surrounding blockchain governance may exacerbate these challenges. In conclusion, we propose several regulatory strategies to mitigate these shortcomings and harness the full potential of blockchain technology.
    Keywords: blockchain technology, Coase theorem, social cost
    JEL: K11 K22 K29
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ilewps:80&r=law

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