nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2023‒05‒15
ten papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine

  1. Murphy's Law or Luck of the Irish? Disparate Treatment of the Irish in 19th Century Courts By Bindler, Anna; Hjalmarsson, Randi; Machin, Stephen; Rubio-Ramos, Melissa
  2. Non-compete agreements in a rigid labour market: The case of Italy By Tito Boeri; Andrea Garnero; Lorenzo G. Luisetto
  3. Neighbourhood Gangs, Crime Spillovers, and Teenage Motherhood By Christian Dustmann; Mikkel Mertz; Anna Okatenko
  4. Introduction to Competition Economics By Merino Troncoso, Carlos
  5. Economic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: A Simulation Feedback Model By Oleg V. Pavlov; Jason M. Sardell
  6. Diffusion of OECD Transfer Pricing Regulations in Eastern Africa: Agency and Compliance in Governing Profit-Shifting Behaviour By Vet, Cassandra
  7. Price and Prejudice: Housing Rents Reveal Racial Animus By Marius Brülhart; Gian-Paolo Klinke; Andrea Marcucci; Dominic Rohner; Mathias Thoenig
  8. Design of partial population experiments with an application to spillovers in tax compliance By Dario Tortarolo; Guillermo Cruces; Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare
  9. Prior Fraud Exposure and Precautionary Credit Market Behavior By Nathan Blascak; Ying Lei Toh
  10. The signaling value of legal form in debt financing By Felix Bracht; Jeroen Mahieu; Steven Vanhaverbeke

  1. By: Bindler, Anna (University of Gothenburg); Hjalmarsson, Randi (University of Gothenburg); Machin, Stephen (London School of Economics); Rubio-Ramos, Melissa (University of Cologne)
    Abstract: Using data on 100 years of 19th century criminal trials at London's Old Bailey, this paper offers clear evidence of disparate treatment of Irish-named defendants and victims by English juries. We measure surname Irishness and Englishness using place of birth in the 1881 census. Irish-named defendants are 11% less likely to plea, 3% more likely to be convicted by the jury, and 16% less likely to receive a jury recommendation for mercy. These disparities are: (i) largest for violent crimes and for defendants with more distinctive Irish surnames; (ii) robust to case characteristic controls and proxies for signals associated with Irish surnames (social class, Irish county of origin, criminality); (iii) particularly visible for Irish defendants in cases with English victims; and (iv) spill-over onto English-named defendants with Irish codefendants. Disparate treatment is first visible in the 1830s, after which it grows, then persists through to the end of the century. In particular, the gap in jury conviction rates became larger during the twenty years after the Irish Potato Famine-induced migration to London. We do not find evidence, however, that the first bombing campaign of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (in 1867 and the 1880s) further exacerbated these disparities.
    Keywords: Irish, crime, criminal law, discrimination, economic history
    JEL: K42 K14 J15 N33 N93
    Date: 2023–04
  2. By: Tito Boeri; Andrea Garnero; Lorenzo G. Luisetto
    Abstract: Non-compete clauses (NCCs) limiting the mobility of workers have been found to be rather widespread in the US, a flexible labour market with large turnover rates and a limited coverage of collective bargaining. This paper explores the presence of such arrangements in a rigid labour market, with strict employment protection regulations by OECD standards and where all employees are, at least on paper, subject to collective bargaining. Based on a representative survey of employees in the private sector, an exam of collective agreements and case law, we find that in Italy i) collective agreements play no role in regulating the use of NCCs while the law specifies only the formal requirements, ii) about 16% of private sector employees are currently bound by a NCC, iii) NCCs are relatively frequent among low educated employees in manual and elementary low paid occupations having no access to any type of confidential information, and iv) in addition to NCCs, a number of other arrangements limit the post-employment activity of workers. Many of the NCCs do not comply with the minimum requirements established by law and yet workers do not consider them as unenforceable and appear to behave as they were effective. Even when NCCs are unenforceable they appear to negatively affect wages when they are introduced without changing the tasks of the workers involved. Normative implications are discussed in the last section of the paper.
    Keywords: non-compete clauses, monopsony, labour market concentration, employment, wages
    Date: 2023–04–03
  3. By: Christian Dustmann (University College London); Mikkel Mertz (Queen Mary University of London); Anna Okatenko (University College London)
    Abstract: Using an identification strategy based on random assignment of refugees to different municipalities in Denmark between 1986 and 1998, we find strong evidence that gang crime rates in the neighbourhood at assignment increase the probability of boys to commit crimes before the age of 19, and that gang crime (but not other crime) increases the likelihood of teenage motherhood for girls. Higher levels of gang crime also have detrimental and long-lasting effects, with men experiencing significantly higher levels of inactivity and women experiencing lower earnings and higher levels of welfare benefit claims at ages 19 to 28.
    Keywords: Crime spillovers, gang crime, teenage motherhood
    JEL: J1 K4 I3
    Date: 2023–03
  4. By: Merino Troncoso, Carlos
    Abstract: The book is intended to be a reference book of Competition Economics for economists, consultants and/or practitioners. It is a modern review of demand and supply estimation, market structure, merger analysis, damage estimation, welfare loss, abuse of dominance, network effects, and a math and statistics review. Faced with potential multibillion fines, and thousands of damage claims firms are hiring and paying high fees to comply, defend or claim in antitrust cases. Complex economic and statistical issues appear in most cases and all the parties involved in cases are expected to have a good knowledge of them. This book tries to cover a demand of practitioners for a compact introductory level book on this field.
    Keywords: antitrust, competition policy, merger simulation, demand estimation
    JEL: L10 L11 L13 L16 L4 L40
    Date: 2023–01–15
  5. By: Oleg V. Pavlov; Jason M. Sardell
    Abstract: This chapter develops a feedback economic model that explains the rise of the Sicilian mafia in the 19th century. Grounded in economic theory, the model incorporates causal relationships between the mafia activities, predation, law enforcement, and the profitability of local businesses. Using computational experiments with the model, we explore how different factors and feedback effects impact the mafia activity levels. The model explains important historical observations such as the emergence of the mafia in wealthier regions and its absence in the poorer districts despite the greater levels of banditry.
    Date: 2023–04
  6. By: Vet, Cassandra
    Abstract: Eastern African countries have codified transfer pricing regulations in their efforts to ring fence corporate tax revenue against profit shifting by multinational companies. Kenya (in 2006), Uganda (2011) and Rwanda (2020) used the dominant OECD transfer pricing guidelines as a template for reform. The wisdom of this approach for developing countries is contested in academic and civil society literature. According to this view, Western states largely dominate rule-setting procedures, and the costly enforcement of transfer pricing drains the scarce resources of revenue authorities. How can we reconcile the critical perspective in global debates with the roll-out of OECD type transfer pricing regimes on the ground? Case study evidence collected in these countries reveals that policymakers prefer anti-avoidance measures that are widespread and considered global practice. The widespread adoption of OECD transfer pricing norms worldwide gives them a unique compatibility advantage – this allows governments to adopt them as a way to raise public revenue, without compromising their attractiveness to investors. These network externalities are among the powerful lock-in effects that have cemented the position of the OECD guidelines in global tax governance. This study complements this narrative with a more bottom-up perspective. This highlights how domestic coalitions drive support for the OECD framework by mobilising both ideational and economic network effects. From this perspective the OECD rules are still an authoritative focal point for policymakers because interested social groups leverage concern about investor attractiveness. Ideational incentives shape bureaucratic policy advice to OECD standards. Civil society organisations, despite their critical stance towards the OECD guidelines at a global level, did not coalesce around a specific alternative – and instead raised the urgency of increasing public revenue.
    Keywords: Finance, Governance,
    Date: 2023
  7. By: Marius Brülhart; Gian-Paolo Klinke; Andrea Marcucci; Dominic Rohner; Mathias Thoenig
    Abstract: We study market rents in the neighborhood of asylum seeker hosting centers. Our empirical setting exploits the quasi-random opening of centers and spatial allocation of asylum seekers in Switzerland. Rents within 0.7km of an active center are found on average to be 3.8% lower than rents in the control group. The price drop is more pronounced when centers host a higher share of asylum seekers from Sub-Saharan countries. In contrast, neither the religious affiliation of asylum seekers nor their inferred crime propensity affect prices significantly. Our findings are consistent with racial animus as the dominant driver of observed market outcomes.
    Keywords: ethnic prejudice, willingness to pay, housing prices, refugee centers
    JEL: D90 J15 R31
    Date: 2023
  8. By: Dario Tortarolo (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Guillermo Cruces (University of Nottingham and CEDLAS-UNLP); Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare (University of California, Santa Barbara)
    Date: 2023–04–24
  9. By: Nathan Blascak; Ying Lei Toh
    Abstract: We study how past experiences with privacy shocks affect individuals’ likelihood to take precautionary behavior when faced with a new privacy shock in the context of credit markets. We focus on experiences with identity theft and data breaches, two kinds of privacy shocks that either directly lead to fraud or put an individual at an elevated risk of experiencing fraud. We show that immediately after the announcement of the 2017 Equifax data breach, individuals with either kind of prior fraud exposure were more likely to freeze their credit report and close credit card accounts than individuals with no prior exposure. We also find that prior victims of identity theft, a more serious type of exposure, were more likely to take precautionary actions than individuals who were victims of a previous data breach.
    Keywords: data breach; credit; Equifax
    JEL: D14 D18 G50
    Date: 2022–11–07
  10. By: Felix Bracht; Jeroen Mahieu; Steven Vanhaverbeke
    Abstract: We examine if a startup's legal form choice is used as a signal by credit providers to infer its risk to default on a loan. We propose that choosing a legal form with low minimum capital requirements signals higher default risk. Arguably, small relationship banks are more likely to use legal form as a screening device when deciding on a loan. Using data from Orbis and the IAB/ZEW Start-up Panel for a sample of German firms, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses but inconsistent with predictions of several competing explanations, including differential demand for debt or growth opportunities.
    Keywords: legal form, minimum capital requirements, signaling, access to debt, financial constraint
    Date: 2023–04–17

This nep-law issue is ©2023 by Eve-Angeline Lambert. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.