|
on Law and Economics |
| By: | Ramanambonona, Ambinintsoa; Razafindravonona, Jean; Ranoelimanana, Dimby |
| Abstract: | In the economic literature on law enforcement, the distinction between the probability of arrest and the probability of conviction is not explicit. However, detection does not necessarily imply punishment. This paper focuses on proving that punishment cannot be applied without preceding detection. In this context, in the case of non-apprehension, the offender expects a double gain: monetary and non-monetary gains. The result shows that if the arrest is optimal, the reputation is equal to zero, which means that the arrest deters reputational gain. Punishment has a negative impact on the monetary gain expected by the offender |
| Keywords: | Deterrence; Law Enforcement; Probability of Arrest; Probability of Conviction; Reputation; Sanction |
| JEL: | K4 K42 |
| Date: | 2023–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113760&r=law |
| By: | Daniel L. Chen (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Susan Yeh (Unknown) |
| Abstract: | Does obscenity law corrode moral values and does it matter? Using random judge assignment and all U.S. obscenity precedents since 1958, we present four main results. Progressive laws liberalized sexual attitudes and behaviors, reduced child abuse, but increased asymptomatic STDs. We document that newspapers reported on obscenity cases. We then assign data entry workers to transcribe randomly allocated newsreports and find that exposure to progressive law shifts attitudes. Second-order norm shifts are consistent with a model where laws sanctioning activity increase its perceived prevalence, and laws shape values when sanctioned activities are prevalent. Deterrence does not solely mediate law's impacts. |
| Keywords: | Law and norms, expressive law, cultural change |
| Date: | 2023–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03921964&r=law |
| By: | Elliott Ash (Unknown); Sam Asher (Unknown); Aditi Bhowmick (Unknown); Sandeep Bhupatiraju (Unknown); Daniel L. Chen (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Tatanya Devi (Unknown); Christoph Goessmann (Unknown); Paul Novosad (Unknown); Bilal Siddiqi (Unknown) |
| Abstract: | We study judicial in-group bias in Indian criminal courts, collecting data onover 80 million legal case records from 2010–2018. We exploit quasi-random assignment of judges and changes in judge cohorts to examine whether defendant outcomes are affected by being assigned to a judge with a similar religious or gender identity. We estimate tight zero effects of in-group bias. The upper end of our 95% confidence interval rejects effect sizes that are one-fifth of those in most of the prior literature. |
| Date: | 2023–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03921979&r=law |
| By: | Matthieu Chemin (Unknown); Daniel L. Chen (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Vincenzo Di Maro (Unknown); Paul Kieti Kimalu (Unknown); Momanyi Mokaya (Unknown); Manuel Ramos-Maqueda (Unknown) |
| Abstract: | Can data science be used to improve the functioning of courts, and unlock the positive effects of institutions on economic development? In a nationwide randomized experiment in Kenya, we use algorithms to identify the greatest sources of court delay for each court and recommend actions. We randomly assign courts to receive no information, information, or an information and accountability intervention. Information and accountability reduces case duration by 22%. We find an effect on contracting behaviour, with more written labor contracts being signed by firms, and an effect on wage, since jobs with written labor contracts pay more. These results demonstrate a causal relationship between judicial institutions and development outcomes. |
| Date: | 2023–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03921938&r=law |
| By: | Brown, Donna; Wadsworth, Jonathan |
| Abstract: | In 2015, the UK government exempted "low-risk" self-employed workers from legislation on workplace safety. This reversed a move two decades earlier that incorporated the self-employed more fully into the same regulatory framework as employees. This paper examines whether workplace accidents among self-employed workers shifted after these two changes to safety regulations. A difference-in-differences estimation framework suggests that the extension of regulation in 1999 had little impact on relative accident rates. In contrast, after 2015, accident rates for high and low risk self-employed converged, driven primarily by a steep fall in accident rates among those still covered by legislation. |
| Keywords: | non-fatal workplace accidents; self employed; de-regulation; health and safety |
| JEL: | J80 J28 K32 R41 |
| Date: | 2022–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:117890&r=law |
| By: | Takayoshi Shinkuma; Akira Hibiki; Eiji Sawada |
| Abstract: | We We have considered an environmental pollution that catastrophically destroys the environment once it occurs. While this kind of pollution could be avoided to some extent through precautionary activity, efforts to prevent pollution could not be observed by a government without inspection. In addition, the polluter might not be able to afford to compensate for the damage. The first best has not been achieved in the literature when moral hazard and limited liability are considered at the same time. By generalizing other policies, including the strict liability rule and the negligence rule, we derive an optimal inspection policy under moral hazard and limited liability. The optimal policy is composed of advance payment and ex-post payment after inspection. In other words, we can consider the optimal policy as a deposit/refund system. We derive the second-best policy by taking account of inspection cost. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:toh:tupdaa:32&r=law |
| By: | Alfaro, Laura; Bao, Cathy; Chen, Maggie X.; Hong, Junjie; Steinwender, Claudia |
| Abstract: | We investigate how firms and markets adapt to trademark protection, an extensively used but under-examined form of IP protection to address asymmetric information, by exploring a historical precedent: China's trademark law of 1923. Exploiting unique, newly digitized firm-employee and firm-agent datasets from Shanghai in 1872-1941, we show that the trademark law, established as an unanticipated and Western-disapproved response to end foreign privileges in China, shaped firm dynamics and relationships on all sides of trade-mark conflicts. Western firms with greater dependence on trademark protection grew and raised brand investment, while Japanese businesses, most frequently accused of counterfeiting, contracted despite attempts to build their own brands. The trademark law also fostered relationships with domestic intermediaries, both within and outside the boundaries of Western firms, and the growth of the Chinese intermediary sector. At the market level, the trademark law did not reduce competition or raise brand prices, leading to a coexistence of trademarks and competitive markets and ultimately gains in consumer welfare. A comparison with previous attempts by foreign powers-such as extraterritorial rights and bilateral treaties-shows that the alternative institutions were broadly unsuccessful. *Omnia Juncta in Uno ("All Joined in One") was the Latin motto on the municipal seal of the Shanghai International Settlement (1843-1941) and signified the joint governance of foreign powers in the settlement. |
| Keywords: | trademark; firm dynamics; intermediaries; competition; IP institutions |
| JEL: | K11 D20 O10 O30 N40 F20 |
| Date: | 2022–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:117758&r=law |
| By: | Janne Tukiainen; Sebastian Blesse; Albrecht Bohne; Leonardo M. Giuffrida; Jan Jääskeläinen; Ari Luukinen; Antti Sieppi; Leonardo Maria Giuffrida |
| Abstract: | While effective bureaucracy is crucial for state capacity, its decision-making remains a black box. We elicit preferences of 900+ real-world public procurement officials in Finland and Germany. This is an important pursuit as they report having sizeable discretion and minimal extrinsic incentives. Through conjoint experiments, we identify the relative importance of multiple features of procurement outcomes. Officials prioritize avoiding unexpectedly high prices but not seeking low prices. Avoiding winners with prior bad performance is the most important feature. Officials avoid very low competition, while litigation risks and regional favoritism play minor roles. Personal preferences and office interests appear well-aligned among bureaucrats. |
| Keywords: | bureaucrats, public procurement, preferences, conjoint experiments |
| JEL: | D73 D90 H11 H57 H83 K41 M54 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10199&r=law |
| By: | Rimkute, Dovile; Mazepus, Honorata |
| Abstract: | Agencification in the EU stretches the confines of the European regulatory state to the maximum by extending to policy domains that were formerly the exclusive terrain of national institutions. Although the challenge to legitimize EU-level agencies is widely acknowledged, scant empirical research has been done on the conditions under which EU-level epistemic authority prevails or fails. To fill this gap, we examine whether EU agencies are perceived as more legitimate when the scientific nature of their regulatory outputs is made explicit and whether they start facing grave legitimacy challenges when national-level stakeholders signal disapproval with their scientific recommendations. We draw on a survey experiment with Dutch local politicians to study their legitimacy perceptions about the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and its mandate to authorize vaccines in view of cross-border health security risks. Our data suggest that the EMA is regarded as a highly legitimate agency and that disapproval by national-level politicians and citizens does not undermine its epistemic authority in the eyes of local decision-makers. This study contributes to the scholarship on non-majoritarian institutions’ legitimation imperatives by introducing novel research avenues and analytical tools to continue rigorous empirical testing of the well-established theoretical and normative claims. |
| Date: | 2023–01–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:bj4vn&r=law |
| By: | Pietro Bonetti; Christian Leuz; Giovanna Michelon |
| Abstract: | The rise of shale gas and tight oil development has triggered a major debate about hydraulic fracturing (HF). In an effort to mitigate risks from HF, especially with respect to water quality, many U.S. states have introduced disclosure mandates for HF wells and fracturing fluids. We use this setting to study whether targeting corporate activities that have dispersed environmental externalities with disclosure regulation to create public pressure reduces their environmental impact. We find significant improvements in water quality, examining salts that are considered signatures for HF impact, after the disclosure mandates are introduced. We document effects along the extensive and the intensive margin, though most of the improvement comes from the latter. Supporting this interpretation, we find that, after the disclosure mandates, operators pollute less per unit of production, use fewer toxic chemicals, and cause fewer spills and leaks of HF fluids and wastewater. We also show that disclosure enables public pressure and that this pressure facilitates internalization. |
| JEL: | D62 G38 K22 K32 L71 L72 M41 M48 Q53 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30842&r=law |
| By: | Monica P. Bhatt; Sara B. Heller; Max Kapustin; Marianne Bertrand; Christopher Blattman |
| Abstract: | Gun violence is the most pressing public safety problem in American cities. We report results from a randomized controlled trial (N=2, 456) of a community-researcher partnership—the Rapid Employment and Development Initiative (READI Chicago)—which provided 18 months of a supported job alongside cognitive behavioral therapy and other social supports. Algorithmic and human referral methods identified men with strikingly high scope for gun violence reduction: for every 100 people in the control group, there were over 11 shooting and homicide victimizations during the 20-month outcome period. Take-up and retention rates were comparable to programs for people facing far lower mortality risk. There is no statistically significant change in an index combining three measures of serious violence, the study's primary outcome. But one component, shooting and homicide arrests, shows a suggestive decline of 64 percent (p=0.15). Because shootings are so costly, READI generates social savings between $174, 000 and $858, 000 per participant, implying a benefit-cost ratio between 3.8 and 18.8 to 1. Moreover, participants referred by outreach workers—a pre-specified subgroup—show enormous declines in both arrests and victimizations for shootings and homicides that remain statistically significant even after multiple testing adjustments. These declines are concentrated among outreach referrals with high predicted risk, suggesting that human and algorithmic targeting may work better together. |
| JEL: | C53 C93 I38 J08 K42 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30852&r=law |