|
on Law and Economics |
| By: | Ram Mohan, M.P.; Kini, Els Reynaers; Prasad, Sriram |
| Abstract: | This paper explores how the long-standing tradition of common law countries such as India, which have acknowledged the fundamental right to a healthy and pollution free life for many decades, can assist Judges in other jurisdictions and inform global climate governance. More specifically, many other common law and civil law jurisdictions are faced for the first time with having to interpret and assess whether there is a fundamental right to a healthy and pollution free environment. This question forces them to review whether state inaction on climate change infringes this fundamental right. This paper examines how Indian courts have adjudicated environment and climate litigation. We further scrutinize the classification of cases as climate litigation in the Indian context to try and truly unearth Indian jurisprudence on environment and climate protection. The paper also examines the trends observable and the way forward for environment and climate litigation in India. We compare the four human rights based climate litigations before the European Court of Human Rights with Indian jurisprudence to understand transnational climate litigation better. |
| Date: | 2022–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iim:iimawp:14682&r= |
| By: | Jeon, Doh-Shin; Lefouili, Yassine; Madio, Leonardo |
| Abstract: | We study a platform’s incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers on the platform, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure that innovative products face from IP-infringing products. However, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which can overturn this intended effect on innovation. Moreover, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers as platform liability reduces consumer surplus for a given number of innovators. We also analyze how different types of cross-group network effects affect the impact of platform liability on innovation and consumer welfare. |
| Keywords: | Platform, Liability, Intellectual Property, Innovation. |
| JEL: | K40 K42 K13 L13 L86 |
| Date: | 2022–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:127344&r= |
| By: | Braakmann, Nils (Newcastle University); Chevalier, Arnaud (Royal Holloway, University of London); Wilson, Tanya (University of Glasgow) |
| Abstract: | We provide first evidence that temporal variations in the expected returns to crime affect the location of property crime. Our identification strategy relies on the widely-held perception in the UK that households of South Asian descent store gold jewellery at home. Price movements on the international market for gold exogenously affect the expected gains from burgling these households, which become relatively more lucrative targets as the gold price increases. Using a neighbourhood-level panel on reported crime and difference-in-differences, we find that burglaries in South Asian neighbourhoods are more sensitive to variations in the gold price than other neighbourhoods in the same municipality, confirming that burglars react rationally to variations in the expected returns to their activities. We conduct a battery of tests on neighbourhood and individual data to eliminate alternative explanations. |
| Keywords: | crime, gold prices, returns to crime, Becker-model, optimal foraging theory, criminal behaviour, crime location |
| JEL: | K42 J19 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15520&r= |
| By: | Eric Langlais; Andreea Cosnita-Langlais |
| Abstract: | We endogenize location/product specification choices in a spatial Cournot duopoly on the linear market, when firms' output entails an accidental harm to the environment. Under a strict liability regime, the equilibrium involves no differentiation when the expected harm is low enough. This outcome is suboptimal, and identical to the spatial pattern obtained under a no-liability regime. With larger harm, the equilibrium displays some dispersion/product differentiation, the degree of which is increasing with the level of harm towards the first best locations/product choices. Our results are robusts when allowing for firms' investment in environmental measures. Moreover, we show that vertical/care differentiation occurs whenever horizontal product differentiation arises. Finally, we show that under a negligence rule, firms always comply with the due care level, but the equilibrium involves no differentiation, either horizontal/product or vertical/care. |
| Keywords: | Cournot competition, spatial model, strategic location, product choice, horizontal differentiation, vertical differentitation, environmental liability, strict liability, negligence. |
| JEL: | L41 K21 D82 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2022-20&r= |
| By: | Eduardo Hidalgo (University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany); Erik Hornung (University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany); Pablo Selaya (University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, 26.2.25, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark) |
| Abstract: | We study how NAFTA changed the geography of violence in Mexico. We propose that open borders increased trafficking profits of Mexican cartels and resulted in violent competition among them. We test this hypothesis by comparing changes in drug-related homicides after NAFTA's introduction in 1994 across municipalities with and without drug-trafficking routes. Routes are optimal paths connecting municipalities with a recent history of drug trafficking with U.S. ports of entry. On these routes, homicides increase by 27% relative to the pre-NAFTA mean. These results cannot be explained by changes in worker's opportunity costs of using violence resulting from the trade shock. |
| Keywords: | Violence, NAFTA, Free Trade, Mexico, Illegal Drug Trafficking, Conflict |
| JEL: | K42 F14 D74 O54 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:196&r= |
| By: | Emilio Depetris-Chauvin (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile); Ruben Durante (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Emilio Gutierrez (TAM, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the relationship between inter-jurisdictional cooperation and law enforcement in Mexico. Exploiting a Regression Discontinuity Design in close municipal elections, we study how improved opportunities for cooperation incrime prevention among neighboring municipalities, due to increased political alignment between mayors, may result in lower rates of violent crime. We find that municipalities in which the party in power in the neighboring jurisdictionsbarely wins tend to cooperate more with their neighbors and to experience lower homicide rates in the following years than those in which it barely lost. This effect is sizeable and robust, is increasing in the share of neighboring municipalities governed by the same party, is independent of which party governs the neighboring municipalities, and does not appear to be driven by improved cooperation with either federal or state authorities. Our findings suggest that, in the presence of geographical spillovers, favoring horizontal cooperation may be an effective way of improving the provision of local public goods. |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:178&r= |
| By: | Barron, Kai (WZB Berlin); Bradshaw, Debbie (SAMRC and University of Cape Town); Parry, Charles D. H. (SAMRC and Stellenbosch University); Dorrington, Rob (University of Cape Town); Groenewald, Pam (SAMRC); Laubscher, Ria (SAMRC); Matzopoulos, Richard (SAMRC and University of Cape Town) |
| Abstract: | On July 13, 2020 a complete nation-wide ban was placed on the sale and transport of alcohol in South Africa. This paper evaluates the impact of this sudden and unexpected five-week alcohol prohibition on mortality due to unnatural causes. We find that the policy reduced the number of unnatural deaths by 21 per day, or approximately 740 over the five-week period. This constitutes a 14% decrease in the total number of deaths due to unnatural causes. We argue that this represents a lower bound on the impact of alcohol on short-run mortality, and underscores the severe influence that alcohol has on society—even in the short-run. |
| Keywords: | alcohol; mortality; economics; health; South Africa; COVID-19; violence; |
| JEL: | I18 I12 K42 |
| Date: | 2021–01–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:273&r= |
| By: | Alin Marius Andries; Anca Copaciu; Radu Popa; Razvan Vlahu |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of changes in recourse legislation on mortgage defaults. Romania provides us with an ideal experimental setting to identify this impact. Using a large dataset of mortgage loans granted between 2003 and 2016, we exploit an exogenous variation in Romanian recourse policy and analyze the behavior of borrowers with mortgages issued under a recourse regime after a change in policy limited lender recourse. We find robust evidence that eliminating penalties for default raises the delinquency probability of existing borrowers, particularly those traditionally considered least likely to default. Our findings highlight the ex-post effects of a switch from a creditor-friendly to a debtor-friendly recourse policy. Broadly, our results point to the importance of assessing borrowers’ default incentives before introducing recourselegislation with retroactive applicability. |
| Keywords: | Mortgage market; Recourse; Mortgage default; Moral hazard; Negative equity |
| JEL: | G21 G28 K11 R20 R30 |
| Date: | 2021–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:727&r= |
| By: | Can Sever |
| Abstract: | The unequal treatment of women in the law is one of the most visible forms of gender inequality. Prevalent legal constraints on the basis of gender prevent women, and thereby economies, from reaching their true potential. In this regard, this paper (i) documents the evolution of gender discriminatory laws around the globe, and (ii) sheds light on the role of legal gender equality in income convergence across countries. It shows that despite the remarkable progress toward gender equality in the law over the last five decades, the legal environment across the world is still far from providing a level playing field for women. Moreover, cross-country gaps in gender discriminatory laws have persisted and even widened over the years, meaning that some countries have lagged behind the progress in repealing the laws that act as a barrier to women’s economic inclusion. Based on a global sample since the 1970s, this paper finds that greater gender equality in the law facilitates cross-country income convergence over time. The results call for action and provide a reason to be optimistic going forward. They imply that legal reforms supportive of gender equality, which could indeed be actionable in the shorter term, help poorer countries catch up with the living standards in the advanced economies. These offer a window of opportunity in the post-Covid-19 period, given the adverse effects of the pandemic on economic growth and gender gaps. |
| Keywords: | Gender inequality; law; gender discriminatory laws; women’s empowerment; convergence; economic growth; economic development; law score; income convergence; discriminatory law; indicator of gender; WBL index; Women; Income; Income inequality; Central Asia; Africa; Europe; Global; GDP distribution; differences narrow |
| Date: | 2022–07–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2022/155&r= |
| By: | Vicente Calabuig (University of Valencia); Natalia Jimenez (Universidad Pablo de Olavide); Gonzalo Olcina (University of Valencia); Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (Universidad de Granada and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Coordinated punishment occurs when punishment decisions are complements; i.e., this punishment device requires a specific number of punishers to be effective; otherwise, no damage will be inflicted on the target. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared with uncoordinated punishment, where punishment decisions are substitutes. We argue that coordinated punishment can prevent the free-riding of punishers and show, both theoretically and experimentally, that this may be beneficial for cooperation in a team investment game, compared with uncoordinated punishment. |
| Keywords: | Team investment game, coordinated punishment, uncoordinated punishment, freeriding, cooperation |
| JEL: | C9 D02 D03 D69 J01 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:22-12&r= |
| By: | Luca Anderlini (Department of Economics, Georgetown University); Leonardo Felli (Department of Economics, University of Cambridge); Michele Piccione (Department of Economics, London School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We ask how enforcement can endogenously emerge in a landscape in which only raw power iron fists, govern the interaction of agents. If two agents are ranked in terms of power, the more powerful one can expropriate, at a cost, the less powerful one. Alternatively, both agents can engage in surplus-augmenting cooperation (e.g. trade). If expropriation is not too costly and cooperation is not overwhelmingly productive, for any pair of ranked agents the possibility of expropriation prevents cooperation. The more powerful agent finds it profitable to expropriate the less powerful one. However, if expropriating agents who are net expropriators of others is cheaper, then a more powerful agent may endogenously become an ``enforcer" for lower ranked agents. In equilibrium, the more powerful agent expropriates the less powerful ones by smaller amounts, and the less powerful ones cooperate and refrain from expropriating agents below them. This is because if they do not the more powerful agent will find it cheaper to expropriate only them by a larger amount. Surprisingly, the details of the power structure are irrelevant for enforcement to emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon provided that the original jungle is inhabited by a sufficiently large number of agents and by one that dominates all others. |
| Keywords: | Jungle, Power Structures, Enforcement, Rule of Law |
| JEL: | C79 D00 D01 D31 K19 K40 K49 |
| Date: | 2022–09–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~22-22-08&r= |
| By: | Anderlini, L.; Felli, L.; Piccone, M. |
| Abstract: | We ask how enforcement can endogenously emerge in a landscape in which only raw power iron ï¬ sts, govern the interaction of agents. If two agents are ranked in terms of power, the more powerful one can expropriate, at a cost, the less powerful one. Alternatively, both agents can engage in surplus-augmenting cooperation (e.g. trade). If expropriation is not too costly and cooperation is not overwhelmingly productive, for any pair of ranked agents the possibility of expropriation prevents cooperation. The more powerful agent ï¬ nds it proï¬ table to expropriate the less powerful one. However, if expropriating agents who are net expropriators of others is cheaper, then a more powerful agent may endogenously become an “enforcer†for lower ranked agents. In equilibrium, the more powerful agent expropriates the less powerful ones by smaller amounts, and the less powerful ones cooperate and refrain from expropriating agents below them. This is because if they do not the more powerful agent will ï¬ nd it cheaper to expropriate only them by a larger amount. Surprisingly, the details of the power structure are irrelevant for enforcement to emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon provided that the original jungle is inhabited by a sufficiently large number of agents and by one that dominates all others. |
| Keywords: | Enforcement, Jungle, Power Structures, Rule of Law |
| JEL: | C79 D00 D01 D31 K19 K40 K49 |
| Date: | 2022–08–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camjip:2222&r= |
| By: | Nathalie Ferrière (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | I study the reaction of donors to the US allocation of family planning aid. Family planning offers an interesting case to understand donor interactions. First, projects are relatively similar from one donor to another, easing substitution between donors. Second, one donor, the US, dominates the sector but its foreign policy on family planning has undergone several changes, related to domestic debates on abortion. European donors clearly express their position against these changes and pledge to substitute the US. Exploiting the timing of the Mexico City Policy to instrument the US allocation, I find that, on average, other donors do not react to the US. Donors only react in countries where abortion is on request suggesting that budget constraints do not allow donors to compensate for the US withdrawal in all countries. |
| Keywords: | Family planning,Foreign Aid,Global Gag Rule,Donors coordination |
| Date: | 2022–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03740404&r= |