nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2021‒11‒01
five papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine


  1. Multi-Product Pricing and Minimum Resale Price Maintenance By Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
  2. Internal Digitalization and Tax-efficient Decision Making By Klein, Daniel; Ludwig, Christopher; Nicolay, Katharina
  3. Tax Incentives to Appear Small: Evidence from Thai Firms and Corporate Groups By Chanont Banternghansa; Athiphat Muthitacharoen; Archawa Paweenawat; Krislert Samphantharak
  4. Regulating Big Tech and Non-bank Financial Services in the Digital Era By Thammarak Moenjak; Veerathai Santiprabhob
  5. Naïve Consumers and Financial Mistakes By Exler, Florian; Hansak, Alexander

  1. By: Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
    JEL: L12 L41 D42 K21
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc21:242338&r=
  2. By: Klein, Daniel; Ludwig, Christopher; Nicolay, Katharina
    JEL: O33 L25 H25 H26 K34
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc21:242365&r=
  3. By: Chanont Banternghansa; Athiphat Muthitacharoen; Archawa Paweenawat; Krislert Samphantharak
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of SME tax incentives on firm behaviors. We use firm-level panel data of all registered firms in Thailand to analyze the effects of a large reduction in corporate income tax rates for SMEs in 2011. First, we find that firms responded strongly to the SME tax incentive as indicated by a sharp bunching of firms just below the threshold after the incentive was introduced. The responses were concentrated among firms with positive EBIT, implying a financial motive for firms to remain small. Second, the bunching was prominent for stand-alone firms, where we observe slower revenue growth for those below the threshold. Third, we do not observe bunching for corporate-group firms, but we find evidence of tax-motivated profit shifting among them instead, especially among firms in small groups with weak corporate governance. Our analysis suggests that transfer pricing was likely a primary channel. Finally, despite the unintended consequences, we find that the incentive significantly raised the probability of firm's survival and encouraged new firm registration, as the policy intended.
    Keywords: Bunching; Tax Incentives; Business Group; Corporate Tax; Size-dependent Policy; Tax Evasion
    JEL: F23 H25 H26 K34 M42
    Date: 2021–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pui:dpaper:148&r=
  4. By: Thammarak Moenjak; Veerathai Santiprabhob
    Abstract: In the digital era, new forms of non-bank entities have emerged and gained increasingly prominent roles in providing financial services. These non-bank entities, particularly those associated with non-financial conglomerates and large technology companies (BigTech) pose new challenges for financial regulators whether in terms of financial stability, level-playing field competition, or customer protection. This article discusses emerging trends in the rise of non-bank entities in the digital era, the challenges they pose, and what financial regulatory approaches can help to address those challenges. This article proposes that a holding company structure could be applied to regulate non-financial conglomerates or BigTech firms providing financial services through subsidiaries. This proposal is expected to help address regulatory concerns where existing regulatory approaches cannot adequately cope with.
    Keywords: Regulation; Global Economy; Industrial Organization
    JEL: G23 K21 K23 O16
    Date: 2021–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pui:dpaper:154&r=
  5. By: Exler, Florian; Hansak, Alexander
    JEL: E21 E43 G18 G41 G51 K12
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc21:242359&r=

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