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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Damle, Devendra (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy); Gulati, Karan (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) |
| Abstract: | There are three common conjectures regarding land and property related litigation in India. First, it forms a large proportion of the caseload of Indian courts. Second, the quality of property records is to blame for the large volume and length of the litigation. Third, the caseload is compounded due to the complexity created by the multitude of laws that govern land and property. Additionally, the government is thought to be the largest litigant. This paper presents a novel data-set of case-level data from the Delhi High Court to test these conjectures. It answers important questions regarding the volume and typologies of such disputes, and the typologies of litigants. At the Delhi High Court, land and property disputes constitute 17% of the litigation. In these cases, the largest proportion of litigation is between private parties. The Union government is the petitioner (or appellant) in 2% of such litigation but is the respondent in more than 18% of cases. Tenancy and land acquisition matters are the most common types of litigation. Lastly, approximately 14% of property litigation originates from and is related to property records. |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:21/349&r= |
| By: | Gulati, Karan (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy); Anand, Tushar (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the inheritance rights of transgender persons in India. Using commercial databases (e.g., SCC and Manupatra), it examines the legal framework for inheritance and looks at all court decisions since 1950 that mention the term transgender. Inheritance laws are based on a binary notion of gender. They do not envisage transgender persons or a change in gender identity. This means that individuals must choose between conforming to their assigned gender or not availing their rights. Moreover, successors are often difficult to identify as individuals may lack documentation, could not marry, or cannot prove adoption. The Indian Constitution bars any discrimination based on sex and gender. Laws should not discriminate against transgender persons only because of their identities. Though courts attempt to address these challenges, they leave it to their subjective satisfaction on when to secure the rights of transgender persons. These are important issues that must be addressed through changes in the law. |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:21/350&r= |
| By: | Alejandro Bayas; Nicolas Grau |
| Abstract: | To what extent should young people be normatively held responsible for committing a crime? To contribute to this debate, we study the role of inequality of opportunity in juvenile crime behavior. Drawing on Roemer’s theoretical framework and using administrative data from Chile, we empirically evaluate how much of the responsibility for the crime was determined by structural factors (i.e., circumstances) and how much was determined by decisions taken by the perpetrator (i.e., agency). Overall, we find evidence of substantial inequality of opportunity in this context. Specifically, we find that the contribution of circumstances varies between 46.44% and 32.10%, when explaining crime among males. As a benchmark analysis, we find that the role of circumstances in high school completion is less relevant than in criminal behavior, with levels between 34.80% and 18.54%. Finally, our study contradicts previous literature— suggesting that a different conception of equality of opportunity does change the conclusion regarding the relative contribution of agency versus circumstances. |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp524&r= |
| By: | Stark, Oded; Jakubek, Marcin |
| Abstract: | This chapter investigates the impact of the imposition of sanctions for employing illegal migrants on the welfare of native laborers. In response to such sanctions, managers in a firm may be reassigned from the supervision of production to the verification of the legality of the firm’s labor force. The chapter analyzes three different conditions of the host country’s labor market: full employment, voluntary unemployment, and minimal wage in combination with involuntary unemployment. It is shown that when the sanctions are steep enough, a profit-maximizing firm will assign managers to verification, which impedes the firm’s productivity. The impact on the wages and / or employment of the native laborers depends on the efficiency of the verification technology, namely on the percentage of the “filtered out” illegal laborers in relation to the fraction of reassigned managers. If this efficiency is not high enough, the sanctions bring in their wake consequences that fly in the face of the very aim of their introduction: the welfare of the native laborers will take a beating. |
| Keywords: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Labor and Human Capital |
| Date: | 2021–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ubzefd:313307&r= |
| By: | Zhorayev, Olzhas |
| Abstract: | Understanding what shapes public trust in the police is an important policy issue for both developed and developing countries. Exploiting an advantage of panel research design, I provide new evidence on this question. Using data from the European Social Survey, I show that in 38 (mainly European) nations confidence in police agencies is significantly associated with citizens’ general attitudes toward state institutions (government, parliament, political parties, and the legal system). These findings hold for countries outside of Europe as well. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey, I find that procedural justice aspects (individuals’ satisfaction with the quality of services, their experience of corruption during interaction with the road police) are important determinants of confidence in the police in 26 transition economies. The results are robust, even after controlling for individual characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Confidence in police, procedural justice, political trust |
| JEL: | C01 P16 Z18 |
| Date: | 2020–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109068&r= |
| By: | Mahmood, Haider; Tanveer, Muhamamd; Ahmad, Abdul-Rahim; Furqan, Maham |
| Abstract: | The rule of law and control of corruption would play an effective role in managing CO2 emissions in Pakistan. The present research has explored this issue in Pakistan controlling economic growth during 1996-2019. Further, the unit root and cointegration tests are used. We found the long and short-run relationships in the model. Economic growth has a positive effect on CO2 emissions. The rule of law could not impact in the long run and negatively impacts in the short run. Hence, improving law and order conditions would reduce CO2 emissions in the short run, and further improvements in the rule of law could have pleasant long-run environmental effects. The control of corruption has a positive impact on CO2 emissions in the long run. However, the short-run effects of control of corruption with first and second lags are found negative. |
| Keywords: | The rule of law, control of corruption, economic growth, CO2 emissions |
| JEL: | E2 E21 O43 |
| Date: | 2021–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:109250&r= |
| By: | Pierre-Guillaume Méon; Khalid Sekkat |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of democratic transitions on institutional outcomes. Using an event study method and a sample of 135 countries over the period 1984-2016, we observe that democratic transitions improve institutional outcomes. The effect appears within 3 years after the transition year. The results are robust to alternative definitions of transitions, alternative codings of pre- A nd post-transition years, and changing the set of control variables. We also find that both full and partial democratizations improve institutional outcomes. Transitions out of military regimes or communist autocracies do not. The effect of democratization depends on GDP per capita, education, and the regularity of the transition. Finally, the evidence suggests that the effect is particularly clear on the corruption, law and order, and military in politics dimensions of the index. |
| Keywords: | Democratic transitions; democratization; governance; institutions; political risk |
| Date: | 2021–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/328681&r= |