nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2016‒05‒28
seven papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine

  1. Common trends in the US state-level crime.What do panel data say? By Mauro Costantini; Iris Meco; Antonio Paradiso
  2. The role of regulation on entry : evidence from the Italian provinces By Bripi,Francesco
  3. Crime and Divorce. Can one Lead to the other? Using Multilevel Mixed Models By Faisal Khamis Al-Shamari
  4. Assessing Firm Behavior in Carve-out Markets: Evidence on the Impact of Carve-out Policy By Gayle, Philip; Thomas, Tyson
  5. Court Excellence Model as a tool of improving the organizational efficiency of courts By Joanna Kuczewska; Sylwia Morawska
  6. When economics met antitrust: The second Chicago School and the economization of antitrust law By Patrice Bougette; Marc Deschamps; Frédéric Marty
  7. Intelligence and Crime: A novel evidence for software piracy By Salahodjaev, Raufhon; Odilova, Shoirahon; Andrés, Antonio R.

  1. By: Mauro Costantini; Iris Meco (Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University London); Antonio Paradiso (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari)
    Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the long-run relationship between crime, inequality, unemployment and deterrence using state-level data for the US over the period 1978- 2013. The novelty of the paper is to use non-stationary panels with factor structures. The results show that: i) a simple crime model well fits the long run relationship; ii) income inequality and unemployment have a positive impact on crime, whereas deterrence displays a negative sign; iii) the effect of income inequality on crime is large in magnitude; iv) property crime is generally highly sensitive to deterrence measures based upon police activities.
    Keywords: Crime, deterrence, inequality, unemployment, panel cointegration, cross- section dependence
    JEL: C33 E20 K40
    Date: 2016
  2. By: Bripi,Francesco
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of differences in local administrative burdens in Italy in the years 2005?2007 preceding a major reform that sped up firm registration procedures. Combining regulatory data from a survey on Italian provinces before the reform (costs and time to start a business) with industry-level entry rates of limited liability firms, it explores the effects of regulatory barriers on the average of the annual entry rates across industries with different natural propensities to enter the market. The estimates of the cross-sectional analysis show that lengthier and, to some extent, more costly procedures reduced entry in sectors with naturally high entry. A one-day delay in registration procedures reduces the entry rate in highly dynamic sectors by more than 1 percent. These results hold when I include measures of local financial development and of efficiency of bankruptcy procedures are included.
    Keywords: Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Access to Finance,Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Information and Communication Technologies
    Date: 2016–04–26
  3. By: Faisal Khamis Al-Shamari (Al-Ain University of Science and Technology)
    Abstract: Cross-sectional and time-series studies of the influence of divorce on crime and the opposite are few in both developing and developed countries. Question is raised whether the divorce causes the crime, the opposite, or both effects are exist in Jordan.The objectives are: Investigating the causal direction of the relationship between the divorce and crime, determining whether the clustering in the divorce and crime within-governorates is exist, and whether the divorce and crime are increased or decreased over time? The study design was cross-sectional time-series analysis. The data of 12 governorates over 14 years (2000-2013) were obtained from several Jordanian Statistical Yearbooks and surveys issued by the Jordanian Statistics Department. The divorce rate (DR) and the crime rate (CR) were calculated. Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression was carried out. Three models for each of divorce and crime were estimated. Comparison between these models was explained in terms of the intra-class correlation (ICC), the proportional change in the variance of the response variable, and the deviance. The p
    Keywords: Multilevel modeling, Divorce, Crime, Time, Governorate, and Intra-class correlation
    JEL: C10 C19 A14
    Date: 2016–03
  4. By: Gayle, Philip; Thomas, Tyson
    Abstract: Airlines wanting to cooperatively set prices for their international air travel service must apply to the relevant authorities for antitrust immunity (ATI). While cooperation may yield benefits, it can also have anti-competitive effects in markets where partners competed prior to receiving ATI. A carve-out policy forbids ATI partners from cooperating in markets policymakers believe will be most harmed by anti-competitive effects. We examine carve-out policy applications to three ATI partner pairings, and find evidence more consistent with cooperative pricing in carve-out markets in spite of the policy, calling into question the effectiveness of the policy in achieving intended market outcomes.
    Keywords: Airline competition; Antitrust immunity; Carve-out Policy
    JEL: L13 L40 L93
    Date: 2016–04–27
  5. By: Joanna Kuczewska (Faculty of Economics, University of Gdansk); Sylwia Morawska (Collegium of Business Administration, Warsaw School of Economics)
    Abstract: The measure of organizational efficiency of the judiciary is to meet needs and requirements of internal and external stakeholders. Benchmarking is the process of investigation of the most effective solutions that produce superior performance in organisations. This concept could be successfully implemented in organisation of justice. The aim of the paper is to present the benchmarking concept and possibilities of its implementation using EFQM Business Excellence Model for improving the organizational efficiency of courts.
    Keywords: justice, benchmarking, efficiency
    JEL: K10 M10
    Date: 2016–04
  6. By: Patrice Bougette (Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (UNS)); Marc Deschamps (Université de Lorraine (UL)); Frédéric Marty (OFCE)
    Abstract: In this article, the authors interrogate legal and economic history to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists’ caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the “economization” process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.
    Keywords: Chicago School of Antitrust; Antitrust law
    Date: 2015–06
  7. By: Salahodjaev, Raufhon; Odilova, Shoirahon; Andrés, Antonio R.
    Abstract: The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that software piracy rats are lower in more intelligent nations. Thus, we econometrically estimate the effect of national IQ on software piracy rates, using data for 102 nations for the year 2011. Our findings offer strong support for the assertion that intelligence is inversely related to the software piracy rates. After controlling for the potential effect of outlier nations in the sample, software piracy rate declines by about 5.3 percentage points if national IQ increases by 10 points.
    Keywords: software piracy; IQ; intelligence; cross-country; institutions; copyright
    JEL: K2
    Date: 2016

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