nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2015‒11‒21
seven papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine

  1. Effects of Hostility Tradition in Antitrust: Leniency Programs and Cooperation Agreements By Pavlova, Natalia; Shastitko, Andrey
  2. Voluntary Disclosure Programs for Tax Evaders By Heiner Schmittdiel
  4. Incentives for Process Innovations under Discrete Structural Alternatives of Competition Policy By Šastitko, Andrej E.; kurdin, a. a.
  5. How Democracy could foster Economic Growth: The Last 200 Years By Leonard, Carol S.; Yanovskiy, Konstantin Ė.; Shestakov, D.
  6. "Your Money or Your Life !" The Influence of Injury and Fine Expectations on Helmet Adoption among Motorcyclists in Delhi By Carole Treibich
  7. Evaluating the Spillover Effects of the Plan Colombia in Ecuador By José Fernández; Matteo Pazzona

  1. By: Pavlova, Natalia; Shastitko, Andrey
    Abstract: The article focuses on the effects that type I errors can have on the incentives of firms to compete, collude or engage in efficiency promoting socially beneficial cooperation. Our results confirm that in the presence of type I errors the introduction of a leniency program can have ambiguous effects, including the destruction and prevention of welfare enhancing horizontal cooperation agreements. The obtained results help understand the negative impact the hostility tradition resulting in type I enforcement errors can have on social welfare when applied to the regulation of horizontal agreements.
    Abstract: В статье рассматриваются эффекты, которые ошибки I типа могут накладывать на стимулы фирм к тому, чтобы конкурировать, вступать в сговор или участвовать в эффективности продвижения социально выгодного сотрудничества. Наши результаты подтверждают, что в присутствии ошибок типа I введение программы смягчения может иметь неоднозначные последствия, в том числе уничтожение и препятствование соглашениям о горизонтальном сотрудничестве, увеличивающем благосостояния. Полученные результаты помогут понять негативное воздействие, которое традиция враждебности в результате ошибки I типа может оказать на социальное обеспечение, когда применяется к регулированию горизонтальных соглашений.
    Keywords: antitrust,competition,collusion,cooperation agreements,leniency,errors
    JEL: D43 K21 L41
    Date: 2014–04–17
  2. By: Heiner Schmittdiel (Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands)
    Abstract: In this paper, we develop a model that can explain why governments may want to choose to offer a voluntary disclosure program that allows people who withheld taxes to turn themselves in without punishment. We find that such a leniency rule not only increases government revenue when it comes as a surprise, but even when taxpayers anticipate it.
    Keywords: Tax compliance; voluntary disclosure; guilt
    JEL: H26 K34 K40
    Date: 2015–11–17
  3. By: Shastitko, Andrey E.; Golovanova, Svetlana V.
    Abstract: This paper demonstrates that even established and verified facts of agreements among producers are not a sufficient condition for cartel identification and, as a consequence, prosecution of agreement participants. Such requires looking at institutional details and the wider context of these and similar appearances or occurrences of documents and actions when qualifying the actions of market participants and their effects. This paper discusses a recent antitrust case brought against Russian manufacturers of large diameter pipes (LDPs) that examined supposedly abusive practices by these firms that were contrary to the law on the Protection of Competition, which prohibits market division. The case under consideration illustrates the importance of investigating institutional details when qualifying the actions of market participants and their effects. An analysis of the materials in this case using modern economic theory indicates that the presence of collusion is inconsistent with the active participation of the main consumer of LDPs in that agreement. The chosen format for the cooperation between pipe manufacturing companies and OJSC Gazprom, namely indicative planning, may be explained from the perspective of reducing contract risk in an environment characterized by large-scale private investments.
    Abstract: Эта статья демонстрирует, что даже установленные и проверенные факты соглашений между производителями не являются достаточным условием для идентификации картеля и, как следствие, судебного преследования участников соглашения. Это требует внимания к институциональным деталям и в более широком контексте этих и подобных выступлений или вхождений документов и действий при квалификации действий участников рынка и их последствий. Эта статья обсуждает недавнее антимонопольное дело, возбужденное против российских производителей труб большого диаметра (ТБД), о якобы имевших место злоупотреблений этими фирмами, противоречащих закону о защите конкуренции, который запрещает передел рынка. Рассматриваемый случай иллюстрирует важность исследования институциональных детали при квалификации действий участников рынка и их последствий. Анализ материалов в этом случае с помощью современной экономической теории показывает, что наличие сговора несовместимо с активным участием главного потребителя ПРМ в этом соглашении. Выбранный формат для сотрудничества между производственными компаниями и ОАО Газпром, а именно индикативного планирования, могут быть объяснены с точки зрения снижения риска контракта в среде, характеризующейся крупномасштабными частными инвестициями.
    Keywords: collusion,antitrust policy,credible commitments,indicative planning,contract risk
    JEL: K21 B52
    Date: 2014–02–07
  4. By: Šastitko, Andrej E.; kurdin, a. a.
    Abstract: This study analyses the incentives for process innovations under different conditions determined by the competition policy for intellectual property rights (IPR) and particular features of markets and technologies. Competition policy is defined by the presence or absence of compulsory licensing, markets are characterized by technological leadership or technological competition. The results of modelling show that the uncertainty engendered by technological competition may lower the intensity of innovative activities, if there are no mechanisms of coordination between participants. Voluntary licensing generally improves social welfare but does not guarantee an increase in innovative efforts. Compulsory licensing can impede innovations due to the opportunistic behaviour of market participants but certain measures of state policy can prevent this negative effect.
    Keywords: competition policy,compulsory licensing,process innovations
    JEL: L24 O31 K21
    Date: 2015–04–14
  5. By: Leonard, Carol S.; Yanovskiy, Konstantin Ė.; Shestakov, D.
    Abstract: In this paper we explore current understandings of the influence of political rights, among historical legacies, on economic development. We construct variables for selected political regimes for 1811-2010. We find significant association between individual rights and economic growth. We argue that current understanding of political regimes supportive of growth (Acemoglu, etc), should parse the concept of property rights to include the protection of the individual in their focus on private property rights protection, alone, respected in various forms of government, are insufficient; what matters is the security of individuals from arbitrary arrest, regardless of “type of regime”. Discretionary rights of rulers or democratic governments to arrest citizens undermines the protection of private property rights and other attributes classically given to democratic foundations of economic growth, for example, free press, freedom of the exercise of religious belief. We suggest, as a research agenda, that the power of the politically competitive system therefore comes from weakening discretionary authority over law enforcement
    Keywords: rule of law,Rule of Force,Personal Rights,Private Property Protection,Economic Growth
    JEL: P16 P50 N40 O40
    Date: 2014
  6. By: Carole Treibich (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS, & EHESS)
    Abstract: Road mortality is a growing burden in many developing countries, although many of these crashes are preventable. Behaviors adopted by road users while traveling is one key dimension on which governments usually play to reduce road accidents, either by stressing the potential injuries or by implementing fines if individuals do not adopt safe behaviors. This paper exploits original data collected among Delhi motorcyclists in 2011. I study the influence of perceived consequences of helmet non-use on the decision whether to wear or not such protective device. I also explore the role of previous experiences in the formation of these beliefs. I find that expected injuries are correlated with helmet use on long distance trips while expectations of financial sanctions are linked with helmet adoption on short distance journeys. Women react more than men to a given level of expected medical expenditures. Furthermore, poorer individuals are more likely to use a helmet for given levels of health costs and traffic fines. Simulations of policies influencing individuals' subjective expectations show that an intensification of police threat and information campaigns would increase helmet adoption among motorcyclists.
    Keywords: subjective expectations, road safety, risky behaviors, India
    JEL: C81 D84 I15 K42 R41
    Date: 2015–11–16
  7. By: José Fernández; Matteo Pazzona
    Abstract: The implementation of the Plan Colombia is thought to have had significant violence-related spillovers in Ecuador's bordering provinces with Colombia. We investigate whether the Plan Colombia lead to an increase in violence, measured by homicide rates, in such provinces. Using a difference in difference approach we do not find any evidence of a crime-increasing effect. As a next step, we evaluate the impact of migration on the level of homicides in Ecuador. The instrumental variable results, based on the intensity of the Plan Colombia, show a significant, although small, crime-reducing effect.
    Keywords: Plan Colombia, Ecuador, Violence and Migration.
    JEL: D74 F22 K42 O54
    Date: 2015–11–16

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