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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Nikolaus Fink; Philipp Schmidt-Dengler (WIFO); Konrad Stahl; Christine Zulehner (WIFO) |
| Abstract: | Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country's EU accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different collusion methods along the lines described by Stigler (1964). Quota cartels employ regular reporting schemes and use compensation mechanisms for departures from set quotas. Specialisation cartels divide markets and rely the least on information exchange and punishment. Price and payment condition cartels primarily aim to prevent secret price cuts, requiring information provision upon request, allow for discretionary decision-taking and (sometimes immediate) punishment. These stylised facts on the contractual arrangements suggest that the possibility to write legally binding agreements was employed to address the usual obstacles to sustaining collusion. |
| Keywords: | Collusion, Cartels, Legal Cartels, Contracts |
| Date: | 2015–07–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2015:i:501&r=law |
| By: | Cyril CHALENDARD |
| Abstract: | This paper identifies opportunities for improving the performance of revenue-collection authorities. To detect and combat fraud, we argue that revenue-collection authorities should, notably in the absence of reliable third-party information, exploit non-usual sources of information. Specifically, our micro-level study of customs evasion provides evidence that using any internal or external available source of information facilitates customsenforcement. Estimates highlight that exploiting historical data and/or relying on an information provider - a pre-shipment inspection company - significantly reduces evasion in Cameroon. The potential endogeneity of pre-shipment inspections is addressed by using instrumental variables. Results are robust to a variety of additional checks. |
| Keywords: | Use of internal information, External Information acquisition, Customs enforcement, Tax evasion, Pre-shipment inspections. |
| JEL: | O17 F13 K42 H83 H26 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1722&r=law |
| By: | Oguzoglu, Umut (University of Manitoba); Ranasinghe, Ashantha (University of Manitoba) |
| Abstract: | Establishment exposure to crime is a frequent occurrence and a major obstacle to business operation in developing economies. We present a simple theory for the frequency and severity of crime across establishment size that is validated against the data in South America. We find that high expectation of crime at the establishment- level is strongly associated with lower sales, labor and capital investment, and consistent with our theory is most evident among medium size establishments. We consider a variety of specifications that are tenable with a causal interpretation of our results. Moreover, when evaluated relative to a host of distortions emphasized in the literature, crime remains important for explaining establishment size and addressing it may be one of the more important policy reforms for spurring development in South America. |
| Keywords: | crime, establishment size, misallocation |
| JEL: | O1 O4 D2 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9209&r=law |
| By: | Joerg Baten; Nicola Bianchi; Petra Moser |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether compulsory licensing – which allows governments to license patents without the consent of patent-owners – discourages invention. Our analysis exploits new historical data on German patents to examine the effects of compulsory licensing under the US Trading-with-the-Enemy Act on invention in Germany. We find that compulsory licensing was associated with a 28 percent increase in invention. Historical evidence indicates that, as a result of war-related demands, fields with licensing were negatively selected, so OLS estimates may underestimate the positive effects of compulsory licensing on future inventions. |
| JEL: | N3 N32 N34 O3 O34 O38 |
| Date: | 2015–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21442&r=law |
| By: | Toshihiro Yokoo; David Levinson (Nexus (Networks, Economics, and Urban Systems) Research Group, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the relationship between road network structure and the percentage of speeding using GPS data collected from 152 individuals over a 7 day period. To investigate the relationship, we develop an algorithm and process to match the GPS data and GIS data accurately. Comparing actual travel speed from GPS data with posted speed limits we measure where and when speeding occurs, by whom. We posit that road network structure shapes the decision to speed. Our result shows that the percentage of speeding, which is calculated by travel distance, is large in high speed limit zones (e.g. 60 mph ) and low speed limit zone (less than 25 mph); in contrast, the percentage of speeding is much lower in the 30 - 50 mph zone. The results suggest driving pattern depends on the road type. We also find that if there are many intersections in the road, average link speed (and speeding) drops. Long links are conducive to speeding. |
| Keywords: | GPS data, speeding, travel behavior |
| JEL: | K42 R41 R42 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nex:wpaper:speeding&r=law |