nep-law New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2015‒07‒04
nine papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine


  1. Leniency and Damages By Buccirossi, Paolo; Marvão, Catarina; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
  2. 'Organized Crime, Corruption and Growth: Theory and Evidence' By Keith Blackburn; Kyriakos C. Neanidis; Maria Paola Rana
  3. Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States By Filipe R. Campante; Quoc-Anh Do
  4. Ensuring good governance and preventing corruption in the planning of major sporting events – open issues By Wolfgang Maennig
  5. The Impact of Software Piracy on Inclusive Human Development: Evidence from Africa By Asongu, Simplice; Andrés, Antonio R.
  6. The Unintended Effects of Increasing the Legal Working Age on Family Behaviour”, By Cristina Belles-Obrero; Sergi Jiménez-Martín; Judit Vall-Castello
  7. Violence and Birth Outcomes: Evidence from Homicides in Brazil By Martin Foureaux Koppensteiner; Marco Manacorda
  8. Pricing the Value of Cash Flow Rights in Crowdinvesting: An Analysis of Innovestment Backers By Lars Hornuf; Matthias Neuenkirch
  9. Managing Labour Mobility: A Missing Pillar of Global Governance By Jose Antonio Alonso

  1. By: Buccirossi, Paolo; Marvão, Catarina; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Abstract: Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of leniency programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated in an EU directive, adopted in November 2014, which seeks a balance between public and private enforcement. It protects the effectiveness of a leniency program by preventing the use of leniency statements in subsequent actions for damages. Our analysis shows such compromise is not required: limiting the cartel victims’ ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of a leniency program and may be counterproductive. We show that damage actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and full access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, is granted to claimants, like in the US.
    Keywords: cartels; competition policy; Leniency Program; private and public enforcement
    JEL: C72 C73 D43 D81 H11 K21 K42 L13 L44 L51
    Date: 2015–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10682&r=law
  2. By: Keith Blackburn; Kyriakos C. Neanidis; Maria Paola Rana
    Abstract: We develop a framework for studying the interactions between organized crime and corruption, together with the individual and combined effects of these phenomena on economic growth. Criminal organizations co-exist with law-abiding productive agents and potentially corrupt law enforcers. The crime syndicate obstructs the economic activities of agents through extortion, and may pay bribes to law enforcers in return for their compliance in this. We show how organized crime has a negative e¤ect on growth, and how this e¤ect may be either enhanced or mitigated in the presence of corruption. The latter of these possibilities is evidenced strongly in an exhaustive empirical investigation using a panel of Italian regions for the period 1983-2009.
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:man:cgbcrp:210&r=law
  3. By: Filipe R. Campante (Harvard University); Quoc-Anh Do (Département d'économie)
    Abstract: We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.
    Keywords: Isolated Capital Cities; Corruption; Accountability; US states
    JEL: D72 D73 H41 H83 K42
    Date: 2014–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/4tc33icveb94nokk2rd2ettg0k&r=law
  4. By: Wolfgang Maennig (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg)
    Abstract: International sports will have to strengthen their efforts to exclude persons with morals in conflict with their sports. IOC and FIFA should mirror their top ambitions in athletic and financial areas by similarly leading ambitions to serve human mankind more generally. To encounter critiques that the organizing of major sporting events are „elitist actions“ IOC and FIFA should declare ex-ante referenda as a precondition for bidding. In order to reduce the funds available for corruption, the role of public finance in major sporting events should be overthought. At least broadcasters under public law public should be excluded from the bidding for TV. FIFA and other sporting federations should make public their payments to member federations etc and the underlying decision criteria.
    Keywords: Corruption, FIFA, good governance, major sporting events, referenda, public finance
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2015–06–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hce:wpaper:051&r=law
  5. By: Asongu, Simplice; Andrés, Antonio R.
    Abstract: This paper examines two dimensions of the software piracy-development nexus to complement existing formal literature. It empirically assesses the incidence of piracy on the Human Development Index (HDI) and its constituents and then the instrumentality of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) treaties (laws) in the linkages. An instrumental variable or Two-stage least squares is applied on panel of 11 African countries with data for the period 2000-2010. Three main findings are established: (1) software piracy has a negative incidence on inequality adjusted human development; (2) the unappealing effect of piracy on the HDI is fuelled by per capita economic prosperity and life expectancy components of human emancipation; (3) software piracy increases literacy. Two major policy implications have been retained from the findings. Firstly, adherence to international IPRs protection treaties (laws) may not impede per capita economic prosperity and could improve life-expectancy. Secondly, adoption of tight IPRs regimes may negatively affect human development by diminishing the literacy rate and restricting diffusion of knowledge.
    Keywords: Software piracy; Human development; Intellectual property rights; Panel data, Instrumental variables.
    JEL: K42 O34 O38 O47 O57
    Date: 2014–12–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:65303&r=law
  6. By: Cristina Belles-Obrero; Sergi Jiménez-Martín; Judit Vall-Castello
    Abstract: We use an exogenous variation in the Spanish legal working age to investigate the effect of education on fertility and infant health. The reform introduced in 1980 raised the minimum legal age to work from 14 to 16 years old. We show that the reform increased educational attainment, which led to 1786 more women remaining childless and 3307 less children being born in the 10 generations after the reform. These negative effects operate through a postponement of first births until an age where the catching up effect cannot take place. We show that woman's marriage market is one channel through which education impacts fertility, delaying the age at which women marry for the first time and reducing the likelihood that a woman marries. Even more importantly, this postponement in fertility seems to be also detrimental for the health of their offspring at the moment of delivery. The reform caused 2,789 more children to be born with less than 37 weeks of gestation, 268 died during the first 24 hours of life and 4,352 were born with low birth weight. We are able to document two channels that contribute to the negative effects on infant health: the postponement in age of delivery as well as a higher employment probability of more educated women, which enhances unhealthier behaviors (smoking and drinking).
    Date: 2015–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2015-09&r=law
  7. By: Martin Foureaux Koppensteiner (University of Leicester); Marco Manacorda (Queen Mary University of London, CEP (LSE), CEPR and IZA)
    Abstract: This paper uses microdata from Brazilian natality and mortality vital statistics between 2000 and 2010 to estimate the impact of in-utero exposure to local violence - measured by homicide rates - on birth outcomes. The estimates show that exposure to violence during the first trimester of pregnancy leads to a small but precisely estimated increase in the risk of low birthweight and prematurity. Effects are found in both rural areas, where homicides are rare, and in urban areas, where violence is endemic and are particularly pronounced among children of poorly educated mothers, implying that violence compounds the disadvantage that these children already suffer as a result of their households' lower socioeconomic status. Our estimates imply that homicides are responsible for around 10 percent of the incidence of low birthweight (<=2.5 kg) in urban areas of Brazil.
    Keywords: Birth outcomes, Birthweight, Homicides, Stress, Brazil
    JEL: I12 I15 I39 J13 K42
    Date: 2015–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp750&r=law
  8. By: Lars Hornuf; Matthias Neuenkirch
    Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the pricing of cash flow rights in startup companies based on a unique dataset of crowdinvesting backers. Our sample consists of 44 campaigns and includes 1,450 bids made by 499 backers during the period from November 6, 2011 to March 25, 2014 on the German crowdinvesting portal Innovestment. In contrast to all other European crowdinvesting portals, Innovestment is running a multiunit sealed bid second price auction where backers can specify the price they are willing to pay for an investment ticket with the portal and startup specifying a lower threshold. We exploit this unique auction mechanism to analyze backers’ willingness to pay for cash flow rights in a startup company. We find that campaign characteristics, investor sophistication, progress in funding, herding, and stock market volatility influence backers’ willingness to pay in an economically meaningful fashion, whereas we do not find any evidence for a local bias or sniping at the end of an auction. Our findings indicate that portal design and self-regulation might well trump government rules in the pursuit to protect investors.
    Keywords: Auction, Crowdinvesting, Innovestment, Regulation, Willingness to Pay
    JEL: D44 G11 K20 M13
    Date: 2015
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trr:wpaper:201507&r=law
  9. By: Jose Antonio Alonso
    Abstract: The increasing problems associated with international migration call for nations to manage migratory flows in a more realistic way both at national and international levels. However, global initiatives undertaken to date in this field have seen very limited success. This paper adopts a political economy approach for identifying the interests of affected social groups with a view towards building feasible policy responses. A dual proposal for global governance of migration is suggested, based on a combination between the establishment of universal minimum standards and the promotion of bilateral and regional interaction driven by problem-solving goals.
    Keywords: International migration, global governance, development, mobility of labor, migratory policy
    JEL: F22 F24 J61 J83 K31 O15
    Date: 2015–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:une:cpaper:026&r=law

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