New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2013‒11‒09
six papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine


  1. LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN RUSSIA By Svetlana Avdasheva; Polina Kryuchkova
  2. The effects of cartel damage compensations By Hunold, Matthias
  3. The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Small Banks By Alqatawni, Tahsen
  4. Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? a study of small business distress in Spain By Miguel García-Posada; Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti
  5. Role of regulation and micro finance in Africa, Asia and Latin America By Marianne, Roedl
  6. Do corporate taxes distort capital allocation? Cross-country evidence from industry-level data By Serena Fatica

  1. By: Svetlana Avdasheva (1National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Industrial and Market Studies. Deputy Director;); Polina Kryuchkova (2National Research University Higher School of Economics. Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, Laboratory of Competition and Antimonopoly Policy. Leading Research Fellow;)
    Abstract: Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations
    Keywords: antitrust, Russia, public enforcement, complaints, legal errors.
    JEL: K21 K42
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:05/pa/2013&r=law
  2. By: Hunold, Matthias
    Abstract: Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law. --
    Keywords: competition law,cartel damage compensation,deterrence,overcharge,private enforcement,vertical relations
    JEL: K21 L41
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:13081&r=law
  3. By: Alqatawni, Tahsen
    Abstract: The Dodd-Frank Act is single longest bill ever passed by the U.S… The Dodd-Frank Act passed in reply to the latest financial meltdown, which applies to prevent further fraud and abuse in the markets, also geared toward protecting consumers with regulations like keeping borrowers from abusive lending conditions and mortgage practices by lenders. Dodd-Frank regulatory requirements set too many restrictions on local lenders and appraisers and that the Act created for large banks "too-big-to-fail”. However, the small banks, which do not fit neatly into standardized financial modeling, will face unintended consequences, as increased operations costs, which lead to reduced income and limited potential growth. The Act created enormous difficulties on small banks, which has little to do with the financial crisis.
    Keywords: Dodd-Frank Act , Law and Compliance , financial regulation
    JEL: G00 G33 G38 K2 K22 K23 K40
    Date: 2013–10–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:51109&r=law
  4. By: Miguel García-Posada (Banco de España-Eurosystem); Juan S. Mora-Sanguinetti (Banco de España-Eurosystem)
    Abstract: Small businesses, the majority of Spanish fi rms, rarely fi le for formal bankruptcy, and this has been the case even during the current economic crisis. This suggests that bankruptcy law has a limited role to play in the distress of small fi rms. We propose an explanation based on two premises: (i) bankruptcy procedures are more costly and drawn out than the main alternative procedure, the mortgage foreclosure; (ii) personal bankruptcy law is unattractive to the individual debtor. Empirical analyses on a large micro data sample of Spanish, French and UK fi rms corroborate our hypothesis. It is important to note that these results are based on data that do not yet capture the impact of recent reforms of the Spanish insolvency framework.
    Keywords: bankruptcy, mortgage, insolvency
    JEL: G33 G21 K0
    Date: 2013–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:1315&r=law
  5. By: Marianne, Roedl
    Abstract: An innovative aspect of this paper is evidenced through its recommendation of the Micro-Savings Requirement Scheme - which offers numerous benefits – as will be highlighted in this paper. Furthermore, the paper not only addresses how linkages, direct and facilitating linkages, can benefit microfinance institutions – and particularly in jurisdictions where the Savings Group Outreach involvement is particularly low, but also illustrates ways and means whereby group lending and other more recent innovative methods used by micro lenders to secure repayments, could increase the desired effects, efficiency and impact of microfinance in selected jurisdictions. In so doing, it addresses some of the existing and persisting problems of micro finance in rural areas.
    Keywords: microfinance; regulation; agency theory; Micro-Savings Requirement Scheme; Africa; Asia; Latin America
    JEL: D82 G2 G21 K2
    Date: 2013–11–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:51177&r=law
  6. By: Serena Fatica
    Abstract: The working paper investigates the impacts of corporate taxes on the accumulation of different types of capital assets. The paper analyses the effect of corporate taxes on new investment in different types of capital assets in the manufacturing industries of 11 advanced economies over the period 1991-2007. The magnitude of the asset substitution elasticities points to a significant inter-asset distortionary effect induced by differences in the tax-adjusted user cost of capital. Overall, differential taxation leads on average to under-investment in ICT capital and to over-investment in other machinery and equipment compared to a counterfactual benchmark where marginal tax rates are equalized across assets. Once cross-country heterogeneity in corporate taxation is accounted for, the results are more mixed, in terms of both the size and the direction of the distortions. On average, 4 percent of the aggregate capital stock appears misallocated.
    Date: 2013–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:euf:ecopap:0503&r=law

This issue is ©2013 by Eve-Angeline Lambert. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.