New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2013‒10‒05
four papers chosen by
Eve-Angeline Lambert, Université de Lorraine

  1. A radical change in traffic law: effects on fatalities in the Czech Republic By Josef Montag
  2. Theocracy By Metin M. Cosgel; Thomas J. Miceli
  3. Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control in Indonesia: Legislative and Regulatory Policy Options for Sustainable Capital Markets By Fianna Jurdant
  4. Why is online piracy ethically different from theft? A vignette experiment. By Wojciech Hardy; Michał Krawczyk; Joanna Tyrowicz

  1. By: Josef Montag (Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University in Brno)
    Abstract: This study examines short- and long-run effects of a new—stricter—road traffic law on traf- fic accident-related fatalities in the Czech Republic. The law introduced tougher punishments through the introduction of a demerit point system and a manifold increase in fines, together with augmented authority of traffic police. Identification is based on difference-in-differences methodology, with neighbouring countries serving as a control group. I find a sharp, 33.3%, decrease in accident-related fatalities during the first three post-reform months. This trans- lates into 127 saved lives (95% confidence interval: 51, 204). The decline was, however, temporary; the estimates of the effects going beyond the first year are around zero. Unique data on traffic police activity reveal that police resources devoted to traffic law enforcement gradually declined. Tougher penalties have significant, but often short-lived effects. Weaker enforcement in the aftermath of such reforms may explain the absence of long-run effects.
    Keywords: traffic law, traffic accidents, demerit point system, law enforcement
    JEL: J28 I12 I18
    Date: 2013–09
  2. By: Metin M. Cosgel (University of Connecticut); Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: Throughout history, religious and political authorities have had a mysterious attraction to each other. Rulers have established state religions and adopted laws with religious origins, sometimes even claiming to have divine powers. We propose a political economy approach to theocracy, centered on the legitimizing relationship between religious and political authorities. Making standard assumptions about the motivations of these authorities, we identify the factors favoring the emergence of theocracy, such as the organization of the religion market, monotheism vs. polytheism, and strength of the ruler. We use two sets of data to test the implications of the model. We first use a unique data set that includes information on over three hundred polities that have been observed throughout history. The results provide strong empirical support for our arguments about why in some states religious and political authorities have maintained independence, while in others they have integrated into a single entity. To examine these issues in current societies, we use recently available cross-country data on the relationship between religious and political authorities.
    Keywords: theocracy, state, politics, religion, church, legitimacy, loyalty, monotheism, polytheism, democracy, power
    JEL: H10 P5 N4 Z12
    Date: 2013–10
  3. By: Fianna Jurdant
    Abstract: A good corporate governance framework should combine transparency, accountability and integrity and this requires knowledge of beneficial ownership. The protection of minority investors and other stakeholder protection will be challenging without access to reliable information about the ownership, including the identity of the controlling owners, and control structures of listed companies. This report assesses the costs, benefits and practicalities of different approaches, suggesting policy options to better identify ultimate beneficial ownership in Indonesia. This report was requested by the Capital Market and Financial Institution Supervisory Agency in Indonesia, Bapepam-LK, in the context of the OECD-Indonesia corporate governance policy dialogue launched in 2011. The objective is to support policy makers and regulators in their efforts to enhance disclosure and enforcement of beneficial ownership and control as part of overall efforts to improve corporate governance standards and practices in Indonesia.
    Keywords: shareholders, corporate governance, control-enhancing mechanisms, disclosure, money laundering, private enforcement, beneficial ownership, inside blockholders, public enforcement, outside blockholders
    JEL: G30 G32 K22 K42
    Date: 2013–07–11
  4. By: Wojciech Hardy (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Michał Krawczyk (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw); Joanna Tyrowicz (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw; National Bank of Poland)
    Abstract: This study employs a vignette experiment to inquire, which features of online “piracy†make it ethically discernible from a traditional theft. This question is pertinent since the social norm concerning traditional theft is starkly different from the evidence on ethical evaluation of online “piracyâ€. We specifically distinguish between contextual features of theft, such as for example the physical loss of an item, breach of protection, availability of alternatives, emotional proximity to the victim of theft, etc. We find that some of these dimensions have more weight in ethical judgment, but there are no clear differences between online and traditional theft which could explain discrepancy in the frequency of commitment.
    Keywords: vignette experiment, illegal downloading, digital piracy, illegal download, downloading behaviour, P2P network
    JEL: A13 C93 D12
    Date: 2013

This issue is ©2013 by Eve-Angeline Lambert. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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