| By: |
Bruno Deffains;
Claude Fluet |
| Abstract: |
We consider situations where legal liability yields insufficient incentives
for socially efficient behavior, e.g., individuals who cause harm are not
always sued or are unable to pay fully for harm done. Some individuals
nevertheless behave efficiently because of intrinsic prosocial concerns.
Others have no such concerns but would like people to believe that they do. We
show that fault-based liability is generally more effective than strict
liability in harnessing social image concerns. This extends to the case where
courts can make mistakes. The rules of proof then affect the inferences drawn
from court decisions and therefore the stigma attached to an adverse judgment.
If fault is a rare event, plaintiffs or prosecutors should bear the burden of
proving the defendant’s fault; otherwise there are cases where defendants
should prove compliance with the legal standard of behavior. Under either
assignment of the burden of proof, incentives to comply are maximized by a
standard of proof stronger than a mere preponderance of evidence. |
| Keywords: |
Normative motivations, prosocial behavior, fault, negligence, strict liability, tort law, public enforcement of law, burden of proof, standard of proof |
| JEL: |
D8 K4 Z13 |
| Date: |
2013 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1321&r=law |