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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Guido de Blasio (Bank of Italy); Carlo Menon (OECD) |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates the effect of local economic conditions on crime. The study focuses on ItalyÂ’s local labor markets and analyzes the short-term response of crime to the severe slump of 2007-2009. It shows that the downturn led to a significant increase in economic-related offenses that do not require particular criminal skills or tools (namely, thefts); on the other hand, for offenses for which specific skills and criminal experience are essential (say, robberies) the impact of the crisis was negative. The results also suggest that: i) labor market institutions (i.e. wage supplementary schemes and pro-worker contractual arrangements) had a role in slowing down the effect of the economy on crime; ii) the link between the downturn and crime was weaker in areas where the presence of organized crime is relatively more intensive. |
| Keywords: | crime, economic crises, Italy |
| JEL: | K14 K42 E32 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_925_13&r=law |
| By: | Mandorff, Martin (Swedish Competition Authority); Sahl, Johan (Swedish Competition Authority) |
| Abstract: | In a series of recent cases - most notably in TeliaSonera and Post Danmark - the equally efficient competitor principle has been explicitly recognised by the Court of Justice of the EU; more clearly so than by courts in the US, where the principle originates. However the exact scope of application of the principle in the EU remains to be defined. While its use in cases concerning predatory pricing and margin squeeze appears to be settled, it is still unclear to what extent the standard applies to other price-based forms of exclusion. And is the principle at all useful in the assessment of non-price-based exclusionary conduct? This article discusses the conceptual basis for the equally efficient competitor principle, and attempts to define its role in the assessment of exclusionary abuse in the EU. |
| Keywords: | equally efficient competitor; abuse of dominance; monopolization; exclusion; competition law; competition economics; antitrust |
| JEL: | K00 K21 L12 L40 |
| Date: | 2013–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:kkveco:2013_001&r=law |
| By: | Jensen, Sissel (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics); Kvaløy, Ola (UiS Business School, University of Stavanger); Olsen, Trond E. (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Sørgard, Lars (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The economics of crime and punishment postulates that higher punishment leads to lower crime levels, or less severe crime. It is however hard to get empirical support for this rather intuitive relationship. This paper offers a model that can contribute to explain why this is the case. We show that if criminals can spend resources to reduce the probability of being detected, then a higher general punishment level can increase the crime level. In the context of antitrust enforcement, the model shows that competition authorities who attempt to fight cartels by means of tougher sanctions for all offenders may actually lead cartels to increase their overcharge when leniency programs are in place. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust enforcement; leniency programs; economics of crime |
| JEL: | K20 K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2013–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2013_005&r=law |