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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Marc Deschamps |
| Abstract: | Le thème des fondements des politiques de concurrence est faussement élémentaire. En effet, il renvoie d’une part aux questionnements relatifs à l’utilité sociale et économique d’une politique de concurrence et, d’autre part à ceux ayant trait à la place des choix politiques. Au-delà de tous les particularismes, il est défendu dans cet article l’idée que les économistes justifient actuellement l’existence, à travers le monde, de politiques de concurrence par leurs effets soit sur la croissance, soit sur la stabilité de l’ordre social. En étudiant ces deux fondements principaux, nous tenterons de démontrer qu’il en ressort que (a) l’existence d’une politique de concurrence n’est pas une nécessité universelle, (b) il n’est pas souhaitable d’uniformiser toutes les politiques de concurrence existantes dans le monde et, (c) les politiques de concurrence (et non la justice concurrentielle) ne peuvent être automatisées ou confiées à des experts, mais doivent résulter directement ou indirectement de choix politiques. Ces conclusions offrent dès lors des pistes de réflexion différenciées notamment pour les pays développés, les pays en transition, et les pays en développement. |
| Keywords: | politique de concurrence, croissance, ordre sociaux, choix, règles |
| JEL: | K21 L40 O43 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2013-23&r=law |
| By: | Paul O'Brien |
| Abstract: | OECD indicators of structural policy show that policy changes in Italy since 1998 should have improved the environment for entrepreneurship significantly, but in the same period its economic performance has deteriorated noticeably. This may be partly because there is a difference between policy measures intended by the government or parliament and their impact on the business environment perceived by entrepreneurs. There is no certainty as to what are the main culprits, but a number of policy steps would help to improve the situation. These include better thought out and better written legislation and implementing regulations, more use of performance-oriented management in public administration, and further streamlining and reduction of incentives to procrastination in the judicial system. Legislative simplification and transparency will increase economic efficiency in themselves, while also making a contribution to reducing the incentives and opportunities for corruption and organised crime to flourish. Clear operational independence with accountability is essential for bodies monitoring and assessing the extent of corruption. This Working Paper relates to the 2013 OECD Economic Survey of Italy (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Italy).<P>Mise en oeuvre des politiques en Italie : réglementation, administration publique et état de droit<BR>D’après les indicateurs de politique structurelle de l’OCDE, les réformes lancées par l’Italie depuis 1998 auraient dû fortement améliorer son climat des affaires, mais ses résultats économiques se sont nettement dégradés dans l’intervalle. Cette situation s’explique peut-être, en partie, par une différence entre l’effet espéré des mesures adoptées par le gouvernement ou le parlement et leur impact sur le climat des affaires tel qu’il est perçu par les chefs d’entreprise. Il est impossible de désigner avec certitude les principaux responsables de cet état de fait, mais un certain nombre de mesures contribueraient à améliorer la situation. Il faudrait notamment une législation et des textes d’application mieux conçus et mieux rédigés, une gestion de l’administration publique davantage axée sur les résultats et un effort supplémentaire de rationalisation du système judiciaire et de réduction des incitations aux mesures dilatoires en la matière. La simplification et la transparence de la réglementation renforceront l’efficience économique d’elles-mêmes, tout en contribuant à réduire les incitations et les possibilités qui permettent à la corruption et à la criminalité organisée de prospérer. Couplée à la responsabilisation, une indépendance opérationnelle claire est essentielle pour les organismes chargés de surveiller la corruption et d’évaluer son ampleur. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l'Étude économique de l'OCDE de l’Italie 2013 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/Italie). |
| Keywords: | corruption, Italy, transparency, regulation, public administration, accountability, civil justice, crime, legislation, rule of law, Italie, transparence, administration publique, corruption, crime, état de droit, législation |
| JEL: | H H1 H7 H73 H83 K K2 K4 |
| Date: | 2013–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:1064-en&r=law |
| By: | Decio Coviello (University of Montreal); Luigi Moretti (University of Padova); Giancarlo Spagnolo (University of Roma "Tor Vergata"); Paola Valbonesi (University of Padova) |
| Abstract: | Disputes on the penalties enforceable for breach of contract are often solved in court. Using a large dataset on Italian public procurement contracts, we study the effects of the inefficiency of the local law courts on the delay with which contractors deliver public works. First we sketch a simple model to see how inefficient law courts - i.e. those characterized by longer average duration of trials - may induce public buyers to refrain from enforcing penalties for late delivery in order to avoid costly disputes in court. Then our empirical findings show that, where the local law courts are inefficient: i) public works are delivered with longer delays, and this applies particularly to higher-value contracts - i.e. complex projects; ii) contracts are more often awarded to larger firms; and iii) on average, a higher share of final payment in contracts is adopted. These results are not driven by omitted environmental variables, since we show that delays in the completion of contracted works are still a selected by the eefficiency of the local law courts after including province-related fixed effects in the model and considering other possible explanations for our findings. |
| Keywords: | "efficiency" of the law courts, enforcement of contract obligations, public procurement contracts, time incentives. JEL: H57, L33, K41. |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0164&r=law |
| By: | Guido de Blasio (Bank of Italy); Daniela Vuri (University of Rome "Tor Vergata") |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of the introduction of joint custody in Italy (Law 54/2006) on judiciary outcomes. As to the formal (legal) assignment of joint custody, the reform envisaged very little judge discretion. With reference to the substance of the custody (the amount of time each parent spends with the child and the money involved in post-dissolution arrangements), the law established new principles while leaving plenty of implementation power to the judges. Our results – based on court data that covers the universe of separations from 2000 to 2010 – document that the law was only cosmetically applied by the judges. Compared to the prereform regime, the share of sole legal custody assignments to the mother drastically decreased. However, court implementation washed out the new principles: the provisions of the law related to the financial postseparation arrangements remained unapplied. This suggests that the main innovative aspect of the law – the possibility for a child to spend an adequate amount of time with both parents – was also left unchanged with respect to the previous regime of sole maternal custody. As joint effect of the introduction of the law and the little degree to which the new principles have been translated into actual verdicts, there was a surge in litigiousness among separating spouses and judicial inefficiency. Moreover, the incentives for a female partner to apply for a separation raised. The paper discusses a possible rationale for the findings and some related policy remedies. As for the former, the evidence we present can be explained by the adoption of genderbiased judiciary practices. As for the latter, our results suggest that a restatement of the law, to define a narrowed grid of prescriptions that constrain judge discretion, could be an effective corrective action. |
| Keywords: | joint custody, separation, judiciary outcomes, difference-in-differences, Italy |
| JEL: | K36 J12 J16 |
| Date: | 2013–07–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:284&r=law |