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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Alan Woodfield (University of Canterbury); Stephen Hickson (University of Canterbury); Andrea Menclova (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | Sentences for employers convicted of offences under NZ health and safety law have been subject to constraints from two main sources (i) legislation; and (ii) guideline judgment cases. Their effect is to effectively split sentencing into three distinct time periods, viz., the period following the introduction of the De Spa Guidelines to the implementation of the Sentencing Act 2002, the second following the joint implementation of the Sentencing Act and the Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act to the Hanham & Philp Guideline judgment in December 2008, and the third is the post Hanham & Philp Guideline period. This article builds on previous work that analyses the various factors relevant to HSE sentencing, concentrating on the second and third periods. We find a difference in sentencing factors that matter at the single s 6 charge level versus the case level and also find that these factors differ across periods. In particular, although harm continues to play an important role in explaining sentences of reparation, its previous role in directly explaining levels of fines is replaced by various levels of employer culpability. The Hanham & Philp decisions incorporated harm in determining culpability and District Court judges appear to follow this judgment closely in this respect. |
| Keywords: | Health & Safety Offences; Judicial Guidelines; Sentencing Determinants |
| JEL: | K32 |
| Date: | 2013–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:13/14&r=law |
| By: | Alan Woodfield (University of Canterbury); Stephen Hickson (University of Canterbury); Andrea Menclova (University of Canterbury) |
| Abstract: | Sentences for employers convicted of offences under NZ health and safety law have been subject to constraints from two main sources (i) legislation; and (ii) guideline judgment cases. Their effect is to effectively split sentencing into three distinct time periods, viz., the period following the introduction of the De Spa Guidelines to the implementation of the Sentencing Act 2002, the second following the joint implementation of the Sentencing Act and the Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act to the Hanham & Philp Guideline judgment in December 2008, and the third is the post Hanham & Philp Guideline period. This article builds on previous work that analyses the various factors relevant to HSE sentencing, concentrating on the second and third periods. Among other results, this work shows that for period 3, although harm continues to play an important role in explaining sentences of reparation, its previous role in directly explaining levels of fines is replaced by various levels of employer culpability. The Hanham & Philp decisions incorporated harm in determining culpability and District Court judges appear to follow this judgment closely in this respect. The present article illustrates forecasted sentences for periods 2 and 3, and, for the forecasts of period 3 penalties using second period weights, finds that fines would have been frequently lower, often substantially so, than those that occurred, consistent with the Hanham & Philp Guidelines. Reparations, however, are largely unaffected. |
| Keywords: | Health & Safety Offences; Judicial Guidelines; Forecasting Fines |
| JEL: | K32 |
| Date: | 2013–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbt:econwp:13/15&r=law |
| By: | Fabra, Natalia; Motta, Massimo |
| Abstract: | In a model in which firms can go bankrupt because of adverse market shocks or antitrust fines, we find that even large corporate fines may not be able to induce deterrence. Managerial penalties are thus needed. If the policy may be changed according to the state of the business cycle, then the optimal outcome can always be achieved through antitrust fines that are more severe in good times and more lenient in bad times. A time-independent policy may result in either too many bankruptcies or under-deterrence as compared to the optimal policy. |
| Keywords: | antitrust fines; business cycles; managing incentives |
| JEL: | K14 K42 L13 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9290&r=law |
| By: | Hyytinen, Ari; Steen, Frode; Toivanen, Otto |
| Abstract: | We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main approaches to raise profits: Price, market allocation, and specialization. These appear to be substitutes. Choosing one has implications on how cartels deal with instability. Simplifying, we find that large cartels agree on prices, cartels in homogenous goods industries allocate markets, and small cartels avoid competition through specialization. |
| Keywords: | antitrust; cartels; competition policy; contracts; industry heterogeneity |
| JEL: | K12 L40 L41 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9362&r=law |
| By: | João Correia-da-Silva (CEF.UP e Faculdade de Economia do Porto.); Joana Pinho (CEF.UP e Faculdade de Economia do Porto.); Hélder Vasconcelos (Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações (ANACOM). CEF.UP e Faculdade de Economia do Porto.) |
| Abstract: | We study sustainability of collusion with optimal penal codes, in markets where demand growth may trigger the entry of a new firm. In contrast with grim trigger strategies, optimal penal codes make collusion easier to sustain before entry than after. We compare different reactions of the incumbents to entry in terms of: sustainability of collusion, incumbent’s profits, entrant’s profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. Surprisingly, the incumbent firms may prefer competition to collusion. |
| Keywords: | Collusion; Demand growth; Optimal penal codes; Reactions to entry. |
| JEL: | K21 L11 L13 |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:487&r=law |
| By: | Leung, Tin Cheuk |
| Abstract: | Music piracy is a double-edged sword for the music industry. On the one hand, it hurts record sales. On the other hand, it increases sales of its complements. To quantify the effect of music piracy, I construct a unique survey data set and use a Bayesian method to estimate the demand for music and iPods, and find three things. First, music piracy decreases music sales by 24% to 42%. Second, music piracy contributes 12% to iPod sales. Finally, counterfactual experiments show that Apple's revenue could increase by $36 per student if music were free. |
| Keywords: | demand estimation, iPod, music piracy |
| JEL: | K42 L14 L82 O34 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:45772&r=law |
| By: | Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut); Matthew J. Baker (Hunter College) |
| Abstract: | This introductory chapter provides an overview of the contents of the volume titled Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, forthcoming (Edward Elgar). |
| Keywords: | Economics of law, economic models |
| JEL: | K1 |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2013-07&r=law |