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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Rasmus Landersø (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University); Helena Skyt Nielsen (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University); Marianne Simonsen (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of school starting age on crime while relying on variation in school starting age induced by administrative rules; we exploit that Danish children typically start first grade in the calendar year they turn seven, which gives rise to a discontinuity in children’s school starting age. Analyses are carried out using register-based Danish data. We find that higher age at school start lowers the propensity to commit crime, but that this reduction is caused by incapacitation while human capital accumulation is unaffected. Importantly, we also find that the individuals who benefit most from being old-for-grade are those with high latent abilities whereas those with low latent ability seem to be unaffected by being old-for-grade in school. |
| Keywords: | old-for-grade, school start, criminal charges, violence, property crime |
| JEL: | I21 K42 |
| Date: | 2013–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2013-03&r=law |
| By: | Lauridsen, Jørgen T. (Centre of Health Economics Research (COHERE)); Zeren, Fatma (Department of Econometrics); Ari, Ayse (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The study investigates selected factors affecting crime rates in the EU-15 countries during the years 2000 to 2007 with an especial focus on inflation rate, level of education, income and employment. While these topics have been investigated in former studies, the present study adds by introducing spatial panel data methods to the case. Regarding the effects of these factors, the present study obtains results comparable to those from former studies, whereby the robustness of these are confirmed. |
| Keywords: | Determinants of crime rates; cost-benefit analysis of crime; EU countries; spatial panel data analysis |
| JEL: | A12 C50 K40 |
| Date: | 2013–01–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2013_002&r=law |
| By: | Guerino Ardizzi (Market and Payment Systems Oversight Department, Bank of Italy, Italy); Carmelo Petraglia (Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics, University of Basilicata, Italy); Massimiliano Piacenza (Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, Italy); Friedrich Schneider (Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Austria); Gilberto Turati (Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Anti–money laundering regulations have been centred on the “Know-Your-Customer” rule so far, overlooking the fact that criminal proceedings that need to be laundered are usually represented by cash. This is the first study aimed at providing an answer to the question of how much of cash deposited via an official financial institution can be traced back to criminal activities. The paper develops a new approach to measure money laundering and then proposes an application to Italy, a country where cash is still widely used in transactions and criminal activities generate significant proceeds to be laundered. In particular, we define a model of cash in-flows on current accounts and proxy money laundering with two indicators for the diffusion of criminal activities related to both illegal trafficking and extortion, controlling also for structural (legal) motivations to deposit cash, as well as the need to conceal proceeds from tax evasion. Using a panel of 91 Italian provinces observed over the period 2005-2008, we find that the amount of cash laundered is sizable, around 7% of GDP, 3/4 of which is due to illegal trafficking, while 1/4 is attributable to extortions. Furthermore, the incidence of “dirty money” coming from illegal trafficking is higher in the Centre-North than in the South, while the inverse is true for extortions. Results are useful to discuss policy initiatives to combat money laundering. |
| Keywords: | Money laundering, Shadow economy, Banking regulation |
| JEL: | K42 H26 G28 |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tur:wpapnw:018&r=law |
| By: | Gerritzen, Berit; Kirchgässner, Gebhard |
| Abstract: | Provided that the literature on the deterrent effect of capital punishment is overall inconclusive, the fact that individual authors persistently claim to have found solid evidence in one or the other direction raises two questions. Firstly, what are the causes for these different results? Do different data samples, estimation methods or time periods lead to different results or do the outcomes merely reflect prior convictions of the authors? Secondly, to what extent is it possible to derive such diverging results by slightly changing the specification of the test equations without violating scientific standards? After a survey of the over forty reviews of this literature available so far, we perform a meta-analysis of 102 deterrence studies published between 1975 and 2011. The profession of the author turns out to be the only statistically significant explanatory variable: Economists claim significantly more often to have found a significant deterrence effect than members of law or other social science departments. Furthermore, using a panel data set of U.S. states, we show how easy it is to derive contradictory results by employing alternative specifications. Thus, our results reinforce the claim that the empirical evidence presented to date is by far too fragile in order to base political decisions on it. |
| Keywords: | Death Penalty, Deterrence, Econometric Evidence, Ideology |
| JEL: | K14 K42 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2013:03&r=law |