New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2013‒02‒03
six papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University


  1. Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation? By Annelise Riles
  2. Cross-Border Spillover: U.S. Gun Laws and Violence in Mexico By Dube, Arindrajit; Dube, Oeindrila; García-Ponce, Omar
  3. Crime and conflicts in Africa: consequences of corruption? By Simplice A, Asongu; Oasis, Kodila-Tedika
  4. Fighting African Conflicts and Crimes: Which Governance Tools Matter? By Simplice A , Asongu; Oasis, Kodila-Tedika
  5. The economic crisis between liberalization and government intervention By Diacon, Paula-Elena
  6. Intermodal competition on some routes in transportation networks: The case of inter urban buses and railways By Bataille, Marc; Steinmetz, Alexander

  1. By: Annelise Riles (Jack G. Clarke Professor of Far East Legal Studies, Cornell Law School (E-mail: ar254@cornell.edu))
    Abstract: A central challenge for international financial regulatory systems today is how to manage the impact of Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) on the global economy, given the interconnected and pluralistic nature of regulatory regimes. This article focuses on the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and proposes a new research agenda regarding the FSBfs emerging regulatory forms. In particular, it examines the regulatory architecture of New Governance (NG), a variety of approaches that are supposed to be more reflexive, collaborative, and experimental than traditional forms of governance. A preliminary conclusion is that NG tools may be effective in resolving some kinds of problems in a pluralistic regulatory order, but they are unlikely to be suitable to all problems. As such, this article proposes that analyses of the precise conditions in which NG mechanisms may or may not be effective are necessary. It concludes with some recommendations for improving the NG model.
    Keywords: International Financial Regulation, Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Financial Stability Board, Regulatory Reform, New Governance, Regulatory Pluralism
    JEL: K23 K33
    Date: 2013–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ime:imedps:13-e-01&r=law
  2. By: Dube, Arindrajit (University of Massachusetts Amherst); Dube, Oeindrila (New York University); García-Ponce, Omar (New York University)
    Abstract: To what extent, and under what conditions, does access to arms fuel violent crime? To answer this question, we exploit a unique natural experiment: the 2004 expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban exerted a spillover on gun supply in Mexican municipios near Texas, Arizona and New Mexico, but not near California, which retained a pre-existing state-level ban. We find first that Mexican municipios located closer to the non-California border states experienced differential increases in homicides, gun-related homicides and crime gun seizures in the post-2004 period. Second, the magnitude of this effect is contingent on political factors related to Mexico's democratic transition. Killings increased substantially more in municipios where local elections had become more competitive prior to 2004, with the largest differentials emerging in high narco-trafficking areas. Our findings are consistent with the notion that political competition undermined informal agreements between drug cartels and entrenched local governments, highlighting the role of political instability in mediating the gun-crime relationship.
    Keywords: gun control, violence, informal employment, cross-border spillover, cartels
    JEL: K14 D72 D73
    Date: 2012–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7098&r=law
  3. By: Simplice A, Asongu; Oasis, Kodila-Tedika
    Abstract: With earthshaking and jaw-breaking levels of corruption in the African continent, the question on the extent to which corruption influences crime still remains unanswered. This paper assesses the effect of corruption (corruption-control) in 38 African countries using updated data. We find that, crime is highly positively (negatively) correlated with corruption (corruption-control). The potential mitigation effect (by corruption-control) is higher than the corresponding positive effect of corruption, implying, corruption-control offsets crime emanating beyond the corruption mechanism (inter alia, other poor governance mechanisms). The relationship is statistically strong when controlling for the number of police officers, age dependency, per capital economic prosperity, level of education, government effectiveness and population density. Given that crime is proxied by the level of organized internal conflict, the findings also sustain the substantial role of corruption in the birth and propagation of conflicts within and across Africa. Policy implications are discussed.
    Keywords: Security; Corruption; Crime; Conflicts; Africa
    JEL: O55 F52 O17 K42 P16
    Date: 2013–01–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:44043&r=law
  4. By: Simplice A , Asongu; Oasis, Kodila-Tedika
    Abstract: Crimes and conflicts are seriously undermining African development. This article assesses the best governance tools in the fight against the scourges. The following findings are established. (1) Democracy, autocracy and voice & accountability have no significant negative correlations with crime. (2) The increasing relevance of government quality in the fight is as follows: regulation quality, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law and corruption-control. (3) Corruption-control is the most effective mechanism in fighting crimes (conflicts). The findings are significantly strong when controlling for age dependency, number of police (and security) officers, per capita economic prosperity, educational level and population density. Justifications for the edge of corruption-control (as the most effective governance tool) and policy implications are discussed.
    Keywords: Security; Governance; Conflicts; Crime; Africa
    JEL: O55 F52 O17 K42 P16
    Date: 2013–01–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:44044&r=law
  5. By: Diacon, Paula-Elena
    Abstract: Abstract: The aim of this article is to provide a brief analysis of the current financial crisis, event that represents a major economic challenge and which reinforces the eternal dispute between the two economic thoughts: economic liberalization and government intervention. The analysis focuses on clarifying how these two concepts are represented, and the ways in which they have affected (or not) the recent events. Although the main variable in the crisis equation was supposed to be liberalization, this article finds out that it is the inadequate regulation that played an important role. In order to prevent such events, it is vital to properly understand the causes of the crisis and to identify the valuable lessons that can be learned.
    Keywords: financial crisis; economic liberalization; government intervention; regulation
    JEL: K20 B00 G01
    Date: 2013–01–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:44089&r=law
  6. By: Bataille, Marc; Steinmetz, Alexander
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of inter urban buses competing on a few routes against trains within an established railway network. In line with expectations, we show that this can lead to unprofitable train service on these routes. However, within an established railway network with every track being profitable, competition on just some tracks can result in a collapse of the entire network. External effects of individual routes on the railway network are fundamental for the profitability of the network. Hence, weakening these network effects might be crucial. As a result, efficient intermodal competition on some routes might cause the abandoning of other routes that are not facing any competition. This effect has to be taken into account by political actors when liberalization of inter urban bus travel is considered. --
    Keywords: Transportation,intermodal competition,network effects
    JEL: K2 L1 L5 R4
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:84&r=law

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