New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2013‒01‒19
two papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University

  1. Acquisitive Crime, Sentencing and Detection: An Analysis of England and Wales By Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay; Samrat Bhattacharya; Marianna Koli; Rudra Sensarma
  2. Sentencing in Criminal Cartel Cases in Ireland: the Duffy Judgment By Gorecki, Paul K.; Maxwell, Sarah

  1. By: Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay; Samrat Bhattacharya; Marianna Koli; Rudra Sensarma
    Abstract: We provide the first detailed econometric analysis of the impact of sentencing on various types of acquisitive crime (theft, burglary, fraud and robbery) in England and Wales. We examine (a) whether sentencing reduces crime and (b) whether short sentences are more effective than long sentences. Detection is another important explanatory variable whose potential endogeneity is addressed by instrumenting using lagged values of police expenditure and detection. Our results show that detection is significant and negatively affects all crime types while the impact of sentences is negative and significant for burglary and fraud in a linear specification. A quadratic specification for sentencing shows that the linear term is positive while the square term is negative for robbery suggesting short sentences may be counterproductive in reducing robbery. We also control for a number of socio-economic variables whose effects significantly affect crime.
    Keywords: crime, sentencing
    JEL: K42 C23
    Date: 2012–08
  2. By: Gorecki, Paul K.; Maxwell, Sarah
    Abstract: Despite 33 convictions of individuals and firms for criminal cartel offences in Ireland since 1996, there is only one reported judgment. The paper examines the Duffy judgment concerning a member of the Citroen motor vehicle cartel. The judgment provides some guidance on sentencing: cartels are pernicious and jail sentences are to be expected in future cases. However, no guidance is provided as to how the jail term for an individual will be determined or the fine for an individual or a firm. Despite the statement that cartels are pernicious, the fine levied on Duffy Motors was 1.3 per cent of the maximum fine under competition legislation and 1.1 per cent of the likely increase in profits due to firm's participation in the cartel. An alternative approach to sentencing is suggested that utilises a well developed methodology and is consistent with the view that cartels are pernicious, while at the same time leaving considerable judicial discretion in determining the ultimate sentence.
    Keywords: Ireland/Individuals/competition
    Date: 2012–12

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