New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2012‒10‒13
four papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University


  1. Regional Party Politics and the Right to Food in India By Shareen Hertel; Corinne Tagliarina
  2. Strategic Announcements of Reference Points in Disputes and Litigations By Andrea Gallice
  3. Reproductive Health Laws Around the World By Jocelyn E. Finlay; David Canning; June Y. T. Po
  4. Monopolistic Location Choice in Two-Sided Industries By Böhme, Enrico; Müller, Christopher

  1. By: Shareen Hertel (University of Connecticut); Corinne Tagliarina (University of Connecticut)
    Abstract: This paper explores the complex relationship between social movements, courts, and political parties in the recognition and fulfillment of human rights. We analyze social mobilization around the right to food in India since 2001, on the recent emergence of political parties' attention to the issue of contemporary food security. Drawing on original datasets (i.e., of media coverage and PILs over multiple decades), original interviews conducted in India in 2012, and analysis of multiple Indian political party platforms, we argue that the attention contemporary political parties are giving to food security did not emerge in a vacuum but that the "Right to Food" social movement has influenced the evolution of contemporary Indian party politics. Translating that influence into concrete policy reform nationally, however, remains an incomplete process.
    Keywords: Right to food, India, rights-based development
    JEL: K0 O1
    Date: 2012–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:ecriwp:21&r=law
  2. By: Andrea Gallice (Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, Italy)
    Abstract: This note shows how the frequent occurrence of seeing exceedingly high claims in disputes and litigations can be rationalized by a model in which claimants display reference dependent preferences, expect the judge to use a generalized social welfare function, and strategically announce their reference points.
    Keywords: reference points, claims, litigations
    JEL: D03 D63 K41
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tur:wpapnw:003&r=law
  3. By: Jocelyn E. Finlay (Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies); David Canning (Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies); June Y. T. Po (Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies)
    Abstract: We develop an index of reproductive health laws around the world. Laws regarding abortion, contraceptive pill, condom, intrauterine device, and sterilization are detailed for 186 countries from 1960 through to 2009. Using qualitative information dating from the 1960s, we code information on reproductive health laws around the world into panel data. In this paper we summarize the indexation of the laws, detailing the sources and methodologies we used to create the index. We show changes in the laws over time, and compare laws across countries. In addition, we demonstrate the potential use of the panel data by exploring the differential liberalization of reproductive health laws across country-level socioeconomic factors. We show that countries with more liberal abortion laws associated with higher income per capita, higher levels of female education, and lower fertility rates.
    Keywords: Fertility, Reproductive Health Laws, Abortion, Contraception
    Date: 2012–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gdm:wpaper:9612&r=law
  4. By: Böhme, Enrico; Müller, Christopher
    Abstract: We analyze the optimal location choice of a monopolistic firm that operates two platforms on a two-sided market. We show that the optimal platform locations are equivalent to the one-sided benchmark if both sides are either restricted to single- or multi-homing. In the mixed case (one side single-homes, the other one multi-homes), the optimal platform locations are determined by the relative profitability of both market sides. Our results indicate that modeling mergers on two-sided markets with fixed locations is often inappropriate.
    Keywords: two-sided markets; location choice; monopoly; merger simulation
    JEL: K20 L51 L12 D42
    Date: 2012–10–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:41761&r=law

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