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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut); Rebecca Rabon (University of Connecticut); Kathleen Segerson (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | When consumers vary in their susceptibility to product-related harm, safety regulation dominates liability because when consumers bear their own damages they are induced to selfselect in their purchase decisions. When consumers also misperceive risk, however, liability may be preferred because the price of the product accurately conveys the risk, thereby eliminating any distortions due to misperception. Generally, regulation is preferred when consumers accurately perceive risk, and liability is preferred when they do not. JEL Classification: K13, L51 Key words: Products liability, regulation, risk perceptions |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2012-15&r=law |
| By: | Paolo Buonanno; Ruben Durante; Giovanni Prarolo; Paolo Vanin |
| Abstract: | This study explains the emergence of the Sicilian mafia in the XIX century as the product of the interaction between natural resource abundance and weak institutions. We advance the hypothesis that the mafia emerged after the collapse of the Bourbon Kingdom in a context characterized by a severe lack of state property-right enforcement in response to the rising demand for the protection of sulfur - Sicily's most valuable export commodity - whose demand in the international markets was soaring at the time. We test this hypothesis combining data on the early presence of the mafia and on the distribution of sulfur reserves across Sicilian municipalities and find evidence of a positive and significant effect of sulphur availability on mafia's diffusion. These results remain unchanged when including department fixed-effects and various geographical and historical controls, when controlling for spatial correlation, and when comparing pairs of neighboring municipalities with and without sulfur. |
| Keywords: | Natural Resource Curse, Weak Institutions, Mafia-type Organizations |
| JEL: | K42 N33 N54 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wpaper:261&r=law |