New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2012‒05‒29
five papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University


  1. Stealing to Survive: Crime and Income Shocks in 19th Century France By Vincent Bignon; Eve Caroli; Roberto Galbiati
  2. Death tolls from natural disasters: Influence of interactions among fiscal decentralization, institutions and economic development By Eiji Yamamura
  3. The Consistency of Merger Decisions in a Developing Country: The South African Competition Commission By Sunel Grimbeek; Steven F. Koch; Richard J. Grimbeek
  4. Human Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution By Samuel Lee; Petra Persson
  5. Fixing the Patent Office By Mark A. Lemley

  1. By: Vincent Bignon (DGEI - DEMFI - Banque de France - Banque de France); Eve Caroli (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor - IZA, Legos - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine); Roberto Galbiati (EconomiX - CNRS : UMR7166 - Université Paris X - Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Sciences Po - Sciences Po)
    Abstract: We wish to thank Andrea Bassanini, Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa, Tommy Murphy, Tommaso Nannicini and seminar participants at University Bocconi for useful comments and discussions. Charlotte Coutand and Clement Malgouyres provided excellent research assistance. We also thank Pierre-Emmanuel Couralet and Fabien Gaveau who proved crucial in helping us with some of the data. We are grateful to Gilles Postel-Vinay for sharing with us his data on wine and phylloxera and for insightful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Banque de France or the Eurosystem. The usual disclaimer applies.
    Keywords: Crime ; Income shock ; Phylloxera ; 19th century France
    Date: 2011–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00623804&r=law
  2. By: Eiji Yamamura
    Abstract: Previous research shows that decentralization plays a key role in the reduction of damage caused by natural disasters. The effect of decentralization will differ according a country’s level of economic development. To investigate this matter further, this paper attempts to investigate how quality of institution influences the effectiveness of decentralization. This paper uses cross-country data from 1990 to 2000 to examine how decentralization, institution, and economic development influence the number of deaths caused by natural disasters. The major findings are that decentralization reduces deaths and its effect is strengthened in countries with lower level of public sector corruption and better functioning legal systems. Furthermore, the interaction between decentralization and high quality institutions has a greater contribution to the reduction of deaths in more developed countries. This implies that decentralization makes a greater contribution to mitigating damage in countries with higher quality institutions. However, when essential technology does not exist, decentralization and quality of institution play only a minor role in the mitigation of damage in the event of a natural disaster.
    Keywords: Natural disaster, law and order, corruption, economic development.
    JEL: D73 K10 O1 Q54
    Date: 2012–05–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eei:rpaper:eeri_rp_2012_08&r=law
  3. By: Sunel Grimbeek; Steven F. Koch; Richard J. Grimbeek
    Abstract: The South African Competition Commission's merger decisions for FY2002 through FY2009 are analyzed to empirically identify the factors historically influencing prohibition, conditional approval and unconditional approval. The key explanatory variables are linked to provisions of the 1998 Competition Act, such that the analysis provides insight into the consistency of merger decisions with respect to the legal requirements specified in the Act. Although the legislation includes standard economic concerns, it also includes a provision for advancing public interests and development concerns. Initial results point to differing behaviour over the time period, which suggests that the Commission is inconsistent; however, those inconsistencies are removed, once additional measures of market contestibility are included in the analysis. The final results suggest that the Commission is less likely to approve mergers that they link to markets that are less contestable. In addition to protecting competition, the Commission is simultaneously protecting other public interests. Therefore, our research supports the hypothesis that the Commission consistently applies its legislative remit.
    Keywords: South African Competition Commission, Merger Decisions
    JEL: K21 L40 D78
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rza:wpaper:286&r=law
  4. By: Samuel Lee; Petra Persson
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:12-07&r=law
  5. By: Mark A. Lemley
    Abstract: How can we allow patent examiners to effectively distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions, without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? This essay reviews the recent literature and considers a number of proposals and their limitations. It concludes that the system can be improved, but that we are unlikely to solve the problem of bad patents altogether. The focus in reform discussions should be on understanding and changing applicant and examiner incentives rather than simply spending money.
    JEL: K30
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18081&r=law

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