New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2012‒03‒21
two papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University


  1. The Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions on Property Crime By John M. Nunley; Richard Alan Seals Jr.; Joachim Zietz
  2. Commitments in Antitrust By Philippe Choné; Saïd Souam; Arnold Vialfont

  1. By: John M. Nunley; Richard Alan Seals Jr.; Joachim Zietz
    Abstract: This paper examines the impact of inflation, (un)employment, and stock market growth on the rates of larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery. The study uses U.S. data for the time period 1948 to 2009. We employ an unobserved component approach to circumvent the problems associated with omitted variables. We find that the three macroeconomic variables have a statistically significant impact for most of the property crime rates. However, taken together the macroeconomic variables explain no more than 15 percent of the surge in property crimes from the 1960 to the 1980s and their subsequent fall during the 1990s. Among the macroeconomic variables, almost all of the explanatory power is provided by changes in the inflation rate.
    Keywords: Murder Rate; Demographic Change; Age Composition; Crime; Misery Index
    JEL: J10 J11
    Date: 2011–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:abn:wpaper:auwp2011-06&r=law
  2. By: Philippe Choné; Saïd Souam; Arnold Vialfont
    Abstract: Competition agencies have the power to close an antitrust case in return for the commitment to end the alleged infringement. We examine how such a procedure affects deterrence and consumer welfare. We first show that it lowers the deterrent effect of competition policy. However, under asymmetric information, commitments may enhance consumer surplus with shortened proceedings and avoidance of trial type-II errors. The variation of consumer harm w.r.t. the firm's gain from the practice determines the optimal usage frequency of this negotiation tool. Finally, we show that trial and commitments may be complements as the latter is not always an answer to a lack of efficiency of the agency.
    Keywords: Commitments in antitrust, Plea bargaining, Consumer Surplus
    JEL: K21 K42 L41
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2012-9&r=law

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