New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2012‒03‒08
two papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University

  1. Crime, Fertility, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence By Kyriakos C. Neanidis; Vea Papadopoulou
  2. Aggregate Litigation and Regulatory Innovation: Another View of Judicial Efficiency By Ramello, Giovanni B.

  1. By: Kyriakos C. Neanidis; Vea Papadopoulou
    Abstract: This paper studies the link between crime and fertility and the way by which they jointly impact on economic growth. In a three-period overlapping generations model, where health status in adulthood depends on health in childhood, adult agents allocate their time to work, leisure, child rearing and criminal activities. An autonomous increase in the probability o¤enders face in escaping apprehension, increases both crime and fertility non-monotonically, giving rise to an ambiguous e¤ect on growth. A cross-country empirical examination, based on data that span four decades, supports the non-linear e¤ects on both crime and fertility. At the same time, it reveals a negative effect on output growth.
    Date: 2012
  2. By: Ramello, Giovanni B.
    Abstract: In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this light, aggregate litigation thus can be equally seen as an incubator for regulation.
    Keywords: aggregate litigation, efficiency, market for risk, hierarchy, regulation, innovation, asbestos
    JEL: K41 O31 G32 L23
    Date: 2012–01

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