New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2012‒02‒27
four papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University

  1. The Crime of Tax Evasion in Transition Economies By Barbara G. Katz; Joel Owen
  2. Aggregate litigation and regulatory innovation: another view of judicial efficiency By Giovanni Battista Ramello
  3. Private antitrust enforcement revisited: The role of private incentives to report evidence to the antitrust authority By Tim Reuter
  4. Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-Ins By Simon Gleeson

  1. By: Barbara G. Katz; Joel Owen
    Date: 2011
  2. By: Giovanni Battista Ramello
    Abstract: In this article, we argue that aggregate litigation and the court system can not only restore the protection of victims and the production of deterrence, but also play a pivotal role in stimulating regulatory innovation. This is accomplished through a reward system that seems largely to mimic the institutional devices used in other domains, such as intellectual property rights, by defining a proper set of incentives. Precisely the described solution relies on creating a specific economic framework able to foster economies of scale and grant a valuable property right over a specific litigation to an entrepreneurial individual, who in exchange provides the venture capital needed for the legal action, and produces inputs and focal points for amending regulations. In this light, aggregate litigation thus can be equally seen as an incubator for regulation.
    Keywords: aggregate litigation, efficiency, market for risk, hierarchy, regulation, innovation, asbestos
    JEL: K41 O31 G32 L23
    Date: 2011–12
  3. By: Tim Reuter (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)
    Abstract: It is commonly believed that the possibility to sue privately for antitrust damages decreases the number of type II errors in enforcement at the cost of creating more type I errors. We extend the analysis by taking into account the fact that private parties often submit evidence during public prosecution. Such parties consider private suit as a partial substitute for public prosecution, as both imply desistance of the violation. The trial option might induce these parties to be less willing to contribute evidence to public cases. Private trials crowd out public prosecution and can have ambiguous effects on the number of enforcement errors.
    Keywords: private and public enforcement, damages, antitrust litigation
    JEL: K21 K41 K42 L41
    Date: 2012–02–13
  4. By: Simon Gleeson
    Abstract: The aim of the bail-in proposal is that governments should have an alternative option to taxpayer-funded rescues of systemic banks.
    Date: 2012–02

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