New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2012‒01‒10
two papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University


  1. Transnational Trafficking, Law Enforcement and Victim Protection: A Middleman Trafficker's Perspective By Akee, Randall K. Q.; Bedi, Arjun S.; Basu, Arnab K.; Chau, Nancy
  2. The Google Book search settlement: A law and economics analysis By Müller-Langer, Frank

  1. By: Akee, Randall K. Q. (Tufts University); Bedi, Arjun S. (ISS, Erasmus University Rotterdam); Basu, Arnab K. (College of William and Mary); Chau, Nancy (Cornell University)
    Abstract: We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market – the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers' demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand.
    Keywords: human trafficking, two-way Nash bargaining, victim protection, law enforcement
    JEL: K42 R23 O15
    Date: 2011–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6226&r=law
  2. By: Müller-Langer, Frank
    Abstract: Beginning in December 2004 Google has pursued a new project to create a book search engine (Google Book Search). The project has released a storm of controversy around the globe. While the supporters of Google Book Search conceive the project as a first reasonable step towards unlimited access to knowledge in the information age, its opponents fear profound negative effects due to an erosion of copyright law. Our law and economics analysis of the Book Search Project suggests that – from a copyright perspective – the proposed settlement may be beneficial to right holders, consumers, and Google. For instance, it may provide a solution to the still unsolved dilemma of orphan works. From a competition policy perspective, we stress the important aspect that Google’s pricing algorithm for orphan and unclaimed works effectively replicates a competitive Nash-Bertrand market outcome under post-settlement, third-party oversight.
    Keywords: Book Rights Registry; Competition Policy; Copyright; Fair Use; Google Book Search; Library Program; Orphan Works
    JEL: K20 O34 K21 L43 K11
    Date: 2011–06–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:35705&r=law

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