| By: |
Camille Chaserant;
Sophie Harnay |
| Abstract: |
This article provides a rationalization of (at least partial) professional
self-regulation resting on the joint production of individual and collective
reputations and its impact on the quality of professional services. It
presents a short model that aims to show that (i) a high-quality steady-state
exists in a market for a credence goods and that (ii) the likelihood of high
quality increases when the market is self-regulated by the profession in
comparison to the situation where there is no self-regulation. The law and
economics literature usually criticizes self-regulation as a modern form of
corporatism; we show that it may help to regulate quality when clients are
faced with opportunistic professionals. |
| Keywords: |
professional services, credence goods, self-regulation, individual reputation, collective reputation |
| JEL: |
K4 L14 L15 L43 L84 D8 |
| Date: |
2011 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-32&r=law |