New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2011‒10‒22
five papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University


  1. Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information By Ian A. MacKenzie; Markus Ohndorf
  2. Law and finance in Africa By Simplice A., Asongu
  3. Law, economic growth and human development By Simplice A., Asongu
  4. Taxes, lawyers, and the decline of witch trials in France By Johnson, Noel D; Koyama, Mark
  5. Copyright Protection, Technological Change, and the Quality of New Products: Evidence from Recorded Music since Napster By Joel Waldfogel

  1. By: Ian A. MacKenzie (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Markus Ohndorf (ETH Zurich, Switzerland)
    Abstract: Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator’s optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability.
    Keywords: Environmental regulation, Project-based emissions trading systems, Audits and compliance.
    JEL: K32 D42 D82 Q58
    Date: 2011–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-152&r=law
  2. By: Simplice A., Asongu
    Abstract: This paper assesses how legal-origin influences financial development through regulation quality and the rule of law. It uses data collected after pioneering works on the law-finance nexus to assess hypotheses resulting there-from in the context of Africa. Distinctions are made between English, French, French sub-Saharan, Portuguese and North African countries in how their legal origins affect financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, size and activity. In terms of policy implications results support the benefits of law channels to financial development in the continent.
    Keywords: Law; finance; banks; Africa
    JEL: O1 K2 G2 P5 K4
    Date: 2011–09–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34080&r=law
  3. By: Simplice A., Asongu
    Abstract: This paper cuts adrift the mainstream approach to the legal-origins debate on the law-growth nexus by integrating both overall economic and human components in our understanding of how regulation quality and the rule of law lie at the heart of economic and inequality adjusted human developments. Findings summarily reveal that legal-origin does not explain economic growth and human development beyond the mechanisms of law channels. As a policy implication results support benefits of the rule of law and quality of regulation as channels to economic growth and human development.
    Keywords: Law; economic growth; human development; developing countries
    JEL: O1 K2 P5 I0 K4
    Date: 2011–10–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34082&r=law
  4. By: Johnson, Noel D; Koyama, Mark
    Abstract: This paper explores the rise of the fiscal state in the early modern period and its impact on legal capacity. To measure legal capacity, we establish that witchcraft trials were more likely to take place where the central state had weak legal insti- tutions. Combining data on the geographic distribution of witchcraft trials with unique panel data on tax receipts across 21 French regions, we find that the rise of the tax state can account for much of the decline in witch trials during this period. Further historical evidence supports our hypothesis that higher taxes led to better legal institutions.
    Keywords: Rule of Law; Witchcraft; France; Institutions; Fiscal Capacity; Legal Capacity
    JEL: K0 H2 P48 K14 N43
    Date: 2011–10–21
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34266&r=law
  5. By: Joel Waldfogel
    Abstract: Recent technological changes may have altered the balance between technology and copyright law for digital products. While file-sharing has reduced revenue, other technological changes have reduced the costs of bringing creative works to market. As a result, we don’t know whether the effective copyright protection currently available provides adequate incentives to bring forth a steady stream of valuable new products. This paper assesses the quality of new recorded music since Napster, using three independent approaches. The first is an index of the quantity of high-quality music based on critics’ retrospective lists. The second and third approaches rely directly on music sales and airplay data, respectively, using of the idea that if one vintage’s music is better than another’s, its superior quality should generate higher sales or greater airplay through time, after accounting for depreciation. The three resulting indices of vintage quality for the past half-century are both consistent with each other and with other historical accounts of recorded music quality. There is no evidence of a reduction in the quality of music released since Napster, and the two usage-based indices suggest an increase since 1999. Hence, researchers and policymakers thinking about the strength of copyright protection should supplement their attention to producer surplus with concern for consumer surplus as well.
    JEL: K11 L82
    Date: 2011–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17503&r=law

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