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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Alberto Chong (Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University); Pascal Restrepo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We provide evidence of the Peltzman effect by tracking the professional path of each hockey player that ended up in the National Hockey League from 2001 to 2006. We take advantage of the fact that visor use has not always been compulsory throughout a player's career, which allows us to compare the change in behavior of users and non-users of visors when they are forced to use them. We find that whereas the average penalty minutes per game is 0.8, visors cause a substantial increase of 0.2 penalty minutes per game. Players become more aggressive when forced to wear a visor, partially offsetting its protective effect and creating potential spillover effects to other players. |
| Keywords: | Peltzman Effect, Ice Hockey, Compensating Behavior |
| JEL: | K32 K23 H40 |
| Date: | 2011–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2011-12&r=law |
| By: | Damian Chalmers; Mariana Chaves |
| Abstract: | Explanations of the dynamics of EU judicial politics must also account for its incidence, namely when and in which sectors litigation of EU law and ECJ judgments occur. This incidence, it is suggested relies on a relationship between three arenas, those for norm-setting, litigation and judgments, as events in each of these arena conditions possibilities for action in the others. This paper analyses the relationship between these arenas through a study of all 2007-9 preliminary rulings and finds EU judicial politics characterised by two predominant dynamics. ‘Patrol norms’ dedicated to securing common policies give rise to low salient judgments dominated by transnational enterprise and national administration litigation. ‘Thickly evaluative norms’ are concerned with articulating certain values. Dominated by litigation by domestic undertakings and non-commercial actors, these norms generate the Court’s salient judgments. |
| Keywords: | Court of Justice; judicial politics; preliminary rulings |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eiq:eileqs:43&r=law |
| By: | Salzberger, Eli (University of Haifa) |
| Abstract: | The term "intellectual property" is a relatively a modern term, first used in its current meaning when the UN established the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967. Beforehand laws around the world protected various aspects of informational goods - inventions and creations - using separate legal concepts, such as copyright, patents and trademarks, which were not perceived as property rights. This linguistic aspect is by no means anecdotal or marginal as it can be argued that the term "intellectual property" constituted its contemporary meaning including the economic analysis of informational goods and services, as can be demonstrated by the recent call to treat trade secrets not as a contractual agreement but as intellectual property (Epstein, 2005). This paper focuses on the normative analysis of IP rights and criticizes the implicit shift in economic analysis of IP from the incentives paradigm, which is founded upon the public good analysis of neo-classical micro-economic theory, to the new propriety paradigm, which is intellectually founded upon the tragedy of the commons literature. It further criticizes the dominant contemporary Law and Economics writings in this field as pre-assuming information to be an object of property, overlooking its fundamental differences from physical property and thus focusing on its management and maximization of value for its "owners" rather than on its initial justifications and its social value and contribution to innovation, growth and progress. |
| Keywords: | Law; intellectual property; growth; incentives |
| JEL: | K11 O31 O34 O43 |
| Date: | 2011–09–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0177&r=law |