New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2011‒10‒01
seven papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University

  1. "Robin Hook": The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy By Anja Shortland
  2. Stealing to Survive: Crime and Income Shocks in 19th Century France By Vincent Bignon; Eve Caroli; Roberto Galbiati
  3. Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency By Levent Koçkesen; Murat Usman
  4. Has Deregulation Increased Investment in Infrastructure?: Firm-Level Evidence from OECD Countries By Sónia Araújo
  5. Stealing to Survive: Crime and Income Shocks in 19th Century France By Bignon, Vincent; Caroli, Eve; Galbiati, Roberto
  6. Constitutional Justice and the Perennial Task of Constitutionalizing Law and Society through Participatory Justice By Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
  7. The need for revised resolution regimes and supervisory arrangements By Ojo, Marianne

  1. By: Anja Shortland
    Abstract: Naval counter-piracy measures off Somalia have failed to change the incentives for pirates, raising calls for land-based approaches that may involve replacing piracy as a source of income. This paper evaluates the effects of piracy on the Somali economy to establish which (domestic) groups benefit from ransom monies. Given the paucity of economic data on Somalia, we evaluate province-level market data, nightlight emissions and high resolution satellite imagery. We show that significant amounts of ransom monies are spent within Somalia. The impacts appear to be spread widely, benefiting the working poor and pastoralists and offsetting the food price shock of 2008 in the pirate provinces. Pirates appear to invest their money principally in the main cities of Garowe and Bosasso rather than in the backward coastal communities.
    Keywords: Somalia, piracy, cash transfers, economic development, remote sensing, satellite imaging
    JEL: K42 O17 O18 R11
    Date: 2011
  2. By: Vincent Bignon (DGEI - DEMFI - Banque de France - Banque de France); Eve Caroli (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - INRA, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX, IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor - IZA, Legos - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion des Organisations de Santé - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); Roberto Galbiati (EconomiX - CNRS : UMR7166 - Université de Paris X - Nanterre, Sciences Po - Sciences Po)
    Abstract: We wish to thank Andrea Bassanini, Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa, Tommy Murphy, Tommaso Nannicini and seminar participants at University Bocconi for useful comments and discussions. Charlotte Coutand and Clement Malgouyres provided excellent research assistance. We also thank Pierre-Emmanuel Couralet and Fabien Gaveau who proved crucial in helping us with some of the data. We are grateful to Gilles Postel-Vinay for sharing with us his data on wine and phylloxera and for insightful comments and suggestions. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Banque de France or the Eurosystem. The usual disclaimer applies.
    Keywords: Crime ; Income shock ; Phylloxera ; 19th century France
    Date: 2011–09
  3. By: Levent Koçkesen (Koc University); Murat Usman (Koc University)
    Abstract: We model the settlement of a legal dispute where the trial outcome depends on the behavior of a strategically motivated judge. We consider a standard asymmetric information model where the uninformed defendant makes a take it or leave it offer. If the case goes to trial, the judge decides how much effort to exert to learn about the actual damages inflicted on the plaintiff. We show that under very general assumptions the model exhibits multiple equilibria. In equilibria in which the judge exerts less effort more cases settle out of court, and vice versa. The judge is better off in low effort equilibria, with a higher settlement rate. However, the terms of the settlement heavily favor the informed plaintiff, and consequently induce over-investment in ex ante preventive care by the defendant.
    Keywords: Litigation, settlement, trial, judges
    JEL: K00 K41 D82 C78
    Date: 2011–09
  4. By: Sónia Araújo
    Abstract: This paper investigates the role played by deregulation on firms’ investment decisions in infrastructure sectors. The analysis covers the period 1980-2006, which was characterised by increased liberalisation and privatisation across OECD countries. We assess the relationship of different dimensions of the regulatory framework, such as the degree of barriers to entry, public ownership, vertical unbundling and the existence of an independent regulator with firm level investment behaviour. We find that the impact of regulation on investment is both sector and firm specific. A reduction in the degree of legal barriers to entry spurs investment in the electricity sector, but only for large firms. In telecommunications, the converse is true with barriers to entry having a negative effect on smaller firms’ investment rates. The existence of an independent regulatory authority spurs investment by telecommunication companies but this effect seems to be driven by large firms alone while it is associated with a reduction in investment levels by smaller companies in the gas sector. In Europe, the degree of vertical integration is positively associated with investment rates in the electricity sector.<P>La déréglementation favorise-t-elle les investissements en infrastructure? : Analyse basée sur les entreprises des pays de l'OCDE<BR>Ce papier vise à étudier l’effet des politiques de déréglementation sur les investissements des entreprises des secteurs des infrastructures. L’analyse s’étend sur la période 1980-2006, qui a été caractérisée par la libéralisation et la privatisation des secteurs des infrastructures dans les pays de l’OCDE. Nous évaluons le rapport de plusieurs dimensions du cadre réglementaire, comme le niveau des barrières à l’entrée, détention publique, intégration verticale et l’existence d’un régulateur sectoriel indépendant avec le niveau d’investissement des entreprises. L’analyse montre que l’impact du cadre réglementaire sur l’investissement varie selon le secteur et le type d’entreprise. Une réduction des barrières à l’entrée encourage l’investissement dans le secteur de l’électricité, mais seulement pour les grandes entreprises. Dans le secteur des télécommunications, l’effet est l’inverse, avec un effet négatif des barrières à l’entrée sur l’investissement des entreprises les plus petites. L’existence d’un régulateur sectoriel indépendant favorise l’investissement dans le secteur des télécommunications, mais cet effet semble être produit uniquement par les grandes entreprises du secteur, tandis que pour les entreprises les plus petites du secteur du gaz un régulateur indépendant défavorise l’investissement. En Europe, le degré d’intégration verticale est positivement associé au taux d’investissement dans le secteur de l’électricité.
    Keywords: investment, regulation, infrastructure, firm level data, investissement, réglementation, infrastructure, données de firmes
    JEL: K2 L5 L92 L94 L95 L96
    Date: 2011–09–19
  5. By: Bignon, Vincent; Caroli, Eve; Galbiati, Roberto
    Abstract: Using department level administrative data from 1826 to 1936 we document the evolution of crime rates in 19th century France and we estimate the impact of a negative income shock on crime. Our identification strategy exploits the phylloxera crisis. Between 1863 and 1890, phylloxera destroyed about 40% of French vineyards. Using the departmental variation in the timing of this shock we instrument wine production and we identify the effects of the shock on property and violent crime rates. Our estimates suggest that the phylloxera crisis did not significantly impact on violent crimes but caused a strong increase in property crimes. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the phylloxera crisis caused an increase in property crime rates of about ten percent.
    Keywords: crime; income shock; phylloxera; 19th century France
    JEL: K42 N33 R11
    Date: 2011–09
  6. By: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
    Abstract: This contribution argues that concepts of social justice in European and international private law must remain consistent with the principles of justice underlying European and international public law. The contribution begins with a brief explanation of the diversity of conceptions of constitutional justice and of their legal impact on ever more fields of European public and private law (1). After clarifying the constitutional terminology used in this contribution (2), Rawlsian principles of justice for national and international law (3) are distinguished from multilevel human rights as principles of justice (4), multilevel judicial protection of constitutional rights and rule of law by ‘courts of justice’ (5), and the diverse forms of democratic and private ‘participatory justice’ for transforming legal and social relationships (6). The constitutional dimensions of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (as discussed in section 7) confirm that the ‘many concepts of social justice in European private law’ - the focus of this conference book - must be construed and developed with due regard to the diverse dimensions of ‘constitutional justice’ in European and international public law.
    Keywords: fundamental/human rights; European Court of Justice; European law
    Date: 2010–03–01
  7. By: Ojo, Marianne
    Abstract: In October 2010, having drawn crucial lessons fom the Financial Crisis which was triggered in 2007, and whose impact was still evident at the time, the Financial Stability Board Recommendations on systemically important financial institutions „called for an assessment, on the basis of the BCBS Recommendations and the draft FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes (FSB Key Attributes), of national authorities’ capacity to resolve SIFIs under existing resolution regimes and of the legislative and other changes to national resolution regimes and policies needed to accomplish effective resolution.“ As well as attempting to highlight why much greater initiatives and efforts are required in relation to exit mechanisms for failing banks – that is, greater initiatives and efforts than prudential aspects of regulation which embrace capital adequacy procedures, this paper also draws attention to vital steps that could be taken at international level to make cross-border resolutions more effective.
    Keywords: lender of last resort; special resolution regime; Financial Crisis; liquidation; bankruptcy; systemic risks; living wills; bailing in; resolution procedures; deposit protection; liquidity
    JEL: K2
    Date: 2011–09

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