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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Paul Hallwood (University of Connecticut); Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | Article 100 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea requires signatories to “cooperate” against maritime piracy, but “cooperate” is undefined. Enforcement is a public good – creating uncompensated benefits for others, so suffering from free-rider problems. Our analysis readily explains why more pirates captured are released than prosecuted; why the U.N. and International Maritime Organization are seeking to reduce enforcement costs; why some in the shipping industry want to apply the 1988 Convention against terrorism at sea; and why still others want to move prosecution of pirates out of national courts to an international court. |
| Keywords: | International law, law enforcement, maritime piracy |
| JEL: | K14 K33 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2011-12&r=law |
| By: | Eckert, Heather (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Eckert, Andrew (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The number of gasoline stations in Canada fell by 40 percent between 1989 and 2000. Many demand and competition related explanations have been offered for this rationalization, while industry sources cite stiffer environmental regulations as a factor in station closures. In the late 1980s and early 1990s most Canadian provinces adopted regulations requiring that unprotected petroleum storage tanks be upgraded or replaced according to a schedule based on the age of the tank and that nearby unprotected tanks also be upgraded or removed. In this paper, we exploit provincial differences in the timing of these regulations to examine the role of upgrade and removal regulations on the timing and degree of station shutdown in 12 cities across the country. |
| Keywords: | petroleum storage; rationalization; retail gasoline; underground storage tanks; environmental regulations |
| JEL: | K20 L81 Q58 |
| Date: | 2011–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2011_007&r=law |
| By: | Hornuf, Lars |
| Date: | 2011–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:dissen:13102&r=law |
| By: | Tim Krieger (University of Mainz); Daniel Meierrieks (University of Paderborn) |
| Abstract: | Terrorism causes enormous costs to society. Since the 9/11 attacks, the “war on terror” has therefore been an important challenge to all civilized countries. In the present contribution we analyze the root causes and costs of terrorist activity, thereby setting the stage for discussing the need for measures against terrorist financing. We argue that running a terrorist organization requires substantial financial resources which are transferred to the groups through clandestine and often illegal channels. Anti-money laundering policies may appear useful measures to stop transfers to terrorist groups; however, they are not sufficient means to deal with all facets of terrorist financing. Compared to similar activities of organized crime, terrorist financing involves “reverse” money laundering. This is a consequence of some fundamental differences between terrorism and organized crime, which also lead to different impl ications in terms of choosing appropriat e counter-measures. |
| Keywords: | terrorist financing, causes and costs of terrorism, money laundering, organized crime vs. terrorism, anti-terrorist financing policies |
| JEL: | K42 H56 D74 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:wpaper:40&r=law |