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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Elisabetta Iossa (Faculty of Economics, University of Rome "Tor Vergata"); Bruno Jullien (University of Toulouse 1) |
| Abstract: | Studying the strategic interaction between litigants, lawyers and judges, we analyze the value of the quality of legal representation and how public information over quality affects the outcome of the judicial process. Judges have reputational concerns and the quality of lawyers is reflected in knowledge of legal principles and in proof-taking ability. Deriving the demand for legal representation and the market equilibrium, we show that higher quality of legal representation is welfare increasing but better information over quality may be welfare reducing. We discuss the implications of our results on the desirability of quality ceritfication, such as the Queen's Counselor system |
| Keywords: | Carrer Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers |
| JEL: | D82 K40 |
| Date: | 2010–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:170&r=law |
| By: | Yamamura, Eiji |
| Abstract: | Using Japanese panel data for 2006-2009, this study attempts to examine how the pass rate of law school students taking the new bar examination influences the number of applicants for the law school in the following years. The major finding is that the higher the law school student pass rate, the greater the number of applicants for the law school becomes. Furthermore, the positive effect of the pass rate is larger for a prestigious university’s law school than for other schools. It follows that the “brand” and the school’s current performance are complementary in increasing demand for places in the law school. |
| Keywords: | Brand; Bar examination; Demand; Law school |
| JEL: | K40 L89 D83 |
| Date: | 2010–07–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:24257&r=law |
| By: | Ehrlich, Isaac; Saito, Tetsuya |
| Abstract: | The interaction between offenders and potential victims has so far received relatively little attention in the literature on the economics of crime. The main objective of this paper is twofold: to extend the “market for offenses model” to deal with both “product” and “factor” markets, and to apply it to the case where guns are used for crime commission by offenders and for self-protection by potential victims. Our analysis offers new insights about the association between crime and guns and the limits it imposes on the efficacy of law enforcement and regulatory policies aimed to control both crime and guns. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:reg:wpaper:587&r=law |
| By: | Yoo, Christopher S. |
| Abstract: | This article, written for the inaugural issue of a new journal, analyzes the extent to which the convergence of broadcasting and telephony induced by the digitization of communications technologies is forcing policymakers to rethink their basic approach to regulating these industries. Now that voice and video are becoming available through every transmission technology, policymakers can no longer define the scope of regulatory obligations in terms of the mode of transmission. In addition, jurisdictions that employ separate agencies to regulate broadcasting and telephony must reform their institutional structures to bring both within the ambit of a single regulatory agency. The emergence of intermodal competition will also place pressure on both telephone-style regulation, which protects against monopoly pricing and vertical exclusion, as well as broadcast-style regulation, which focuses on content and ownership structure. It will also force regulators to rethink social policies such as universal service and public broadcasting. At the same time, it is possible that convergence will be incomplete and that end users will maintain more than one network connection, which would reduce the danger of anticompetitive activity and allow policymakers to stop short of forcing every connection to be everything to everyone. Lastly, the increase in traffic volumes associated with the advent of Internet video may require the deployment of multicast protocols, content delivery networks, and more aggressive traffic management, all of which potentially implicate the debate over network neutrality currently taking place in the U.S. This article was published in Communications & Convergence Review 2009, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 44-55. |
| Keywords: | Technology and Industry |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:reg:rpubli:571&r=law |
| By: | Ginsburg, Douglas H.; Moore, Derek W. |
| Abstract: | Neoclassical economics or “price theory†has had a profound effect upon antitrust analysis, first as practiced in academia and then as reflected in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States. More recently, behavioral economics has had a large and growing influence upon legal scholarship generally. Still, behavioral economics has not yet affected judicial decisions in the United States in any substantive area of law. The question we address is whether that is likely to change in the foreseeable future, i.e., whether the courts’ present embrace of price theory in antitrust cases portends the courts’ imminent acceptance of behavioral economics in either antitrust or consumer protection cases. |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:reg:rpubli:598&r=law |