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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Alain Marciano; Sophie Harnay |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this article is to discuss Posner's economic analysis of law and to analyse the differences between his economic analysis of law and law and economics. We propose and demonstrate a twofold original argument. First, we show that Posner does not only propose an economic analysis of the working of the legal system but also that his approach has changed in the early 1970s, shifting from a law and economics perspective in which the focus is put on the working of the economic system to an economic analysis of law in which the emphasis is put on the functioning of the legal system. He appears then no longer influenced by Aaron Director and Ronald Coase but rather by Gary Becker. Therefore, and this is the second part of our demonstration, we show that the evolution in Posner's works essentially derives from the influence of Becker and the adoption by the former of the methodological views of the latter. More precisely, we claim that Posner no longer retains a -- restrictive -- definition of economics by subject matter but that he aligns himself on Becker and his broader definition of economics placing nonmarket decisions and method at the core of the discipline. In other words, we argue that Posner is the first who transposes Becker’s definition of economics in law and economics and that this is precisely what makes Posner's economic analysis of law possible and specific, and also of particular importance. |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:09-2008&r=law |
| By: | Federico M. Mucciarelli |
| Abstract: | To avoid the cumulative application of takeover regulation of more jurisdictions, it is common practice to exclude from the offer shareholders resident in countries adopting extraterritorial conflict rules. Among such countries, the most significant case is that of US securities regulation: according to US case-law, in order to avoid the application of US takeover regulation and anti-fraud provisions, bidders should completely exclude any publicity of the offer in the US or to US resident and consider acceptances from US residents as void. However, such restrictions could be at odds with the principle of equal treatments of target’s shareholders, provided for by the EU Takeover Directive. In the paper, I argue that only restrictions to dissemination could be reconciled with the equality principle. On the contrary, restrictions to acceptance represent a clear violation of such principle, which can be admitted only if the cumulative application of US law would make the offer unfeasible. |
| Keywords: | Cross-border tender offers; choice-of-law; US securities law; EC Takeover Directive; exclusion of US holders |
| JEL: | K22 K33 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:wcefin:09051&r=law |