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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Hans-Jörg Trenz |
| Abstract: | This article addresses the critical issue of how constitutional designing of the EU is related to the expression of collective identities. A European collective identity is perceived in terms of the discursive representation of the underlying demos of a European democracy. Against the common view that holds the self-identified political community as prior and independent of constitutional designing, it is claimed that democracy rather operates through the identification of popular subjectness. The demos is signified and recognised as distinct and internally coherent through democratic practice. In the empirical part, it is tested out to what extent public debates on EU constitution-making were linked to the identification of popular subjectness. By drawing on a comparative media survey of constitutional debates from 2002-2007, the paper distinguishes different markers of collective identities (national, European or multiple) that were used for representing and signifying democratic subjects in the EU. |
| Keywords: | Constitution for Europe; democracy; European identity; European public space; media |
| Date: | 2009–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0041&r=law |
| By: | Schouten, Michael C. |
| Abstract: | The use of equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares (“hidden ownership”) is increasingly drawing attention from the financial community, as is the exercise of voting power without corresponding economic interest (“empty voting”). Market participants and commentators have called for expansion of ownership disclosure rules, and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are now contemplating how to respond. Yet, in order to design appropriate responses it is key to understand why we have ownership disclosure rules in the first place. This understanding currently appears to be lacking, which may explain why we observe divergent approaches between countries. The case for mandatory ownership disclosure has also received remarkably little attention in the literature, which has focused almost exclusively on mandatory issuer disclosure. Perhaps this is because most people assume that ownership disclosure is a good thing. But why is such information important, and to whom? This paper aims to answer these fundamental questions, using the European disclosure regime as an example. First, the paper identifies two main objectives of ownership disclosure: improving market efficiency and corporate governance. Next, the paper explores the various mechanisms through which ownership disclosure performs these tasks. This sets the stage for an analysis of hidden ownership and empty voting that demonstrates why these phenomena are so problematic. |
| Keywords: | ownership disclosure; market efficiency; corporate governance; monitoring; hidden ownership; empty voting; hedge fund activism |
| JEL: | K20 G38 K22 G34 G10 G30 |
| Date: | 2009–03–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14138&r=law |