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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Amanda Carmignani (Bank of Italy); Silvia Giacomelli (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | The functioning of the Italian civil justice system is characterized by deep regional disparities: the length of legal proceedings is on average significantly higher in the South than in the rest of Italy. Using mainly a descriptive approach, this paper documents these differences and investigates possible explanations examining the number of proceedings initiated in courts and the human and financial resources assigned to the courts. As regards population distribution, regions in the South are more litigious than those in the Centre and North and therefore receive a higher proportion of public resources. Nevertheless, the endowment of resources in the South is in line with the rest of Italy when measured according to the annual flow of new proceedings whereas it receives fewer resources in relation to the number of proceedings pending. On the basis of the available information, it is not possible to establish whether the greater stock of proceedings pending in the South is due to an inadequate endowment of resources and/or to lower productivity. |
| Keywords: | civil justice, litigation, regional disparities |
| JEL: | K4 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_40_09&r=law |
| By: | Eric Langlais |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we assume that a criminal organization is an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability. |
| Keywords: | Criminal teams, corporate criminality, state dependent risk aversion, deterrence, monetary penalties versus detection |
| JEL: | K13 K4 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-11&r=law |
| By: | Langlais, Eric |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of lternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage contracting; particularly when consideration of parents’ altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases. |
| Keywords: | marriage models; unilateral divorce law; the parents’ altruism and protective measures for children. |
| JEL: | K12 K10 J12 K41 D1 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14368&r=law |
| By: | Langlais, Eric |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we modelize a criminal organization as an agency where the Principal and the Agent have different sensibilities towards the risk of arrestation and punishment, and at the same time have different skills with respect to general organization tasks, crime realization or detection avoidance activities (i.e. allowing to reduce the probability of detection). In this set up, we first compare two regimes of exclusive sanctions (either the sanctions are borne by the Principal/beneficiary of the crime, or they are borne by the Agent/perpetrator of the crime), and we analyze the comparative efficiency of the various instruments which are at the disposal of public authorities to prevent corporation in criminal activities (frequency of control and level of monetary penalties). Finally, we study a case with joint liability. |
| Keywords: | Criminal teams; corporate criminality; state dependent risk aversion; deterrence; monetary penalties versus detection. |
| JEL: | K13 K42 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14369&r=law |
| By: | Makowsky, Michael; Thomas, Stratmann |
| Abstract: | Traffic accidents are one of the leading causes of injury and death in the U.S. The role of traffic law enforcement in the reduction of accidents has been studied by relatively few papers and with mixed results that may be due to a simultaneity problem. Traffic law enforcement may reduce accidents, but police are also likely to be stricter in accident-prone areas. We use municipal budgetary shortfalls as an instrumental variable to identify the effect of traffic citations on traffic safety and show that budgetary shortfalls lead to more frequent issuance of tickets to drivers. Using a panel of municipalities in Massachusetts, we show that increases in the number of tickets written reduce motor vehicle accidents and accident related injuries, and that tickets issued to younger drivers have a larger effect in reducing accidents. The findings show that failure to control for endogeneity results in a significant underestimation of the positive impact of law enforcement on traffic safety. |
| Keywords: | accidents; safety; law enforcement; simultaneity |
| JEL: | K32 H71 K42 C33 |
| Date: | 2008–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:14360&r=law |
| By: | Besley, Timothy J.; Ghatak, Maitreesh |
| Abstract: | This chapter develops a unified analytical framework, drawing on and extending the existing literature on the subject, for studying the role of property rights in economic development. It addresses two fundamental and related questions concerning the relationship between property rights and economic activity. (i) What are the mechanisms through which property rights affect economic activity? (ii) What are the determinants of property rights? In answering these, it surveys some of the main empirical and theoretical ideas from the extensive literature on the topic. This paper will form a chapter for Volume V of the Handbook of Development Economics edited by Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig |
| Keywords: | Economic Development; Property rights |
| JEL: | K11 O17 P14 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7243&r=law |