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on Law and Economics |
| By: | James E. Anderson (Boston College) |
| Abstract: | Predation---extortion or theft---imposes significant endogenous costs on trade, with rich implications for trade policy. The model of this paper shows that the response of trade to liberalization depends on the strength of enforcement against predators. Efficient commercial policy may either tax or subsidize trade. The Mercantilist predilection for trade monopoly and for subsidy has a rationale. Insecurity induces an international externality alternative that of the standard terms of trade effect. Tolerance or intolerance of smuggling can be rational depending on the weakness or strength of enforcement, illustrated by the switch from the former to the latter by Britain in regard to its North American colonies. |
| Keywords: | commercial policy, predation, extortion, theft, trade costs, trade policy |
| JEL: | F13 O17 K42 |
| Date: | 2008–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:703&r=law |
| By: | James E. Anderson (Boston College) |
| Abstract: | Are bigger markets safer? How should government policy respond to terrorist threats? Trade draws potential terrorists and economic predators into productive activity, but trade also draws terrorist attacks. Larger trade reduces the risk of terrorist attack when the wage elasticity is high, associated with low ratios of predators to prey and high wages; but it may increase the risk of terrorist attack when the wage elasticity is low, associated with high ratios of predators to prey. Anti-terrorist trade policy should always promote trade in simultaneous play. Government first mover advantage and inelastic wage may imply trade restriction. Tolerance of smuggling may improve security. Better enforcement should ordinarily be provided for bigger, inherently safer and higher wage markets. |
| Keywords: | terrorism, trade, policy, predation, smuggling |
| JEL: | F13 O17 K42 |
| Date: | 2008–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:701&r=law |
| By: | George Saridakis; Hannes Spengler |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp853&r=law |
| By: | Scherer, F. M. (Harvard U) |
| Abstract: | This paper, written for a conference of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues, explores the history of copyright protection for musical compositions. The first modern copyright law did not cover musical works. The role of Johann Christian Bach, Ludwig van Beethoven, and Johann Neopmuk Hummel in securing legal changes is traced. How Giuseppe Verdi exploited the new copyright law in Northern Italy is analyzed. The paper argues that Verdi, enriched by copyright protection, reduced his compositional effort along a backward-bending supply curve. However, his good fortune may have had a demonstration effect inducing other talented individuals to become composers. An attempt to determine the impact of legal changes on entry into composing is inconclusive. The paper shows, however, that a golden age of musical composition nevertheless occurred in nations that lacked copyright protection for musical works. |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp08-052&r=law |
| By: | Pavel Pelikan |
| Abstract: | This paper agrees that a suitably generalized Darwinism may help understand socioeconomic change, but finds the most publicized generalization by Hodgson and Knudsen unsuitable. To do better, it generalizes the extension of Neo-Darwinism into evolutionary developmental biology ("evo-devo"), which pays more attention to genomes-as-instructors than to genes-as-replicators, and to the entire process of instructed development than to fully developed organisms. The new generalization has clear connections to economics with a minimum guarantee of helpfulness: it generalizes both evo-devo and previously elaborated approaches that already helped understand specific issues of comparative economics, economic reforms, and transformation policies |
| Keywords: | evolution of instructions, instructed development of interactors, multilevel evolution and development, evolution of institutional rules, development of economies Length 36 pages |
| JEL: | A10 D02 K10 O10 P50 Z10 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-17&r=law |
| By: | Malwina Mejer; Bruno van Potteslberghe de la Potterie |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that the consequences of the ‘fragmentation’ of the European patent system are more dramatic than the mere prohibitive costs of maintaining a patent in force in many jurisdictions. First, detailed analysis of judicial systems in several European countries and four case studies provide evidence suggesting that heterogeneous national litigation costs, practices and outcome induce a high level of uncertainty. Second, a high degree of managerial complexity results from systemic incongruities due to easier ‘parallel imports’, possible ‘time paradoxes’ and the de facto paradox of having EU-level competition policy and granting authority ultimately facing national jurisdictional primacy on patent issues. These high degrees of uncertainty and complexity contribute to reduce the effectiveness of the European patent system and provide additional arguments in favour of the Community patent and a centralized litigation in Europe. |
| Keywords: | European patent system, patent cost, litigation process, enforcement, uncertainty |
| JEL: | K41 P14 O34 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_003&r=law |
| By: | Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J. |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We .nd that corruption is procyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations and behave as if they were Keynesian. We also find that business cycle shocks can induce political instability with politicians losing office in recessions. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; entry regulation; performance voting; business cycles. |
| JEL: | D72 K42 O41 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:0861&r=law |
| By: | Simeon Djankov; Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer |
| Abstract: | We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy. |
| JEL: | H11 K42 P16 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14703&r=law |