New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2008‒03‒15
seven papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University

  1. The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States at the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases By Nicholas Economides; Ioannis Lianos
  2. Antitrust Policy and Industrial Policy: A View from the U.S. By Lawrence J. White
  3. The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended Discussion By Lawrence J. White
  4. Interconnection among Academic Journal Platforms: Multilateral versus Bilateral Interconnection By Doh-Shin Jeon; Domenico Menicucci
  5. Better Than Conscious? The Brain, the Psyche, Behavior, and Institutions By Christoph Engel; Wolf Singer
  6. U.S. Climate Policy Developments By Toshi Arimura; Dallas Burtraw; Alan J. Krupnick; Karen L. Palmer
  7. Trust, Honesty and Regulations By Pinotti, Paolo

  1. By: Nicholas Economides; Ioannis Lianos
    Date: 2008
  2. By: Lawrence J. White
    Date: 2008
  3. By: Lawrence J. White
    Date: 2008
  4. By: Doh-Shin Jeon; Domenico Menicucci
    Abstract: Electronic academic journal platforms provide new services of text and/or data mining and linking, indispensable for efficient allocation of attention among over- abundant sources of scientific information. Fully realizing the bene.t of these ser- vices requires interconnection among the platforms. Motivated by CrossRef, a mul- tilateral citation linking backbone, this paper performs a comparison between a multilateral interconnection regime and a bilateral one and finds that publishers are fully interconnected in the former while they may partially break connectivity in the latter for exclusion or di¤erentiation motives. Surprisingly, if partial intercon- nection arises for di¤erentiation motive, exclusion of small publisher(s) occurs more often under the multilateral regime than under the bilateral one. In addition, we show that our main result is robust in the case of Internet Backbone interconnec- tion. Finally, when publishers can interconnect both in a multilateral way and in a bilateral way, a conflict between a private incentive and a social incentive may arise when large publishers prefer excluding small publishers by opting for a bilateral interconnection. In this case, a light-handed regulation imposing no discrimination among rivals would foster full interconnection.
    Keywords: Multilateral Interconnection, Bilateral Interconnection, Academic Journals, Internet, Platforms
    JEL: D4 K21 L41 L82
    Date: 2008–03
  5. By: Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Wolf Singer (Max Planck Institute for Brain Research, Frankfurt/Main)
    Abstract: The title of this chapter is deliberately provocative. Intuitively, many will be inclined to see conscious control of mental process as a good thing. Yet control comes at a high price. The consciously not directly controlled, automatic, parallel processing of information is not only much faster, it also handles much more information, and it does so in a qualitatively different manner. This different mental machinery is not adequate for all tasks. The human ability to consciously deliberate has evolved for good reason. But on many more tasks than one might think at first sight, intuitive decision-making, or at least an intuitive component in a more complex mental process, does indeed improve performance. This chapter presents the issue, offers concepts to understand it, discusses the effects in terms of problem solving capacity, contrasts norms for saying when this is a good thing, and points to scientific and real world audiences for this work.
    JEL: C70 C91 D01 D81 K41
    Date: 2007–12
  6. By: Toshi Arimura (Resources for the Future); Dallas Burtraw; Alan J. Krupnick; Karen L. Palmer
    Abstract: This paper outlines recent developments in U.S. climate policies. Although the United States does not participate in the Kyoto Mechanism, a number of climate policies are being implemented at state level as well as at the federal level. First, we report and compare the federal cap and trade proposals in the 110th Congress. Then, the paper illustrates the current situations of state level climate policies, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the northeastern states or AB32 in California. We analyze these proposals from the viewpoint of technology policies and impacts on international markets. It is found that technology policies play important roles in the cap and trade proposals and that there is a great expectation for carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology. In terms of the impacts on international markets, several federal proposals as well as regional programs permit trading in international markets. As emission targets become more stringent in the future, U.S. GHG emitters are more likely to interact with these markets. Thus, despite the lack of U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol, U.S. markets will be linked to foreign markets, at least, in an indirect way.
    Keywords: United States, climate policy, cap and trade, the Kyoto mechanism, technology policy
    JEL: K32 Q48 Q54 Q58
    Date: 2007–10–31
  7. By: Pinotti, Paolo
    Abstract: This paper investigates the importance of cultural traits for understanding the causes and consequences of government intervention in the economy. First, it presents a simple model in which, under reasonable assumptions about the structure of the economy and the individual values and beliefs, more trustful individuals prefer lower product market regulation. This theoretical prediction is supported by evidence from international survey data. Second, it shows that, if trust predicts trustworthiness across countries, lower honesty would drive both greater regulation and higher incidence of illegal activities. It follows that some of the negative effects usually associated with government intervention may indeed be a consequence of underlying cultural traits. In particular, evidence from cross-country data suggests that a large part of the effect of regulation on corruption and unofficial activity estimated in previous studies can be attributed to omitted variation in trust and honesty.
    Keywords: trust; honesty; regulations; corruption; unofficial economy
    JEL: L51 D02 Z10 K42
    Date: 2008–03

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