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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz |
| Abstract: | We model takeovers as a bargaining process and explain termination fees for, both, the target and the acquirer, subject to parties’ bargaining power and outside options. In equilibrium, termination fees are offered by firms with outside options in exchange for a greater share of merger synergies. Termination fees decrease in firms’ bargaining power, and increase in firms’ outside options. We find that a merger with the second highest bidder, including a termination fee, can lead to equally high premiums as a merger with the highest bidder, without a termination fee. This novel result directly contrasts the agency cost perspective, which argues that termination provisions may be used by managers to lock into acquirers that do not generate the highest shareholder value. Further, even in a merger with the highest bidder and in the absence of bidding related costs, a termination fee is not necessarily a deal protection device, but can be used to improve shareholder value. Our bargaining model offers an alternative to auction related explanations of termination fees, like cost compensation or seller commitment. |
| Keywords: | bargaining; break-up fees; lockups; mergers and acquisitions; outside option; termination fees |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D44 G34 K22 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6210&r=law |
| By: | Hochberg, Yael; Sapienza, Paola; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behaviour of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favour of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation, and compare their returns to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the four and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 10 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors’ positive expectations with regards to the effects of the law were warranted for the enhanced disclosure provisions of SOX. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance; Sarbanes Oxley Act |
| JEL: | G34 K22 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6201&r=law |
| By: | Javier Rodríguez; Javier Santiso |
| Abstract: | Private capital movements have risen in recent decades, and bank flows have been part of this story. Some empirical studies have analysed the political drivers of private international liquidity, but paradoxically very few have looked at the political economy of bank flows. Even less research exists on the role of politics in explaining cross-border banking movements towards emerging democracies. The present study links compiled indicators on democracy, policy uncertainty and political stability to international bank lending flows from data developed by the BIS. It provides an empirical investigation of the political economy of cross-border bank flows to emerging markets and tries to answer two questions. Do bankers tend to prefer emerging democracies? Do they reward democratic transitions as well as policy and political stability? One of the major findings is that politics do matter, and international banks tend to have political preferences; annual growth in bank flows usually booms in the three years following a democratic transition, especially in Latin America. <BR>Les flux de capitaux privés ont connu un essor sans précédents au cours des dernières années. Les flux bancaires ont pris part à cette dynamique. Néanmoins, excepté quelques rare travaux empiriques, peu de travaux ont été consacrés aux facteurs politiques expliquant cet essor, et encore moins de recherche a été dédiée à l’économie politique des flux bancaires privés. Le travail présenté aborde cette question en croisant une série d’indicateurs sur la démocratie, l’incertitude et la stabilité politique, avec les séries de flux bancaires développés par la Banque des Règlements Internationaux (BRI). Il propose une économie politique des flux privés bancaires internationaux en abordant deux questions : les banques préfèrent-elles la démocratie ? Tendent-elles à primer les transitions démocratiques, la stabilité des politiques publiques et la stabilité politique ? Un des résultats les plus intéressants du travail présenté est de corroborer que les facteurs politiques importent pour les banques internationales. Celles-ci tendent en particulier à augmenter leurs prêts internationaux dans les trois années qui suivent une transition démocratique. Cette tendance est particulièrement prégnante en Amérique latine où, pays vers lesquels les opérations de crédit bancaire internationale ont augmenté avec l’essor de la démocratie. |
| Keywords: | capital flows, bank, democracy & emerging markets |
| JEL: | F21 F34 G21 K00 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:devaaa:259-en&r=law |
| By: | Ingo Borchert |
| Abstract: | In the presence of sunk costs to exporting, preferential tariff liberalization may have a prolonged, dynamic effect on the pattern of a beneficiary country's exports. In particular, preferential tariff liberalization might trigger a geographic spread of exports to third markets outside the preferential trading area. I test this hypothesis for the pattern of Mexican exports after the inception of NAFTA to several Latin American trading partners. After controlling for product specific shocks and the overall trend in export growth, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that initial exports to the United States further prompted exports to third markets. The results suggest a significant impact on exports to large or geographically proximate countries (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama). The stunning growth in the extensive margin as a count measure owes much to rather simple goods, while more sophisticated goods exert a substantial impact on the value of Mexican exports. The findings also document the existence of considerable tariff-induced trade diversion for goods with little skill or technology content. |
| Keywords: | Preferential tariffs, Mexico, NAFTA, sunk costs, conditional logit panel estimation |
| JEL: | F13 F15 K33 |
| Date: | 2007–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:dp2007:2007-06&r=law |