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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Guillaume R. Fréchette |
| Abstract: | There is a long history of models attempting to identify the causes of corruption, yet empirical analysis is complicated. Not only is data difficult to obtain and often available only for few countries and a limited number of years, but such estimation involves inherent complexities. This paper focuses on the use of panel data techniques to better identify factors that affect bureaucratic corruption. Furthermore, this paper identifies an endogeneity problem which arises in the analysis of the causes of corruption, and a new instrumental variable is proposed to solve it. To help in this endeavor, a data set is employed which provides information for as many as 135 countries over a span of sixteen years. Results show that neglecting the endogeneity problem leads to severely biased results. Using panel data techniques reveals that the availability of rents is a crucial determinant of corruption and that previous research may have underestimated the economic significance of rents on corruption. Furthermore, corruption is shown to be procyclical. <P>Depuis longtemps, des modèles sont utilisés dans le but de déterminer les causes de la corruption. Toutefois, l’analyse empirique demeure complexe. Qui plus est, les données sont difficiles à recueillir et couvrent souvent un nombre restreint de pays et une période limitée. Ce genre d’évaluation présente aussi des complexités inhérentes. Le présent document met l’accent sur le recours à des techniques de données de panels dans le but de mieux connaître les facteurs qui influent sur la corruption bureaucratique. En outre, cette analyse souligne le problème d’endogénéité qui ressort de l’analyse des causes de la corruption et propose une nouvelle variable instrumentale permettant de contrer celui-ci. Pour faciliter la démarche, ce document utilise un ensemble de données fournissant des renseignements sur au moins 135 pays et pour une période de seize ans. Les résultats indiquent que si le problème d’endogénéité n’est pas pris en compte, les résultats sont sérieusement biaisés. De plus, la corruption est décrite comme étant procyclique. |
| Keywords: | corruption, endogeneity, income, rents, corruption, endogénéité |
| JEL: | H8 K4 C33 |
| Date: | 2006–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-28&r=law |
| By: | Carlos Medina; José Escobar |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effect on hourly wages and hours of work, of an increase in the number of hours of work, defined by law as daytime hours of work. To identify the parameter of interest, we estimate difference in difference models. Although we do not know the working hour schedule; we exploit the necessary conditions for the intervention to affect them, to define treatment and comparison groups. We find that wages of males older than 25 working in industry in metropolitan areas decreased more than 11% due to the reform, while females older than 25 working in industry in metropolitan areas reduced their hours of work per week in 3.6 hours. There is evidence, although weaker, of increases in hourly wages for male workers in the other sectors of the economy. This suggests that employers increased labor demand in those sectors. Overall, the reform would have had positive effects on all workers but those in industry. |
| Date: | 2006–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:001043:002745&r=law |
| By: | Christian Schubert |
| Abstract: | Markets for complex, multi-faceted goods normally require a complex institutional framework to function properly, i.e., to lead to patterns of outcomes that are deemed acceptable by the individuals involved. This paper examines the institutional underpinnings of the market for urban land use rights, taking both German and U.S. public and private land use law as a case in point. Apart from efficiency considerations that have been discussed in the literature, the individuals' preferences regarding the fairness of (i) the contents of urban land use rights and (ii) the distribution of costs and benefits induced by innovative land uses have been largely neglected. It is argued that investigating the impact of these preferences (and the underlying informal fairness norms) on the legal treatment of land use rights provides a key opportunity to construct an alternative Law & Economics approach that is compatible with an evolutionary perspective on economic land use decisions. |
| Keywords: | externalities, takings, land use law, distributive fairness, procedural fairness |
| JEL: | K11 R13 R14 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2005-22&r=law |