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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Ojo, Marianne |
| Abstract: | The incoming Labour administration in 1997 caused a stir when it gave the Bank of England additional monetary policy powers but removed the Bank’s powers to regulate banking. Up till 1997, banking regulation had been the function of the Bank of England while other areas of financial services had been regulated by bodies such as: The Securities and Investment Board (for investment business) and the Department of Trade and Industry (for insurance). Section 21 of the Bank of England Act 1998 effectively transferred banking supervision to the Financial Services Authority (then known as the Securities and Investments Board). This paper amongst other objectives, aims to explore how the Financial Services Authority ( the FSA) as a regulator, could benefit from the expertise of the external auditor as a middleman, to avoid regulatory capture. As an efficient system of accountability would also help prevent regulatory capture, the issue of accountability will also be discussed. A consideration of developments leading to the adoption of a single regulator in the UK, will illustrate how the type of regulator can contribute to knowledge of how the external auditor can assist the regulator. Furthermore, not only does this paper consider how the introduction of the FSA has improved transparency and accountability within the banking regulatory and supervisory system, but also the claim that the external auditor could further employ his expertise to help the regulator avoid regulatory capture. |
| Keywords: | single; regulator; regulatory; capture; external; auditor; banking; supervision |
| JEL: | K2 |
| Date: | 2005–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:230&r=law |
| By: | Krupnikov, Yanna; Levine, Adam S.; Lupia, Arthur; Prior, Markus |
| Abstract: | We re-examine whether the broad support for repeal of the estate tax is a result of citizen ignorance. We find that increasing information about the estate tax or politics in general has very different effects on Republicans and Democrats. While high and low-information Republicans support estate tax repeal, Democratic support is higher among those who know less. However, most highly-informed people in both parties support repeal. We also show that standard surveys overestimate the extent of misinformation about the estate tax. Therefore, “ignorance” is not a compelling explanation of why so many people support estate tax repeal. |
| Keywords: | estate tax; voter competence; survey research; experimental economics; public policy |
| JEL: | H20 H30 K10 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:346&r=law |
| By: | Gomez-sorzano, Gustavo |
| Abstract: | Abstract: I apply the Beveridge-Nelson business cycle decomposition method to the time series of murder in the United States (1900-2004). Separating out “permanent” from “cyclical” murder, I hypothesize that the cyclical part coincides with documented waves of organized crime, internal tensions, breakdowns in social order, crime legislation, alternation in power, social, and political unrest overseas as wars, and recently with the periodic terrorist attacks in the country. The cyclical component estimated shows that, 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks occurred, two years after the end of the last declining cycle of 1994-1999. The estimated cyclical terrorist murder component warns, that terrorist attacks in U.S., soil from 1923 to 2004, historically occur in, and around the vicinity of the turning points, of whether a declining, or ascending cycle, and so, it must be used in future research to construct a model for explaining the causal reasons for its movement across time, and for forecasting cyclical terrorist murder, and terrorist attacks. |
| Keywords: | Keywords: United States; Colombia; murder; Beveridge-Nelson; business cycle; decomposition; time-series; domestic terrorism; cyclical terrorist murder; cyclical terrorist attacks; cyclical terrorist murder and attacks indicator. |
| JEL: | C22 N41 O51 K42 C13 K14 |
| Date: | 2006–06–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:660&r=law |