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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Paolo Buonanno (University of Bergamo); Daniel Montolio (University of Barcelona); Paolo Vanin (University of Padova) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of civic norms and associational networks on crime rates. Through their impact on trust and economic development, civic norms may raise the expected returns to crime, but they may also increase its opportunity cost and the feelings of guilt and shame attached to it. Associational networks may increase returns to non-criminal activities and raise detection probabilities, but they may also provide communication channels for criminals. The empirical assessment of these effects poses serious problems of endogeneity, omitted variables and measurement error. Italy's great variance in social and economic characteristics, its homogeneity in policies and institutions, and the availability of historical data on social capital in its regions allow us to minimise the first two problems. To tackle the third one, we exploit high and stable report rates for some forms of property crime. Once we address these problems, we find that both civic norms and associational networks have a negative and significant impact on property crimes across Italian provinces. |
| Keywords: | Civic norms, Associational networks, Property crime, Italy |
| JEL: | A14 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0029&r=law |
| By: | Vivi Alatas; Lisa Cameron; Ananish Chaudhuri; Nisvan Erkal; Lata Gangadharan |
| Abstract: | In recent years, a substantial body of work has emerged in the social sciences exploring differences in the behavior of men and women in various contexts. This paper contributes to this literature by investigating gender differences in attitudes towards corruption. It departs from the previous literature on gender and corruption by using experimental methodology. Attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Based on experimental data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men in Australia, there are no significant gender differences in attitudes towards corruption in India, Indonesia and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences found in the previous studies may not be nearly as universal as stated and may be more culture-specific. We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find that there are larger variations in women’s attitudes towards corruption than in men’s across the countries in our sample. |
| Keywords: | Gender, Corruption, Experiments, Punishment, Multicultural Analysis |
| JEL: | C91 J16 K42 O12 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:974&r=law |
| By: | Vivi Alatas; Lisa Cameron; Ananish Chaudhuri; Nisvan Erkal; Lata Gangadharan |
| Abstract: | We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that although both subject pools show a high level of concern with the extent of corruption in Indonesia, the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the public servants for either engaging in or not engaging in corruption suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by arguing that experiments such as the one considered in this paper can be used to measure forward-looking attitudinal change in society and that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in the determination of such attitudinal changes. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Experiments, Subject Pool Effects |
| JEL: | C91 D73 O12 K42 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mlb:wpaper:975&r=law |
| By: | Alessandro Fedele; Massimo Tognoni |
| Abstract: | Under the principle of the Failing Firm Defense (FFD) a merger that would be blocked due to its harmful effect on competition could be nevertheless allowed when (i) the acquired firm is actually failing, (ii) there is no less anti-competitive alternative offer of purchase, (iii) absent the merger, the assets to be acquired would exit the market. We focus on potential anti-competitive effects of a myopic application of the third requirement by studying consequences of a horizontal merger on entry in a Cournot oligopoly with a failing firm. If the merger is blocked entry occurs and, when the industry is highly concentrated, consumer welfare is bigger because gains due to augmented competition exceed losses due to shortage of output. |
| Keywords: | Failing Firm Defense, Entry Deterrence, Consumer Surplus |
| JEL: | K21 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mis:wpaper:20061002&r=law |
| By: | Pedro Pereira (Autoridade da Concorrencia, Portugal); Tiago Ribeiro (Indera) |
| Abstract: | In Portugal, the telecommunications incumbent o®ers broadband access to the Inter- net, both through digital subscriber line and cable modem. In this article, we estimate the impact on broadband access to the Internet of the structural separation of these two businesses. We use a panel of consumer level data and a discrete choice model to estimate the price elasticities of demand and the marginal costs of broadband access to the Internet. Based on these estimates, we simulate the e®ect on prices and social welfare of the structural separation. Our results indicate that the structural separation would lead to substantial price reductions. For broadband clients, on average, each household would save 3:37 euros per month, or 14% of the current price levels. Overall, on average, each household would save 2:73 euros per month, or 14% of the current price levels. We test the robustness of our results in terms of: (i) the estimates of the demand elasticities, (ii) the strategic behavior of the ¯rms, and (iii) the market share estimates. There is no evidence of collusion. |
| Keywords: | Broadband, Structural Separation, Prices |
| JEL: | L25 L51 L96 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:0610&r=law |
| By: | Di Tella, Rafael; Dubra, Juan |
| Abstract: | We observe that countries where belief in the "American dream" (i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know from previous work that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms offer and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call "meanness". It is this meanness level that a penal system based on "retribution" tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the "American" (as opposed to the "French") equilibrium, belief in the "American dream" is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge. |
| Keywords: | beliefs; multiple equilibria; illegal behavior; fines; sentences. |
| JEL: | K42 K14 E62 P16 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:500&r=law |