New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2005‒11‒12
sixty-two papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University
  1. An analysis of the constitutional position of the US independent agencies By Lavrijssen,S.
  2. Compensating losses and sharing surpluses in project-allocation situations By Ju,Y.; Ruys,P.H.M.; Borm,P.
  3. Cooperation in transactions and disputes : a problem-solving legal system? By Barendrecht,M.
  4. A new way to measure competition By Boone,J.
  5. Strategic trading of forward contracts in oligopolistic industries with non-storable commodities By Calcagno,R.; Sadrieh,A.
  6. Structural remedies in merger regulation in a Cournot framework By Medvedev,A.
  7. Pragmatic privatisation : the Netherlands 1982-2002 By Damme,E. van
  8. Unification of the private law in Germany in the nineteenth century : an economic perspective By Kanning,A.
  9. Codification of the common law in the United States : an economic perspective By Kanning,A.
  10. Dynamic regulation and entry in telecommunications markets : a policy framework By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M.
  11. Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets By Bijl,P.W.J. de
  12. Shareholder lockup agreements in French nouveau marche and German neuer markt IPOs By Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.; Khursed,A.
  13. Dividend policy of German firms : a dynamic panel data analysis of partial adjustment models By Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.; Correia da Silva,L.
  14. Recent developments in German corporate governance By Goergen,M.; Manjon,M.C.; Renneboog,L.
  15. Capital structure and managerial compensation : the effects of remuneration seniority By Calcagno,R.; Renneboog,L.
  16. Creditor- and debtor-oriented corporate bankruptcy regimes revisited By Franken,S.
  17. Three principals of transnational corporate bankruptcy law : a review By Franken,S.F.
  18. Marktstructuur en innovatie By Boone,J.; Damme,E. van
  19. Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting By Motchenkova,E.
  20. Effects of leniency programs on cartel stability By Motchenkova,E.
  21. Balance of power By Boone,J.
  22. Dominance and monopolization By Canoy,M.; Rey,P.; Damme,E. van
  23. The changing landscape of EU company law By McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M.
  24. Limited partnership reform in the United Kingdom : a competitive, venture capital oriented business form By McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M.
  25. Unbundling the local loop : one-way access and imperfect competition By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M.
  26. Is investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by the agency costs or asymmetric information? : Evidence from the UK By Pawlina,G.; Renneboog,L.
  27. Patterns in payout policy and payout channel choice of UK firms in the 1990s By Renneboog,L.; Trojanowski,G.
  28. Advice and monitoring in venture finance By Cumming,D.; Johan,S.
  29. Provincial preferences in private equity By Cumming,D.; Johan,S.
  30. Is it the law or the lawyers? : Investment fund covernants across countries By Cumming,D.; Johan,S.
  31. Policy uncertainty and supply adaquacy in electric power markets By Brunekreeft,G.; McDaniel,T.
  32. Interconnected networks By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Brunekreeft,G.; Damme,E.E.C. van
  33. Local loop unbundling in Europe: : experience, prospects and policy challenges By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M.
  34. Liberalizing the Dutch electricity market 1998-2004 By Damme,E. van
  35. Does the European company prevent the "Delaware-effect"? By McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M.
  36. Distribution and incomplete contracts By Kanning,A.J.
  37. Economische aspecten van deugdelijk ondernemingsbestuur By Damme,E. van
  38. Merger simulation analysis : an academic perspective By Damme,E. van; Pinkse,J.
  39. Control structures and payout policy By Renneboog,L.; Trojanowski,G.
  40. Leveraged public to private transactions in the UK By Renneboog,L.; Simons,T.; Wright,M.
  41. Stock price reactions to short-lived public information : the case of betting odds By Palomino,F.; Renneboog,L.; Zhang,C.
  42. Corporate governance convergence : evidence from takeover regulation reforms in Europe By Goergen,M.; Martynova,M.; Renneboog,L.
  43. Naar eenvormiger burgerlijk recht binnen de Europese Unie? By Kanning,A.J.
  44. Merger without costs advantage By Huck,S.; Konrad,K.A.; Muller,W.
  45. Regulatory co-opetition : transcending the regulatory competition debate By Geradin,D.; McCahery,J.A.
  46. Optimal privatization using qualifying auctions By Boone,J.; Goeree,J.K.
  47. Technological change, wages and firm size By Brink,R. van den; Ruys,P.H.M.
  48. Public-to-private transactions : LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs By Renneboog,L.; Simons,T.
  49. The governance of services By Ruys,P.H.M.
  50. Insider trading, news releases and ownership concentration By Fidrmuc,J.; Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.
  51. Regulating access to stimulate competition in postal markets? By Bijl,P.W.J. de; Damme,E. van; Larouche,P.
  52. Conceptual divergence : an inter-disciplinary perspective using economics. Contribution for Binding Unity/Diverging Concepts By Larouche,P.
  53. Network effects and regulatory competition By Vermeulen,E.P.M.
  54. Takeover waves : triggers, performance and motives By Martynova,M.; Renneboog,L.
  55. Underground Gun Markets By Philip J. Cook; Jens Ludwig; Sudhir Venkatesh; Anthony A. Braga
  56. Debiasing through Law By Christine Jolls; Cass R. Sunstein
  57. Strengthening Regulation in Chile: The Case of Network Industries By Luiz de Mello; Alexander Galetovic
  58. Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules By Benito Arruñada
  59. Public provision of a private good: What is the point of the BSD license? By Alex Gaudeul
  60. Illegal Market of Cigarettes in Estonia By Evelin Ahermaa
  61. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia about Separation of Powers and Courts By Poigo Nuuma
  62. "Contract Enforcement in the Early Transition to a Market Economy." By Jeffrey B. Miller; Kenneth Koford
  1. By: Lavrijssen,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Keywords: agencies;administration
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200401&r=law
  2. By: Ju,Y.; Ruys,P.H.M.; Borm,P. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Keywords: projects;allocation;games
    JEL: C71 H70
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200402&r=law
  3. By: Barendrecht,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200403&r=law
  4. By: Boone,J. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Keywords: competition;measurement;profit;firms
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200404&r=law
  5. By: Calcagno,R.; Sadrieh,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200405&r=law
  6. By: Medvedev,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    JEL: D43 K21 L51
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200406&r=law
  7. By: Damme,E. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200407&r=law
  8. By: Kanning,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200408&r=law
  9. By: Kanning,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200409&r=law
  10. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200410&r=law
  11. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200411&r=law
  12. By: Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.; Khursed,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200412&r=law
  13. By: Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.; Correia da Silva,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200413&r=law
  14. By: Goergen,M.; Manjon,M.C.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200414&r=law
  15. By: Calcagno,R.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200415&r=law
  16. By: Franken,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200416&r=law
  17. By: Franken,S.F. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200417&r=law
  18. By: Boone,J.; Damme,E. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200418&r=law
  19. By: Motchenkova,E. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200419&r=law
  20. By: Motchenkova,E. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200420&r=law
  21. By: Boone,J. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200421&r=law
  22. By: Canoy,M.; Rey,P.; Damme,E. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200422&r=law
  23. By: McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200423&r=law
  24. By: McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200424&r=law
  25. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200425&r=law
  26. By: Pawlina,G.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200501&r=law
  27. By: Renneboog,L.; Trojanowski,G. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200502&r=law
  28. By: Cumming,D.; Johan,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200503&r=law
  29. By: Cumming,D.; Johan,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200504&r=law
  30. By: Cumming,D.; Johan,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200505&r=law
  31. By: Brunekreeft,G.; McDaniel,T. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200506&r=law
  32. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Brunekreeft,G.; Damme,E.E.C. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200507&r=law
  33. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200508&r=law
  34. By: Damme,E. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200509&r=law
  35. By: McCahery,J.A.; Vermeulen,E.P.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200510&r=law
  36. By: Kanning,A.J. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200511&r=law
  37. By: Damme,E. van (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200512&r=law
  38. By: Damme,E. van; Pinkse,J. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200513&r=law
  39. By: Renneboog,L.; Trojanowski,G. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200514&r=law
  40. By: Renneboog,L.; Simons,T.; Wright,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200515&r=law
  41. By: Palomino,F.; Renneboog,L.; Zhang,C. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200516&r=law
  42. By: Goergen,M.; Martynova,M.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200517&r=law
  43. By: Kanning,A.J. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200518&r=law
  44. By: Huck,S.; Konrad,K.A.; Muller,W. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200519&r=law
  45. By: Geradin,D.; McCahery,J.A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200520&r=law
  46. By: Boone,J.; Goeree,J.K. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200521&r=law
  47. By: Brink,R. van den; Ruys,P.H.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200522&r=law
  48. By: Renneboog,L.; Simons,T. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200523&r=law
  49. By: Ruys,P.H.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200524&r=law
  50. By: Fidrmuc,J.; Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200525&r=law
  51. By: Bijl,P.W.J. de; Damme,E. van; Larouche,P. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200526&r=law
  52. By: Larouche,P. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200527&r=law
  53. By: Vermeulen,E.P.M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200528&r=law
  54. By: Martynova,M.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center))
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:200529&r=law
  55. By: Philip J. Cook; Jens Ludwig; Sudhir Venkatesh; Anthony A. Braga
    Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets drawing on interviews with gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, prostitutes, police, public school security guards and teens in the city of Chicago, complemented by results from government surveys of recent arrestees in 22 cities plus administrative data for suicides, homicides, robberies, arrests and confiscated crime guns. We find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market for guns in Chicago. We argue that these frictions are due primarily to the fact that the underground gun market is both illegal and “thin” -- the number of buyers, sellers and total transactions is small and relevant information is scarce. Gangs can help overcome these market frictions, but the gang’s economic interests cause gang leaders to limit supply primarily to gang members, and even then transactions are usually loans or rentals with strings attached.
    JEL: K42 L1
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11737&r=law
  56. By: Christine Jolls; Cass R. Sunstein
    Abstract: In many settings, human beings are boundedly rational. A distinctive and insufficiently explored legal response to bounded rationality is to attempt to "debias through law," by steering people in more rational directions. In many important domains, existing legal analyses emphasize the alternative approach of insulating outcomes from the effects of boundedly rational behavior, often through blocking private choices. In fact, however, a large number of actual and imaginable legal strategies are efforts to engage in the very different approach of debiasing through law by reducing or even eliminating people's boundedly rational behavior. In important contexts, these efforts to debias through law can avoid the costs and inefficiencies associated with regulatory approaches that take bounded rationality as a given and respond by attempting to insulate outcomes from its effects. This paper offers a general account of how debiasing through law does or could work to address legal questions across a range of areas, from consumer safety law to corporate law to property law. Discussion is also devoted to the risks of government manipulation and overshooting that are sometimes raised when debiasing through law is employed.
    JEL: K00 K11 K13 K22
    Date: 2005–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11738&r=law
  57. By: Luiz de Mello; Alexander Galetovic
    Abstract: Chile’s regulatory framework is working reasonably well. The country’s structural reforms since the 1980s, with the privatisation of utilities and deregulation of product and labour markets, have improved resource allocation and increased the population’s access to basic services, while calling for a comprehensive upgrading of regulatory institutions. At the same time, public-private partnerships (PPPs) are contributing to closing Chile’s infrastructure deficit, particularly in transport. The recurrent cuts in shipments of natural gas from Argentina since 2004 have put additional strain on regulation in the electricity sector to encourage investment in generation and ensure the security of supply. This paper reviews regulatory reform in three network industries (electricity, gas and telecoms), where further liberalisation, particularly in electricity retailing, and improvements in the regulation of telecoms would do much to further improve the business climate. The governance of public-private partnerships can be improved by increasing transparency and accountability in the concession process. In doing so, the government’s exposure to contingent liabilities can be contained. This Working Paper relates to the 2005 OECD Economic Survey of Chile (www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/chile). <P>Renforcer la réglementation au Chili Le cadre de la règlementation chilienne fonctionne assez bien. Les réformes structurelles depuis les années 80, avec la privatisation des services et la réglementation des marchés des produits et du travail, ont amélioré l'allocation des ressources et augmenté l'accès de la population aux services de base, en même temps que modernisé les institutions de réglementation. Parallèlement, les partenariats public-privé ont contribué à réduire le déficit d'infrastructure du Chili, particulièrement dans les transports. Les coupures récurrentes dans les exportations de gaz naturel de l'Argentine depuis 2004 ont ajouté une contrainte sur la réglementation du secteur d'électricité, qui a encouragé l'investissement dans la production et garanti la sécurité de l'offre. Ce document passe en revue les réformes de la réglementation dans trois industries de réseau (électricité, gaz et télécommunication), dans lesquelles plus de libéralisation, particulièrement concernant la vente de détail de l'électricité, et des progrès dans la réglementation des télécommunications, amélioreraient grandement le climat des affaires. La gouvernance des partenariats public-privé peut-être améliorée en augmentant la transparence et la responsabilité du processus de concession. En faisant ainsi le gouvernement évite de s'exposer à d'éventuels passifs. Ce Document de travail se rapporte à l'Étude économique de l'OCDE du Chili, 2005 (www.oecd.org/eco/etudes/chili).
    Keywords: telecommunications, télécommunications, network industries, réglementation, industrie de réseau, regulations, electricity, gas, électricité, gaz, Chile, Chili
    JEL: D4 H4 K2
    Date: 2005–10–27
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:455-en&r=law
  58. By: Benito Arruñada
    Abstract: Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate payment systems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees (MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificial lowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but it will however lead to higher cardholders’ fees and, likely, new prices for point of sale terminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders’ fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.
    Keywords: Credit cards, payment systems, regulation, interchange fees
    JEL: K21 K23 L14 L41
    Date: 2005–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:899&r=law
  59. By: Alex Gaudeul (University of East Anglia - Norwich & ESRC Centre for Competition Policy)
    Abstract: Software is a potentially excludable public good. It is possible, at some cost, to exclude non-paying users from its consumption by using copyright law or technological restraints. Licensing the software under proprietary license terms makes of it a private good, licensing it under the BSD does not change the economic nature of the software while licensing it under the GPL artificially makes of it a pure public good. A project leader will prefer one or the other of those license terms depending on her software project’s market potential and on the cost of developing it. The optimal licensing for a sequence of cumulative innovations and the impact of possible competition between rival software development teams are considered.
    Keywords: Open Source Software; Public Goods; Information Goods; Non- Profit; Volunteer Organisation; Intellectual Property; Copyright; Licensing; Innovation
    JEL: D23 D45 D71 H41 H42 K11 L31 L86 O31 O32 O34
    Date: 2005–11–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511002&r=law
  60. By: Evelin Ahermaa (Estonian Institute of Economic Research)
    Abstract: Tobacco products belong to a group of excise goods and an excise duty is levied on them. The latter increases the price, but there are no changes in the quality of the goods and it leads to tax frauds. There has been regular increase in the excise duties on tobacco products in Estonia; changes in tax rates have influenced legal sales, mostly of cigarettes. Consumption of cigarettes is the largest in the group of tobacco products in Estonia; therefore, the paper is especially focused on cigarettes. The purpose of the paper is to evaluate illegal market of cigarettes in Estonia, using comparison of the net of estimations. The paper introduces the method of analysis where the essential role is given to inhabitants (concerning their expert and individual opinions). Empirical evidence concerning illegal market of cigarettes in Estonia is presented by size on the example of fieldwork carried out in 2003.
    Keywords: cigarettes, excise duty, illegal market, taxation
    JEL: E62 K42
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ttu:wpaper:tutwpe05/122&r=law
  61. By: Poigo Nuuma (Department of Public Economy at Tallinn University of Technology)
    Abstract: Separation, balance and equality of powers as it is stipulated in § 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia can not be taken lightly when applying it; instead, it should be based on the concept and provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, changing the concept of the Constitution is not in accordance with § 4 and separating the court system into partly belonging under the administration of the executive power, taking the court system as a part of the law-enforcement body, considering the court of first instance and the appeal court to be independent solely on the fact that judges are sovereign in their rulings, excluding other activities of the court under the administration of governmental institutions, ignoring the restriction of fusion and allowing the right of the courts to self-regulate to be given to the Ministry of Justice and to its directors of administration to regulate. By that the concept of separation of powers that was adopted during the referendum has been altered and people’s faith in the separation, balance and equality of legislative, executive and the court power (court system) has been lost. According to § 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the court system should be separated from other powers and it should balance them and appear this way to the citizens in order for them to have trust in the courts as independent and objective institutions.
    Keywords: Separation of powers, the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, court system, legislative power, executive power, judicial power, Supreme Court of Estonia, Courts Acts, law-enforcement bodies, fusion, court of first instance, appeal court.
    JEL: K10 K41
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ttu:wpaper:tutwpe05/128&r=law
  62. By: Jeffrey B. Miller (Department of Economics,University of Delaware); Kenneth Koford
    Abstract: How were contracts among firms enforced in the early phase of a transition economy when firms lacked experience with commercial contracts or legal procedures? What were their views of their new business environment? We interviewed a sample of Bulgarian firms, including private, state-owned and cooperative firms in 1994. Consistent with Williamson’s (1994) theories, complex contracts were quite limited, sometimes implying the breakdown of important markets, but we also found that even spot-market contracts had severe problems of bilateral dependency. Having been "burned" in previous transactions, firms were very cautious in dealing with new potential trading partners and tried to work closely with trustworthy counterparts. These results are consistent with Klein, Crawford and Alchian’s (1978) theory.
    Keywords: Bulgaria, contract enforcement, contract institutions, contract law,legal institutions
    JEL: P5 I22 K12
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dlw:wpaper:05-11&r=law
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