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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Stefan Voigt |
| Abstract: | Judicial independence is not only a necessary condition for the impartiality of judges, it can also endanger it: judges that are independent could have incentives to remain uninformed, become lazy or even corrupt. It is therefore often argued that judicial independence and judicial accountability are competing ends. In this paper, it is, however, hypothesized that they are not necessarily competing ends but can be complementary means towards achieving impartiality and, in turn, the rule of law. It is further argued that judicial accountability can increase per capita income through various channels one of which is the reduction of corruption. First tests concerning the economic effects of JA are carried out drawing on the absence of corruption within the judiciary as well as data gathered by the U.S. State Department as proxies. On the basis of 75 countries, these proxies are highly significant for explaining differences in per capita income. |
| Keywords: | Judicial Independence; judicial accountability; rule of law; economic growth; corruption; constitutional political economy. |
| JEL: | H11 K40 O40 P51 |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:19-2005&r=law |
| By: | Steven D. Levitt |
| Abstract: | Over the last thirty years, the use of child safety seats in motor vehicles has increased dramatically, fueled by well publicized information campaigns and legal mandates. In spite of this movement, there is relatively little empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of child safety seats relative to the much cheaper alternative of traditional seat belts. Using data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) on all fatal crashes in the United States from 1975-2003, I find that child safety seats, in actual practice, are no better than seat belts at reducing fatalities among children aged 2-6. This result is robust to a wide range of sensitivity analyses, including controlling for sample selection that arises because the FARS data set includes only crashes in which at least one fatality occurs. |
| JEL: | K2 R4 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11591&r=law |
| By: | Jennifer Hunt |
| Abstract: | Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials’ clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions. |
| JEL: | K4 H4 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11595&r=law |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Corporate actors differ from individuals in one important respect: technically, it may be possible to observe the formation of the corporate will from outside, and to impact on its formation. This feature can be exploited by regulators. One technology is inducing corporate actors to hire an interface actor, representing the regulatory cause at the interior of the firm. Regulators are corporate actors as well. Statutes usually do not fully determine their behaviour. Therefore, firms may induce the regulator to give an interface actor access to the regulatory arena. This interface actor has the task of representing the commercial cause in regulatory decision-making. The paper uses a principal-agent-supervisor model to analyse each of these cases separately, and to demonstrate how the reciprocal nature of the relationship may be exploited. |
| Keywords: | principal-agent-supervisor, corporate actor, corporate governance, regulatory procedure, governance, interface actor |
| JEL: | C72 D23 D73 K22 K23 K32 L51 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_15&r=law |