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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Winand Emons; Claude Fluet |
| Abstract: | An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The ability to commit to an adjudication scheme makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence. |
| Keywords: | Evidence production, procedure, costly state falsification, adversarial, inquisitorial |
| JEL: | D82 K41 K42 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0520&r=law |
| By: | Ernst R. Berndt; Adrian H. B. Gottschalk; Matthew W. Strobeck |
| Abstract: | In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) agency is responsible for regulating the safety and efficacy of biopharmaceutical drug products. Furthermore, the FDA is tasked with speeding new medical innovations to market. These two missions create an inherent tension within the agency and between the agency and key stakeholders. Oftentimes, communications and interactions between regulated companies and the FDA suffer. The focus of this research is on the interactions between the FDA and the biopharmaceutical companies that perform drug R&D. To assess the current issues and state of communication and interaction between the FDA and industry, we carried out a survey of industry leadership in R&D and regulatory positions as well as senior leadership at the FDA who have responsibility for drug evaluation and oversight. Based on forty-nine industry and eight FDA interviews we conducted, we found that industry seeks additional structured and informal interactions with the FDA, especially during Phase II of development. Overall, industry placed greater value on additional communication than did the FDA. Furthermore, industry interviewees indicated that they were willing to pay PDUFA-like fees during clinical development to ensure that the FDA could hire additional, well-qualified staff to assist with protocol reviews and decision-making. Based on our survey and discussions, we uncovered several thematic opportunities to improve interactions between the FDA and industry and to reduce clinical development times: 1) develop metrics and goals at the FDA for clinical development times in exchange for PDUFA like fees; 2) establish an oversight board consisting of industry, agency officials, and premier external scientists (possibly at NIH or CDC) to evaluate and audit retrospectively completed and terminated drug projects; and 3) construct a knowledge database that can simultaneously protect proprietary data while allowing sponsor companies to understand safety issues and problems of previously developed/failed drug programs. While profound scientific and medical challenges face the FDA and industry, the first step to reducing development times and associated costs and facilitating innovation is to provide an efficient regulatory process that reduces unnecessary uncertainty and delays due to lack of communication and interaction. |
| JEL: | I1 H11 K23 |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11425&r=law |
| By: | OECD Economics Department |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an assessment of the impact of a package of structural reforms in the European Union and the United States on long-run trade and output gains accruing to OECD countries. The package includes reforms that reduce competition-restraining regulations, cut tariff barriers and ease restrictions on foreign direct investment to "best practice" levels in the OECD area. The analysis, which is based on earlier OECD studies, indicates that such reforms could lead to gains in GDP per capita in both transatlantic areas of up to 3 to 3 ½ per cent. Moreover, due to trade linkages, the benefits of reforms in the United States and the European Union would spread to other OECD countries, with an estimated increase in GDP per capita of up to 1½ per cent. As the analysis is confined to a relatively narrow set of policies and abstracts from potential dynamic effects from reform-induced increase in innovation, the overall gains from broad reforms could be significantly higher than reported in the paper. <p> Les bénéfices de la libéralisation des marchés de produits et de la réduction des barrières aux échanges et aux investissements internationaux: le cas des Etats-Unis et de l'Union européenne <p> Ce document offre une évaluation des réformes globales structurelles en Europe et aux États-Unis sur les échanges et la croissance de long terme dans les pays de l'OCDE. Ces réformes incluent l'ensemble des mesures politiques visant la réduction de la réglementation anti-compétitive, la baisse des barrières tarifaires et des restrictions sur les investissements directs étrangers vers les "meilleures pratiques" observées au sein des pays de l'OCDE. L'analyse, qui s'appuie sur de précédents travaux de l'OCDE, montre que de telles réformes peuvent conduire à une augmentation du PIB par habitant entre 3 et 3½ pour cent. De plus, en raison d'effets de transmission via les échanges, le bénéfice des réformes en Europe et aux États-Unis devrait se répandre à l'ensemble des autres pays de l'OCDE conduisant à une augmentation du PIB moyen par habitant de plus de 1½ pour cent. Étant donné que l'analyse ne couvre qu'un nombre de mesures spécifiques et exclut les effets dynamiques potentiels de l'innovation, les bénéfices tirés d'un ensemble de réformes beaucoup plus large pourraient bien être plus élevés que ceux reportés dans ce document. |
| Keywords: | international trade; foreign direct investment; regulation; growth and productivity;United States; European Union |
| JEL: | F13 F21 K2 O4 |
| Date: | 2005–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oed:oecdec:432&r=law |
| By: | Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm and apprehension costs as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for, and impact of, the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a solicitation but otherwise not predisposed to commit a crime. |
| Keywords: | Entrapment, criminal solicitation, law enforcement |
| JEL: | K14 K42 |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-17&r=law |