New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2005‒01‒16
two papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University

  1. Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies By Josef Falkinger
  2. Women Status in Pakistan under Customs and Values & The Controversial Hudood Ordinance 1979 By Rana Riaz Saeed

  1. By: Josef Falkinger
    Abstract: In small groups norm enforcement is provided by mutual punishment and reward. In large societies we have enforcement institutions. This paper shows how such institutions can emerge as a decentralized equilibrium. In a first stage, individuals invest in a public enforcement technology. This technology generates a sanctioning system whose effectiveness depends on the aggregate amount of invested resources. In a second stage, in which individuals contribute to the provision of a public good, the sanctioning system imposes penalties and rewards on deviations from the endogenous norm contribution. It is shown that even if group size goes to infinity public norm enforcement is supported in a noncooperative equilibrium. Psychological factors are not necessary but can be favorable for the emergence of effective public norm enforcement.
    Keywords: norm enforcement, public goods, institutions, sanctioning
    JEL: H41 K40 Z13
    Date: 2004
  2. By: Rana Riaz Saeed (Development Advocates & Lobbyists)
    JEL: K
    Date: 2005–01–11

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