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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Fábio Augusto Reis Gomes; Lourenço Senne Paz |
| Abstract: | In this paper an exploratory research of the determinants of criminal victimization in São Paulo state is conducted using the life-style and opportunity models with Seade's 1998 Pesquisa de Condição de Vida (Life Condition Survey). São Paulo is the most populous Brazilian state with 37 million inhabitants, responding for more than one third of the Brazilian GDP. Our results indicate that the life-style and opportunity models had a good fitting to the data. As expected, the likelihood of being a burglary/larceny victim is increasing in income and if the person is male, and it decreases if the person is married and has few years of schooling. In relation to assault, the victimization likelihood increases considerably if the person is asian, single or divorced, and foreigner, on the other hand, it is decreasing in income and years of schooling, and it is smaller for black or multi-racial background people. |
| JEL: | K40 O17 K42 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2004:147&r=law |
| By: | Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez; Mario Jorge Cardoso de Mendonça; Adolfo Sachsida; Paulo Roberto Amorim Loureiro |
| Abstract: | The objective of this study is to shed light on the determinants of criminality in Brazil. In order to undertake it we performed an econometric model based in panel data analysis for Brazilian states: Among the major conclusions we have an important result that income inequality plays an important role in criminality. Results also showed that unemployment and urbanization are positively related to crime factors. Based in panel data GMM methodology we found the existence of "inertial effect" on criminality. Panel data GMM estimator was also used to control the existence of endogeneity related to the variable public security. In this case, the results showed that public security spending is effective to diminishes criminality. Contrary to the common wisdom, we cannot found evidence that poverty increases violent crime. Finally considering the results from the Granger causality tests, it was possible to show that inequality causes crime in fact and not the contrary, what supports that the income inequality in an inequivocous determinant of criminality. |
| JEL: | K42 Z13 C23 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2004:149&r=law |
| By: | Paul Tang; Gerard Verweij |
| Abstract: | The Netherlands wants to reduce the administrative burden for businesses between 2003 and 2007 with a quarter. With the aid of the so called Standard Cost Model, the burden is estimated to amount to 16.4 billion euro in 2002. This is about 3.6 % of the Dutch gross domestic product (GDP). However, a significant part of the administrative burden, over 40% of the total, is the direct result of international, mainly European legislation. This makes the reduction of the administrative burden a European issue. Besides, a reduction in one member state may affect the economies in other member states. <P> This memorandum considers the direct and indirect effects of reducing the administrative burden on firms. Reducing the burden is expected among other things to boost investment, adding to the increase in production and labour productivity. For an individual country a unilateral reduction probably has different effects than a reduction that is part of a co-ordinated, European effort to scale down the administrative burden of government regulations. <P> To assess the indirect effects, within the economy of the European Union and between European economies, we employ the CPB’s general-equilibrium model WorldScan, which simultaneously takes account of the different product and factor markets in the world economy and which models many European economies in detail. The Netherlands is one of the very few countries, which currently has detailed information on the administrative burden of government regulations. Therefore, we assume that the key figures for the Netherlands also hold for the other member states of the European Union. This assumption implies that for the whole European Union an administrative burden exists of 340 billion euro in 2002. Better data for other member states are needed to arrive at a complete assessment of direct and indirect effects. <P> Conclusions <P> Based on Dutch data, reducing the administrative burden with 25% leads to a 1.7% increase in real GDP for the European Union. The long-term effect is higher than the initial impact, since the reduction induces extra capital accumulation and brings spillovers from extra R&D. The production growth is not fully translated into welfare gains. The gap between the two follows from a loss in terms-of-trade, but is generally small. For individual EU-25 member states the effects are broadly similar. <P> The simulations show that the gains from a co-ordinated reduction are somewhat larger than from a unilateral reduction. The main reason is not terms-of-trade effects but rather spillovers from extra R&D investment. The macro-economic results do not change when an alternative, uneven distribution of the administrative burden on sectors is assumed. With this alternative distribution agriculture and services see the largest gains in production. |
| Keywords: | administrative burden; deregulation. europe; european union; international trade |
| JEL: | D58 E6 F4 K20 |
| Date: | 2004–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpb:memodm:93&r=law |
| By: | Kanning,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004008&r=law |
| By: | Kanning,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004009&r=law |
| By: | Bijl,P.W.J. de; Peitz,M. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004010&r=law |
| By: | Bijl,P.W.J. de (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004011&r=law |
| By: | Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.; Khursed,A. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004012&r=law |
| By: | Goergen,M.; Renneboog,L.; Correia da Silva,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004013&r=law |
| By: | Goergen,M.; Manjon,M.C.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004014&r=law |
| By: | Calcagno,R.; Renneboog,L. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004015&r=law |
| By: | Franken,S. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004016&r=law |
| By: | Franken,S.F. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004017&r=law |
| By: | Motchenkova,E. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004019&r=law |
| By: | Motchenkova,E. (TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center)) |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2004020&r=law |
| By: | Alexey Savvateev |
| Abstract: | The author models the interaction between the “Center”, represented by inspectors, and free riders in local trains (“hares” in the Russian slang). In order to characterize the optimal deterring strategy of the Center, one must look into the nature the interaction among parties in this game. After accomplishing this task, the author considers a more general class of phenomena that are intimately related to the one just described. Such phenomena will be analyzed in the framework of a “Center-offenders” model (a special case of the “Crime and Punishment” problem). The appropriate solution concept may be called a “natural Stackelberg solution”. |
| JEL: | K14 K42 |
| Date: | 2003–04–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eer:wpalle:00-103e&r=law |
| By: | Yury Andrienko |
| Abstract: | Is development criminogenic? Presented model of criminal behavior in the economy with heterogeneous agents shows, that economic development (wealth increase) is accompanied with crime growth, whereas reduction in inequity (inequality in distribution of wealth) and higher human development (rise of honesty, measured by the level of education) lead to lower crime rate. These hypotheses will be tested on data from international crime victim surveys. |
| JEL: | K14 K42 |
| Date: | 2003–07–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eer:wpalle:01-214e&r=law |
| By: | Adriana Breccia (University of York) |
| Abstract: | A crucial aspect of debt restructuring is the redistribution of value among many diverse interests, differing in priority, collateral and bargaining power. Focusing on renegotiable debt contracts in a continuous-time framework, we characterise the U.S corporate bankruptcy renegotiation (Chapter 11) in a game-theoretic framework. In formal bankruptcy, the equity holders can renegotiate with one creditor at a time. Unlike previous studies, this allows us to endogenise not only the bankruptcy threshold but also the impairment strategy. Moreover, our game-theoretic setting allows us to explicitly introduce and accommodate varying bargaining powers of claimants. First, we show that there exists a unique sequence of equilibrium restructuring plans and impairment strategies which allows us to derive simple and intuitive closed-form solutions for pricing different classes of debt. Secondly, the model provides a theoretical explanation for cases of seniority reversal. Thirdly, we derive sufficient conditions for the senior credit spread to be smaller than the junior one at all levels of the state variable. |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0411&r=law |
| By: | Johan N. M. Lagerlof (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London); Paul Heidhues (WZB Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority’s decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that takes the influence activities into consideration. |
| Keywords: | lobbying, rent seeking, asymmetric information, disclosure, ef- ficiency gains, antitrust. |
| JEL: | D72 D82 K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hol:holodi:0424&r=law |
| By: | Pierre, Gaëlle (World Bank); Scarpetta, Stefano (World Bank and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we present evidence on how employers perceive labor regulations and react when these are perceived to constrain the operation of their firm. The paper draws from harmonized surveys of (up to) 17,000 firms around the world, and compares employers’ responses with actual labor legislation. We find that employers’ concerns about labor regulations are closely matched by the relative stringency of de jure labor laws. Countries that have, from an international perspective, tight labor regulations tend to have higher proportions of employers reporting these regulations as severe constraints. But not all firms are affected in the same way by onerous labor regulations. Medium sized firms are those whose business and prospect for growth are most negatively affected. Similarly, innovating firms are disproportionally affected by tight labor regulations. There is also clear evidence in the data that firms facing tight regulations invest more in training and make greater use of temporary employment. Small firms mainly rely on temporary employment, while medium and large firms, as well as innovating firms, tend to rely more on on-the-job training if labor regulations make hiring and firing very costly. |
| Keywords: | employment protection indices, firms surveys, training, temporary employment |
| JEL: | J23 J65 K31 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1424&r=law |
| By: | Andreas Panagopoulos |
| Abstract: | Patents act as an incentive to innovate. However, as this paper argues, patents can lead the patent holder to rest on his laurels and at the same time discourage some innovators from innovating, reducing knowledge spillovers. The combined result of the above suggests an inverse U relationship between patent protection and output growth. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual property, patent races, growth. |
| JEL: | K0 O11 |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:uobdis:04/565&r=law |
| By: | Gianfranco Domenighetti; Jacqueline Quaglia; Annamaria Fahrlaender; Michele Tomamichel; Alain Kiener |
| Abstract: | This study measures, on a representative sample of employees in the banking sector (N=428), the prevalence of 18 work condition factors which may have an influence on the levels of stress and insecurity. The analysis then points out the relationship between these two latter factors and 16 health indicators of subjective morbidity and medical consumption. The main results show a significant increase in the prevalence of subjective morbidity and medical consumption with the increase in exposure to a "medium to high" level of fear of dismissal and to a continuous level of stress in the previous 12 months. The comparative analysis carried out on a representative sample of employees in other economic sectors (N=859) shows that employees in the banking sector declare higher levels of stress and insecurity and show evidence of significantly worse health indicators with respect to those of employees working in other sectors. |
| Keywords: | economic development; labour market; unemployment; job insecurity; deprivation; health; public health; health impact assessment |
| JEL: | A13 E24 E60 H10 I12 I30 J20 J6 K2 L20 O11 |
| Date: | 2004–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:04.14&r=law |
| By: | Andreas Panagopoulos |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces the idea that strong patent protection can lead innovators to rest on their laurels, into a simple tournament based framework. Concentrating on optimal patent protection, the one that maximizes production, the model shows that there is a positive relationship between the ability of the economy (firm) to innovate and how strong patent protection should be. This line of thinking runs counter to the uniÞed intellectual property regime, as introduced by TRIPS. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual property, sequential innovation, tournaments. |
| JEL: | K0 O11 |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:uobdis:04/566&r=law |
| By: | Xinyu Hua; Kathryn E. Spier |
| Abstract: | The information created and disseminated through the litigation process can have social value. Suppose a long-lived plaintiff is suing a defendant for damages sustained in an accident. The plaintiff may suffer similar damages in future accidents involving different defendants. Potential injurers update their beliefs after observing the first case and subsequently fine-tune their precautions to avoid accidents. The joint incentive of the plaintiff and the first defendant to create public information through litigation is too small. The optimal liability rule trades off providing future injurers with incentives to take precautions and providing the plaintiff with incentives to create information. |
| JEL: | K13 K41 D83 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10943&r=law |
| By: | Robert Bornholz; James J. Heckman |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the economic and statistical foundations of proposed tests for discrimination. We focus on extension of disparate impact doctrine to new domains. |
| JEL: | K32 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10946&r=law |
| By: | Nicola Persico; Petra Todd |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the use of outcomes-based tests for detecting racial bias in the context of police searches of motor vehicles. It shows that the test proposed in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) can also be applied in a more general environment where police officers are heterogenous in their tastes for discrimination and in their costs of search and motorists are heterogeneous in their benefits and costs from criminal behavior. We characterize the police and motorist decision problems in a game theoretic framework and establish properties of the equilibrium. We also extend the model to the case where drivers' characteristics are mutable in the sense that drivers can adapt some of their characteristics to reduce the probability of being monitored. After developing the theory that justifies the application of outcomes-based tests, we apply the tests to data on police searches of motor vehicles gathered by the Wichita Police deparment. The empirical findings are consistent with the notion that police in Wichita choose their search strategies to maximize successful searches, and not out of racial bias. |
| JEL: | J70 K42 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10947&r=law |
| By: | Juan José Ganuza; Fernando Gómez |
| Abstract: | We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assuming that the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as due care the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth of the injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potential injurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level of care, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extend the basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimal general standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show the conditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of care for accidents. |
| Keywords: | Accidents, limited liability and negligence rule |
| JEL: | K13 K23 L51 H24 |
| Date: | 2003–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:759&r=law |
| By: | Benito Arruñada; Veneta Andonova |
| Abstract: | We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders. |
| Keywords: | Legal systems, institutional development, law enforcement |
| JEL: | K40 N40 O10 |
| Date: | 2004–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:768&r=law |
| By: | Jay Pil Choi |
| Abstract: | Tying arrangements recently have been a major and contentious issue in many high profile antitrust cases in the US and Europe. Examples include the Microsoft case, the Visa and MasterCard case, and the proposed GE/Honeywell merger to name a few. This paper conducts a selective review of the recent developments in the analysis of tying arrangements. It also discusses relevant antitrust cases concerned with tying arrangements in light of recent theoretical advances in this area. |
| JEL: | K21 L10 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1336&r=law |
| By: | Eric Neumayer |
| Abstract: | After the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights, many global and regional human rights treaties have been concluded. Critics argue, based on economic and neo-realist theories, that these are unlikely to have made any actual difference in reality. Others contend that international regimes can improve respect for human rights in state parties. Only two empirical studies exist and they paint a pessimistic picture, suggesting there is no effect or, perversely, even a negative effect of treaty ratification on respect for human rights. This study employs an improved research design and tackles the question more comprehensively, addressing reservations and derogations as well as taking potential reverse causality into account. The results are complex and it matters which treaty and which aspect of human rights one looks at as well as how stringent the empirical test is. On the whole, however, this is the first study to find that ratification of human rights treaties often improves respect for human rights. |
| JEL: | K |
| Date: | 2004–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0411003&r=law |
| By: | Dennis Epple; Holger Sieg |
| Abstract: | Research over the past several years has led to development of models characterizing equilibrium in a system of local jurisdictions. More recently, there have been a number of studies which have tried to estimate these models. The evidence suggests that simple parametric models can explain the observed sorting of individuals by income among local jurisdictions reasonably well. One drawback of the approach adopted in most empirical studies is that identification of important parameters of the model may be primarily due to functional form assumptions which are hard to evaluate. In this paper, we provide a discussion of identification and estimation of hierarchical equilibrium models in a semi-parametric framework. We show that a broad class of models is identified without imposing strong parametric restriction on the distribution of unobserved tastes for local public goods. We then extend the framework and consider a broad class of non-hierarchical model. Our results suggest that identification of non-hierarchical model may ultimately have to rely on stronger assumptions on the distribution of unobserved tastes for public goods than those used in hierarchical models. |
| Date: | 2002–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:-311829589&r=law |