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on Central and South America |
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Issue of 2012‒11‒11
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Alzúa, María Laura (CEDLAS-UNLP); Cruces, Guillermo (CEDLAS-UNLP); Ripani, Laura (Inter-American Development Bank) |
| Abstract: | This study looks at the effect of welfare programs on work incentives and the adult labor supply in developing countries. The analysis builds on the experimental evaluations of three programs implemented in rural areas: Mexico's PROGRESA, Nicaragua's RPS and Honduras' PRAF. Comparable results for the three countries indicate that the effects that the programs have had on the labor supply of participating adults have been mostly negative but are nonetheless small and not statistically significant. However, the evidence does point to the presence of other effects on labor markets. In the case of PROGRESA, there is a small positive effect on the number of hours worked by female beneficiaries and a sizeable increase in wages among male beneficiaries and a resulting increase in household labor income. Moreover, PROGRESA seems to have reduced female labor-force participation in ineligible households. These results imply that large-scale interventions may have broader equilibrium effects. |
| Keywords: | welfare programs, income support, labor supply, work incentives, conditional cash transfers, randomized control trials, developing countries |
| JEL: | J08 J22 I38 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6959&r=lam |
| By: | Bruno Cézar Araújo |
| Abstract: | Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar a evolução das políticas de apoio à inovação no Brasil, bem como suas medidas de apoio direto e indireto e seu arcabouço institucional de formulação e implementação dos incentivos à inovação. Apesar dos explícitos esforços governamentais desde 2003 e do chamado "boom científico" brasileiro, os indicadores de inovação não mudaram dramaticamente na última década se comparada à anterior. Algumas hipóteses para explicar isto são expostas na última seção, que deverão ser objeto de exploração futura: i) os indicadores de inovação no Brasil são limitados pela estrutura setorial; ii) mesmo com impactos positivos sobre o esforço de inovação relatados pela literatura, a escala dos instrumentos de apoio à inovação é muito reduzida em comparação ao público potencial, e o foco dos instrumentos também não é claramente direcionado às empresas com potencial inovador; e iii) há obstáculos institucionais que prejudicam a efetividade dos instrumentos. Palavras-chave: Políticas de inovação, indicadores de inovação, avaliação de impacto de políticas públicas. This article aims to analyze the evolution of innovation policies in Brazil, as well as its measures of direct and indirect support and its institutional framework. Despite the explicit government efforts since 2003 and the so-called "scientific-boom", Brazilian innovation indicators have not changed dramatically in the last decade compared to earlier. Some hypotheses to explain this are discussed in the last section, which should be objects of further exploration: i) innovation indicators in Brazil are limited by the industry structure; ii) even with positive impacts on innovation efforts reported by the literature, the scale of instruments to support innovation is very low compared to the potential audience, and the focus of the instruments is not clearly directed to companies with innovative potential; and iii) there are institutional barriers that hinder the effectiveness of the instruments. Keywords: Innovation policies, innovation indicators, impact evaluation of public policies. |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1759&r=lam |
| By: | Felipe Barrera; Dario Maldonado; Catherine Rodríguez |
| Abstract: | Resumen |
| Date: | 2012–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000092:010078&r=lam |
| By: | Palma, J.G. |
| Abstract: | As soon as international financial markets felt reassured in 2003 by the surprisingly neoliberal orientation of President Lula’s government, the ‘spot-the-new-Latin-tiger’ financial brigade became dazzled by Brazil — they just couldn’t have enough of it. So much so, that they had little difficulty in turning a blind eye to the obvious fact that (except for several commodities, finance, and a small number of other activities) Brazil’s economic performance since the beginning of neo-liberal reforms (c.1990) had been remarkably poor. This not only contrasted with its own performance pre-1980, but also with what was happening in Asia. I shall argue that the weakness of the new neo-liberal paradigm is rooted as much in its intrinsic flaws as in the particular way it was implemented. As in the rest of Latin America, Brazil’s economic reforms were undertaken primarily as a result of its perceived economic weaknesses — i.e., there was an attitude of ‘throwing in the towel’ vis-à-vis the previous state-led import substituting industrialisation strategy, because most politicians and economists interpreted the 1982 debt crisis as conclusive evidence that it had led the region into a cul-de-sac. As Hirschman has argued, policy-making has a strong component of ‘path-dependency’; as a result, people often stick with policies after they have achieved their aims, and those policies have become counterproductive. This leads to such frustration and disappointment with existing policies and institutions that is not uncommon to lead to a ‘rebound effect’. An extreme example of this phenomenon is post-1982 Latin America, where the core of the discourse that followed ended up simply emphasising the need to reverse as many aspects of the previous development strategy as possible. This helps to explain the peculiar set of priorities, the rigidity and the messianic attitude with which the reforms were implemented in Brazil, as well as their poor outcome. As the then President of Brazil’s Central Bank explained at the time, their main task was “...to undo forty years of stupidity.” With this ‘reverse-gear’ attitude, this experiment in economic reform almost inevitably ended up as an exercise in ‘not-very-creative-destruction’ — especially vis-à-vis its manufacturing industry. Something very different happened in Asia, where economic reforms were often intended (rightly or wrongly) as a more targeted and pragmatic mechanism to overcome specific economic and financial constraints. Instead of implementing reforms as a mechanism to reverse existing industrialisation strategies, in Asia they were put into practice in order to continue and strengthen ambitious processes of industrialisation. Although the Brazilian economy has been unable to deliver sustainable productivity-growth since the beginning of economic reforms (just a few short growth-dashes), Brazilian-style neo-liberal capitalism became unrivalled when it came to offering world-class commodities, an abundance of precarious (mostly service) jobs, stylish retail, extremely lucrative finance, and the ‘purity of beliefs.’ |
| Keywords: | Ideology, Neo-liberalism, Productivity, Employment, Investment, Income distribution, Premature De-industrialisation, ‘middle-income trap’, financialisation. |
| JEL: | B52 D31 E20 F13 F59 H54 J20 L50 N16 N36 O16 O40 P50 |
| Date: | 2012–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1248&r=lam |
| By: | Guilherme Mendes Resende |
| Abstract: | O objetivo deste estudo é combinar micro e macroavaliações dos Fundos Constitucionais de Financiamento do Nordeste (FNE) focando a análise no caso do estado do Ceará com vistas a controlar pela heterogeneidade espacial. Busca-se mensurar os impactos dos empréstimos do FNE-industrial sobre o crescimento do emprego e o crescimento da produtividade do trabalho em nível micro (empresa) e o crescimento do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) per capita em nível macro (municipal) durante os anos de 2000- 2003 e 2000-2006. O estudo do caso do Ceará pode ajudar na melhor interpretação dos resultados obtidos para a região Nordeste como um todo. Sabe-se que, na presença de heterogeneidade espacial, os resultados podem variar ao longo do espaço, por exemplo, de um estado para outro. De fato, os resultados sugerem que os micro e macroimpactos do FNE-industrial no estado do Ceará apresentam uma magnitude maior daqueles observados para toda a região Nordeste. Palavras-chave: avaliação de impacto; FNE; Ceará. The main goal of this paper is to combine micro and macro-evaluations of the Constitutional Financing Funds for the Northeast (FNE) focusing on the analysis of Ceará state in order to control for spatial heterogeneity. It aims to measure the impact of the FNE industrial loans on employment and labour productivity growth at the micro (firm) level and on GDP per capita growth at macro (municipalities) levels for the 2000-2003 and 2000-2006 periods. The case of Ceará may help to better understand the results obtained for the Northeast region as a whole. In fact, the results suggest that micro and macro-impacts of FNE-industrial in the state of Ceará have a higher magnitude than those observed in the Northeast region as a whole. Keywords: impact evaluation; FNE; Ceará. |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1777&r=lam |
| By: | Rafael Guerreiro Osório; Pedro H. G. Ferreira de Souza |
| Abstract: | O objetivo deste trabalho é documentar a evolução da pobreza extrema e da desigualdade na Bahia. A pobreza extrema e a desigualdade de renda na Bahia tiveram duas quedas expressivas de 1995 a 2009, em períodos coincidentes, mas de extensão temporal diferente. A primeira queda ocorreu a partir de 1996. No caso da pobreza extrema, foi uma queda abrupta de 1996 a 1997, enquanto a desigualdade prosseguiu em queda até 1999. Depois de 1997 e 1999, respectivamente, ambas se estabilizaram até 2003, quando ocorreu a segunda queda. Desta feita, a desigualdade caiu abruptamente de 2003 a 2004, e a pobreza extrema esteve em queda até 2006. Após a segunda queda, ficaram no novo patamar até 2009. A desigualdade medida pelo coeficiente de Gini estacionou em torno de 0,55, e a taxa de pobreza extrema, em torno de 10% da população estadual. Herein a characterization of the evolution of extreme poverty and income inequality in Bahia is presented. Extreme poverty and income inequality in Bahia fell twice from 1995 to 2009, in roughly the same periods, but at different pace. The first fall begins in 1996. For extreme poverty, it was a sudden fall ending in 1997, whilst inequality kept falling till 1999. After 1997 e 1999, extreme poverty and income inequality were stagnant up to 2003, when the second fall starts. This time, the income inequality fall was abrupt and ended in 2004, while extreme poverty diminished until 2006. The second fall took both to a lower level where they remained in 2009. Inequality measured by the Gini coefficient was stable about 0,55, and the extreme poverty rate was around 10% of the state population. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1696&r=lam |