By: |
Maria Claudia Lopez (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN);
James J. Murphy (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK);
John M Spraggon (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst);
John K. Stranlund (Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst) |
Abstract: |
In this paper we describe a field experiment conducted among mollusk
harvesters in a community on the Pacific Coast of Columbia. The experiment is
based on a standard linear public good and consists of two stages. In the
first stage we compare the ability of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions among
community members to increase contributions to the public good. In the second
stage we add a government regulation with either a high or low sanction for
noncompliance to community enforcement efforts. The results for the first
stage are consistent with other comparisons of monetary and nonmonetary
sanctions within groups; both led to higher contributions. The results from
the second stage reveal that government regulations always complemented
community enforcement efforts. While the subjects tended to reduce their
sanctioning efforts under the government regulations, contributions and
earnings were significantly higher than without government interventions. In
fact, the combination of community and government enforcement efforts
generated near-perfect contributions to the public good. However, more
research into the combined roles of government intervention and community
enforcement efforts is needed because the complementarity we find may be
situation-specific. |
Keywords: |
Field experiments, public goods, government regulation, community enforcement |
JEL: |
C93 H41 Q2 |
Date: |
2008–07 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dre:wpaper:2008-4&r=lam |