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on Central and South America |
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Issue of 2008‒06‒27
three papers chosen by |
| By: | Yezid HERNÁNDEZ LUNA |
| Abstract: | En el trabajo se estudian los efectos redistributivos de las remesas enviadas al país desde el extranjero y su impacto en la pobreza en seis regiones y en el nivel nacional. Los hallazgos indican que la magnitud del impacto, de un incremento del 10% en las remesas, es distinto según el grado de difusión de la migración que presente cada zona, es decir, la cantidad de hogares en los deciles de ingreso más bajos que tengan acceso a estos recursos. Para ello, se sigue la metodología de descomposición del coeficiente de Gini y de los índices de pobreza FGT (0, 1 y 2) por fuentes de ingreso. En las regiones Central (incluye el Eje Cafetero) y Oriental se observa que los hogares de los deciles más bajos no tienen acceso a los mercados laborales internacionales, razón por la cual el efecto del incremento porcentual en las remesas no es significativo ni en la desigualdad ni en la pobreza. Antioquia y Atlántico, en cambio, muestran mayores niveles relativos de experiencia migratoria; por ello, el impacto de las remesas extranjeras, aunque moderadamente bajo, disminuye la pobreza y la desigualdad. Las remesas internas exhiben un efecto mucho más redistributivo y atenuador de la pobreza, en la medida en que esta fuente de recursos es una opción real para diversificar el ingreso, en los hogares más pobres. |
| Date: | 2008–06–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000118:004733&r=lam |
| By: | Claudio Agostini (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado); Eduardo Saavedra (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado); Manuel Willington (ILADES-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado) |
| Abstract: | In September 2005, the Chilean Competition Authority filed a complaint against the 5 largest private health insurance providers for violation of antitrust laws. The 5 providers were accused of colluding to reduce the coverage of the plans offered to customers between March 2002 and March 2003. The main fact is that during that period these 5 providers reduced the coverage offered from 100% for hospitalization and 80% for ambulatory care to 90% and 70% respectively. As usual the observation of parallel conduct is not enough to infer collusion and it is required to observe additional factors that allow us to reject the hypothesis of providers behaving competitively. In this paper, we show that some specific characteristics of the health insurance markets generate barriers to entry and switching costs that allow the possibility of a collusive agreement. Then, we adapt an imperfect competition model of product differentiation to derive some testable propositions that allow us to distinguish between competition and collusion outcomes in the health insurance market in Chile. Finally, we show econometric evidence consistent with a collusive agreement among the 5 largest providers and inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium. . In particular, by comparing the prosecuted and non-prosecuted open Isapres before and during the collusive period, we show that sales efforts of the accused Isapres were reduced during the transition period toward lower-quality plans, that the profitability of the two groups of Isapres increased, and that the rate of transfers within the group of accused Isapres fell during the transition period. |
| Keywords: | Tacit Collusion, Isapres, Health Insurance, Conscious Parallelism, Plus Factors. |
| JEL: | L41 D43 I11 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ila:ilades:inv206&r=lam |
| By: | Gustavo Yamada; Juan F. Castro; Arlette Beltran; Maria A. Cardenas |
| Abstract: | We propose a model that accounts for the potential feedback between schooling performance, human capital accumulation and long run GDP growth, and links these results with poverty incidence. Our simulation exercise takes into account targets for education indicators and GDP growth itself (as arguments in our planner's loss function) and provides two conclusions: (i) with additional funds which amount to 1 percent of GDP each year, public intervention could, by year 2015, add an extra 0.89 and 1.80 percentage points in terms of long-run GDP growth and permanent reduction in poverty incidence, respectively; and (ii) in order to engineer an intervention in the educational sector so as to transfer households the necessary assets to attain a larger income generation potential in the long run, we need to extend the original set of MDG indicators to account for access to higher educational levels besides primary education. |
| Keywords: | Millennium development goals, education, human capital, GDP growth, poverty, Peru |
| JEL: | O41 I32 C25 C41 C61 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:mpiacr:2008-05&r=lam |