| By: |
Araujo, M. Caridad;
Ferreira, Francisco H.G.;
Lanjouw, Peter;
Ozler, Berk |
| Abstract: |
This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund
investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets
on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and
province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of project
choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with
the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive
projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as
latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to
receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these
results are sensitive to the specific measure of inequality used in the
empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the
distribution. |
| Keywords: |
Rural Poverty Reduction,Economic Theory & Research,Population Policies,Services & Transfers to Poor,Poverty Monitoring & Analysis |
| Date: |
2006–08–01 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3997&r=lam |